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Computational complexity theory aims to understand what problems can be efficiently
solved by computation. This thesis studies computational complexity in the model of Boolean
circuits. Boolean circuits provide a basic mathematical model for computation and play a
central role in complexity theory, with important applications in separations of complexity
classes, algorithm design, and pseudorandom constructions. In this thesis, we investigate
various types of circuit models such as threshold circuits, Boolean formulas, and their ex-
tensions, focusing on obtaining complexity-theoretic lower bounds and algorithmic upper
bounds for these circuits.
• Algorithms and lower bounds for generalized threshold circuits. We extend
the study of linear threshold circuits, circuits with gates computing linear thresh-
old functions, to the more powerful model of polynomial threshold circuits where the
gates can compute polynomial threshold functions. We obtain hardness and meta-
algorithmic results for this circuit model, including strong average-case lower bounds,
satisfiability algorithms, and derandomization algorithms for constant-depth polyno-
mial threshold circuits with super-linear wire complexity.
• Algorithms and lower bounds for enhanced formulas. We investigate the
model of Boolean formulas whose leaf gates can compute complex functions. In par-
ticular, we study De Morgan formulas whose leaf gates are functions with “low com-
munication complexity”. Such gates can capture a broad class of functions including
symmetric functions and polynomial threshold functions. We obtain new and improved
results in terms of lower bounds and meta-algorithms (satisfiability, derandomization,
and learning) for such enhanced formulas.
• Circuit lower bounds for MCSP. We study circuit lower bounds for the Minimum
Circuit Size Problem (MCSP), the fundamental problem of deciding whether a given
function (in the form of a truth table) can be computed by small circuits. We get new
and improved lower bounds for MCSP that nearly match the best-known lower bounds
against several well-studied circuit models such as Boolean formulas and constant-
depth circuits.
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Computational complexity theory aims to understand the amount of computational re-
sources (time, memory, randomness, etc.) needed to solve natural problems. This leads to
the study of complexity classes that classify problems under the constraints of different
resources:
• The class P contains problems that can be solved by a computer whose running time
is polynomial-bounded in the input size of the problem.
• By allowing computers to use randomness (the ability to toss random coins), we
get probabilistic computers, and the corresponding class of polynomial-time solvable
problems is called BPP.
• The class NP are problems that can be solved in polynomial-time by a computer with
non-determinism (the ability to “guess”).
• By allowing computers to utilize quantum bits (qubits), we get quantum computers,
and the class of polynomial-time solvable problems in such a model is called BQP.
While each of the above complexity classes is interesting by itself as it characterizes
many important problems in computing science, the relationships between these complexity
classes are unclear, and this forms the most fundamental questions in complexity theory:
• What is the role of non-determinism in computation (P vs. NP)?
• How useful is randomness (P vs. BPP)?




Answering the above questions requires to prove lower bounds against Turing machines, the
mathematical abstraction of modern computers. That is, we need to find a problem (e.g.,
some problem in NP) that cannot be solved by any Turing machine that runs in less than a
certain amount of time (e.g., polynomial time). However, the “unstructured” characteristics
of Turing machines (or computer programs) makes them notoriously difficult to analyze in a
“non-black-box” manner, and it is known that “black-box” techniques by themselves cannot
resolve questions such as P vs. NP (This is known as the Relativization Barrier [BGS75]).
Boolean circuits is a computational model that is considered to be mathematically more
“structured” than Turing machines and has been intensively studied in complexity theory.
A Boolean circuit consists of a collection of gates, such as AND, OR, and NOT, which
take as input either two bits (for AND or OR) or one bit (for NOT) and output one bit,
where bits are values in {0, 1}. These gates are connected by wires, each of which transmits
the value from the output of one gate to the input of another gate. A Boolean circuit
naturally computes some Boolean function; a Boolean function takes a binary input string
and outputs one bit. For a Boolean function (representing some computational problem),
we are interested in the minimum size (measured by either the number of gates or wire) and
depth (length of the longest path from the output gate to any input variable) of a circuit
computing the function.
P 6= NP from circuit lower bounds. It can be shown that every problem in P can
also be computed by polynomial-size circuits. One way to show P 6= NP is to prove a lower
bound for NP against polynomial-size circuits. That is, find a problem in NP that cannot
be solved by any polynomial-size circuit.
Derandomization from circuit lower bounds. Proving circuit lower bounds also
has consequences for the P vs. BPP question. A beautiful line of research in the area of
derandomization shows that proving a certain strong (but plausible) circuit lower bound
would imply P = BPP [NW94, IW97].
Quantum computing and circuit complexity. For the question of quantum versus
classical computers, it is natural to address this question by finding a problem that can be
efficiently solved by a quantum computer but lacks efficient circuits (see, e.g., [BGH07,
WKST19]). Another connection between quantum computing and circuits complexity can
be found in the recent breakthrough result of [RT19], which showed a separation of BQP and
PH (Polynomial Hierarchy, a generalization of the class NP) in the “black-box model”. The
proof of this result crucially made use of analytical results from classical circuit complexity.
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1.3 Meta-computational problems
An important line of research in circuit complexity is the study of meta-computational
problems. Informally, these are problems whose input or output are computational devices
(e.g., circuits). Apart from being important algorithmic problems in their own right, meta-
computational problems are intimately related to the task of proving circuit lower bounds.
For example, “non-trivial” algorithms for such problems often imply circuit lower bounds.
Therefore, studying the algorithmic aspects of these problems is beneficial because this
allows us to use our knowledge of algorithm design, which is much more extensive than
our knowledge of proving lower bounds, to obtain circuit lower bounds. We briefly describe
below some well-studied meta-computational problems.
Satisfiability. The (circuit) satisfiability problem (or Circuit-SAT) asks to determine
whether a given Boolean circuit has a satisfying assignment. As a canonical NP-complete
problem, it is not believed to have a polynomial-time (or subexponential-time) algorithm.
However, it is still very interesting to look for nontrivial algorithms for Circuit-SAT running
faster than exhaustive search. More specifically, is there an algorithm that, given a circuit
of polynomial-size on n variables, runs in time at most 2n/nω(1) and determines whether it
has a satisfying assignment?
It turns out that this task is challenging even for very restricted classes of circuits.
The difficulty of obtaining such a satisfiability algorithm can be partially explained by
the work of Williams [Wil13, Wil14b] showing that a Circuit-SAT algorithm faster than
exhaustive search for a given class of circuits can often be used to prove nontrivial circuit
lower bounds against that same class of circuits (given that the class of circuits satisfies
some mild conditions).
Derandomization. A fundamental problem in complexity theory is to give an efficient
deterministic algorithm for computing the majority output value of a given Boolean cir-
cuit, under the promise that the fraction of minority-value inputs to the circuit is at most
1/3. That is, given a circuit that outputs some unknown value b ∈ {0, 1} on all but at
most 1/3 fraction of inputs, we need to determine this majority value b, efficiently and
deterministically.
As for Circuit-SAT, it is also known that a “faster-than-brute-force” algorithm solving
the aforementioned derandomization problem for a circuit class C (satisfying some mild
conditions) implies lower bounds against that class C [KI04, Wil13].
Black-Box Derandomization: Pseudorandom generators. One way to solve the
derandomization problem for a class C of circuits is to construct a pseudorandom generator
(PRG) for C. A PRG for a class C of n-input Boolean circuits is an efficiently deterministi-
cally computable function G mapping short binary strings (seeds) to longer binary strings so
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that every C ∈ C accepts G’s output on a uniformly random seed with about the same prob-
ability as that for an actual uniformly random string. More precisely, we say that a generator
G : {0, 1}r → {0, 1}n ε-fools a class C of Boolean circuits if for every C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
from C
|Pr[C(G(x)) = 1]−Pr[C(y) = 1]| ≤ ε,
for uniformly random x ∈ {0, 1}r and y ∈ {0, 1}n. The parameter r is called the seed length
of the PRG. Then given a PRG that fools C, for every C ∈ C, we can estimate the fraction
of accepted inputs to within an additive error ε, by computing the outputs of PRG for
all possibles seeds and evaluating C on these outputs. This gives a deterministic algorithm
solving the derandomization problem that runs in time approximately 2r.
Note that a PRG yields black-box derandomization in the sense that we do not need to
be given as input a circuit C ∈ C in order to decide the set of 2r query points for C; the set
of 2r query points is the same for all circuits in class C.
Learning. Roughly speaking, the learning problem is to, given a set of random samples
or queries of a target function, output a device that (exactly or approximately) computes
the function. The learning problem has received intensive attention in both applied and
theoretical research. It is also known that learning algorithms for circuits would imply some
kind of circuit lower bounds [FK09, KKO13].
Minimum Circuit Size Problem. The minimum circuit size problem (MCSP) asks if
a given truth table1 represents a function that can be computed by some small-size circuit.
MCSP is a fundamental problem in complexity theory. Despite sustained efforts devoted to
this problem, its exact complexity remains a mystery. In particular, while it is known that
MCSP is in NP, whether MCSP is NP-complete is a widely open question. MCSP also plays
an important role in a recent line of research called hardness magnification, which states
that a weak circuit lower bound for (some variants of) MCSP implies breakthrough results
in circuit complexity.
1.4 The frontiers
Proving circuit lower bounds is known to be a difficult task, and this fact was mathematically
formulated as the Natural Proofs Barrier in circuit complexity [RR97]. Informally, The
Natural Proofs Barrier states that if cryptographically secure pseudorandom functions exist
(which is a central assumption in cryptography), then for any circuit class that is powerful
enough to compute a pseudorandom function, proving lower bounds against that circuit
class requires a technique that does not follow some certain “natural” pattern, which is
1A truth table is a bit-string that stores the output values of a function for all possible inputs.
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presented in almost every currently known method for proving lower bounds. Currently, no
super-linear lower bound is known for general circuits.
Threshold circuits. As the general class of polynomial-size Boolean circuits (a.k.a,
P/poly) seems well beyond the currently known methods for proving lower bounds, the
focus of circuit complexity research has been on various restricted circuit classes. Particu-
larly successful has been the study of constant-depth circuits (which can be thought of as
very efficient parallel nonuniform algorithms).
Different natural sets of gates were considered. For the gates AND, OR, and NOT (where
AND and OR have unbounded fan-in), the resulting circuit class is AC0. A milestone in cir-
cuit complexity was the proof that the parity function on n bits requires exponential-size AC0
circuits (with a matching upper bound also known) [Ajt83, FSS84, Yao85, Hås89]. Adding
the parity gate to AC0 circuits, we get the class AC0[2] with modulo 2 gates. An exponential
lower bound against AC0[2] for the n-bit majority function was shown by Razborov [Raz87],
and was extended by Smolensky [Smo87] to exponential lower bounds against AC0[p], for
an arbitrary prime modulus p > 0. It is still open (though widely believed) whether the
majority function requires exponential size also for the class AC0[m] for any composite mod-
ulus m > 1; significant progress has been recently made by Williams [Wil14b] who showed
that a Boolean function computable in nondeterministic exponential time (NEXP) requires
superpolynomial-size AC0[m] circuits, for any integer modulus m > 1.
Adding the majority gate to AC0 circuits, we get the class TC0, for which no superpoly-
nomial circuit lower bounds are known for any explicit function (not even for a function
in NEXP), despite serious efforts by complexity researchers over the past thirty years. One
reason for our inability to prove strong lower bounds against TC0 stems from the fact
that TC0 is a powerful circuit class, capable of computing many interesting and useful func-
tions: addition, multiplication, division, and sorting (see [Raz92] and the references therein).
Surprisingly, every function computable by a polynomial-size AC0[m] circuit, for any inte-
ger m > 1, has an equivalent depth-3 TC0 circuit of quasipolynomial size [All89, Yao90].
Moreover, TC0 is conjectured to be capable of computing cryptographically secure pseudo-
random function generators [NR04], which, coupled with arguments in [RR97], means that
it is highly unlikely that a “natural” lower bound proof method would work against TC0,
as any such “natural” proof would yield an efficient algorithm to break every candidate
pseudorandom function generator in TC0.
As it seems very difficult to prove superpolynomial lower bounds against TC0, the focus
has shifted to proving fixed-polynomial lower bounds (even for a fixed constant depth, say
depth 2 or 3). Before discussing these results, let us mention another motivation for studying
TC0. Closely related to the majority function is a Linear Threshold Function (LTF), defined
as the sign of a linear (degree 1) polynomial in variables x1, . . . , xn; when the variables xi
assume Boolean values, the resulting LTF is a Boolean function. Note that an LTF may have
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arbitrarily large coefficients (weights) for the underlying linear polynomial, which makes an
LTF provably more powerful than a majority function, or more generally, than an LTF with
small (polynomially bounded) weights [MK61]. On the other hand, somewhat surprisingly,
an arbitrary LTF can be represented by a polynomial-size depth-2 TC0 circuit [GHR92].
Linear Threshold Functions (LTFs) and circuits with LTF gates have been studied since
at least the 1940s in the context of artificial neural networks [MP43] (see [Ant01] and
the references therein). Some of the early lower bounds for LTFs are due to Minsky and
Papert [MP69], who showed, for example, that the parity function cannot be computed by
any LTF.
For constant-depth LTF circuits, two complexity measures have been considered: the
number of gates (excluding the input variables), and the number of wires. The first super-
linear wire complexity bound was obtained by Impagliazzo et al. [IPS97], who showed
that the n-bit parity function requires depth-d LTF circuits with at least n1+εd wires,
where εd = exp(−d). They also showed that the n-bit parity function requires depth-d
LTF circuits with at least (n/2)1/(2(d−1)) gates. Recently, these bounds were generalized to
average-case (correlation) bounds by Chen et al. [CSS18]. For depth-2 LTF circuits, Kane
and Williams [KW16] have recently proved an n3/2/poly(logn) gate complexity bound,
and n5/2/poly(logn) wire complexity bound for an explicit function in P (Andreev’s func-
tion [And87]). More recently, Alman, Chan and Williams [ACW16] and Tamaki [Tam16]
both gave satisfiability algorithms for depth-2 LTF circuits with an almost quadratic num-
ber of gates, and obtained lower bounds against these circuits for an explicit function in
ENP, using the connection between satisfiability algorithms and circuit lower bounds.
De Morgan formulas Another type of restricted circuits that has been intensively stud-
ied is De Morgan formulas. A (De Morgan) formula is a binary tree whose internal nodes are
labelled by AND or OR gates, and whose leaves are marked with a variable or its negation.
The size of a formula is defined to be the number of leaves in the tree. One motivation of
studying formulas is that the class of polynomial-size formulas is equivalent to the class
of (polynomial-size) circuits with logarithmic depth, which captures the notion of efficient
parallel computation. A major open problem in complexity theory is to find a problem in P
that cannot be computed by polynomial-size formulas. Such a lower bound against formulas
would show that there are problems, despite being efficiently solvable, are inherently serial
and have no efficient parallel algorithms. Also, it is worth noting that any function that can
be computed by a constant-depth polynomial-size threshold circuit can also be computed by
some polynomial-size formula, so the Natural Proof Barrier also applies to polynomial-size
formulas.
Despite sustained efforts over the last three decades, the best-known lower bound against
De Morgan formulas is only sub-cubic. Namely, there exists a function in P that requires
formulas of size at least n3−o(1) [Hås98, Tal14, Tal17a, DM18]. The techniques underlying
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these lower bound results have also enabled algorithmic developments. These include a non-
trivial satisfiability algorithms for sub-cubic size formulas [Tal15], learning algorithms for
size-s formulas in time nO(
√
s) [Rei11b], and a pseudorandom generator with seed length
s1/3+o(1) for size-s formulas [IMZ19].
1.5 Contributions and organization of this thesis
This thesis focuses on getting a better understanding of Boolean circuits, by studying com-
plexity lower bounds and meta-algorithms for restricted classes of circuits such as constant-
depth threshold circuits, formulas and extensions. After giving some background in Chap-
ter 2, we present our results in the following structure.
1.5.1 Algorithms and lower bounds for polynomial threshold circuits
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we investigate the class of circuits whose gates compute polyno-
mial threshold functions (PTFs). A PTF is a generalization of LTF to the case of arbitrary
(not necessarily linear) polynomials. We extend the aforementioned results for constant-
depth LTF circuits (i.e., lower bounds, satisfiability, and quantified derandomization) to
the more powerful model of PTF circuits.
• We prove lower bounds against constant-depth circuits with PTF gates of any degree
1 ≤ d
√
logn/ log logn, generalizing the recent bounds against constant-depth LTF
circuits proved by Kane and Williams [KW16] and Chen, Santhanam, and Srinivasan
[CSS18]. In particular, we show that there is an n-variate Boolean function Fn ∈ P
such that every depth-2 circuit with PTF gates of degree d ≥ 1 that computes Fn








(logn)O(d2) wires. For constant depths greater than 2, we
also show average-case lower bounds against such circuits with a super-linear number
of wires. These are the first super-linear bounds on the number of wires for circuits
with PTF gates.
• We give the first zero-error randomized algorithm faster than exhaustive search that
counts the number of satisfying assignments of a given constant-depth circuit with a
super-linear number of wires whose gates are s-sparse PTFs, for s almost quadratic in
the input size of the circuit; here a PTF is called s-sparse if its underlying polynomial
has at most s monomials. More specifically, we show that there exists a constant
ε > 0 such that, given a constant-depth circuit with (n1.99)-sparse PTF gates that
has at most n1+ε wires, the number of satisfying assignments of the circuit can be
computed in randomized time 2n−nε with zero error. This generalizes the result by
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Chen, Santhanam and Srinivasan [CSS18] who gave a SAT algorithm for constant-
depth circuits of super-linear wire complexity with LTF gates only.2
• The quantified derandomization problem, introduced by Goldreich and Wigderson
[GW14], asks to compute the majority output value of a given Boolean circuit, under
the promise that the minority-value inputs to the circuit are very few. We give a
quantified derandomization algorithm for constant-depth PTF circuits with a super-
linear number of wires that runs in quasi-polynomial time. More specifically, we show
that for some constant ε > 0, there is an algorithm that, given a constant-depth
degree-d PTF circuit C with n1+ε wires such that C has at most 2n0.99 minority-value




and determines the majority
value of C. This extends the recent result of Tell [Tel18] for constant-depth LTF
circuits of super-linear wire complexity.
• We show a nontrivial pseudorandom generator for PTF circuits (of unrestricted depth)
with sub-linearly many gates. As a corollary, we get a PRG for degree-d PTFs with




· log2(1/ε); this gives the first PRG for PTFs with a
seed length that is sub-polynomial in both n and 1/ε.
The key ingredient in our results is a new structural lemma for low-degree polynomials,
which is called Random Restrictions Lemma. Using this structural lemma, we also obtain
a “derandomized” version of the Littlewood-Offord theorem, a type of classical result in
additive combinatorics, for low-degree polynomials.
The results in Chapter 3 are from the joint work with Kabanets and Kane [KKL17],
and the results in Chapter 4 are from the subsequent work with Kabanets [KL18].
1.5.2 Algorithms and lower bounds for enhanced formulas
While showing lower bounds for large formulas remains a major open problem in circuit
complexity, recent research (e.g., [Tal17a, OPS19]) shows that understanding smaller for-
mulas whose leaves are replaced by certain functions would also be very useful.
In Chapter 5, we study the class FORMULA[s]◦G consisting of size-s De Morgan formulas
whose leaves are any Boolean functions from a class G. We give lower bounds and (SAT,
Learning, and PRG) algorithms for FORMULA[n1.99] ◦G, for classes G of functions with low
communication complexity (see section 5.2 for definitions). Let R(k)(G) be the maximum k-
party number-on-forehead randomized communication complexity of a function in G. Among
other results, we show that:
2Our satisfiability algorithm for circuits with sub-quadratically sparse PTF gates was recently extended
by Bajpai el at. [BKK+19] to the case of polynomially sparse PTF gates.
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• There exists a function in P (the generalized inner product function) that cannot be










This significantly extends the lower bounds against bipartite formulas obtained by
[Tal17b]. As a corollary, we get an (average-case) lower bound against sub-quadratic-
size De Morgan formulas whose leaf gates are constant-degree PTFs.
• There is a PRG of seed length n/2+O
(√
s · log(s) ·R(2)(G)
)
that fools FORMULA[s]◦
G. For the special case of FORMULA[s] ◦ LTF, we get the better seed length O(n1/2 ·
s1/4 · log(n) · log(n/ε)), where ε is the error of the PRG. In particular, this provides
the first non-trivial PRG (with seed length o(n)) for intersections of n half-spaces in
the regime where ε ≤ 1/n, complementing a recent result of [OST19].









s · polylog(s) ·R(2)(G)
)1/2
.
In particular, this implies a nontrivial satisfiability algorithm for sub-quadratic-size
formulas whose leaf gates are LTFs.
• The Minimum Circuit Size Problem is not in FORMULA[n1.99]◦XOR; thereby making
progress on hardness magnification, in connection with results from [OPS19, CJW19].
On the algorithmic side, we show that the concept class FORMULA[n1.99] ◦ XOR can
be PAC-learned in time 2O(n/ logn).
This chapter is a joint work with Kabanets, Koroth, Myrisiotis, and Oliveira [KKL+20].
1.5.3 Circuit lower bounds for MCSP
In Chapter 6, we improve several circuit lower bounds for MCSP, using pseudorandom
generators (PRGs) that are local; a PRG is called local if its output bit strings, when
viewed as the truth table of a Boolean function, can be computed by a Boolean circuit of
small size. We get new and improved lower bounds for MCSP that almost match the best-
known lower bounds against several circuit models. Specifically, we show that computing
MCSP, on functions with a truth table of length N , requires
• N3−o(1)-size De Morgan formulas, improving the recent N2−o(1) lower bound by Hi-
rahara and Santhanam [HS17],
9
• N2−o(1)-size formulas over an arbitrary basis or general branching programs (no non-
trivial lower bound was known for MCSP against these models), and
• 2Ω(N1/(d+1.01))-size depth-d AC0 circuits, improving the (implicit, in their work) expo-
nential size lower bound by Allender et al. [ABK+06].
The AC0 lower bound stated above matches the best-known AC0 lower bound (for the parity
function) up to a small additive constant in the depth. Also, for the special case of depth-2
circuits (i.e., CNFs or DNFs), we get an optimal lower bound of 2Ω(N) for MCSP.





In this chapter, we introduce some terminologies, as well as some basic definitions and
results that will be useful for understanding this thesis.
2.1 Boolean functions and polynomials
A n-variate Boolean function maps n bits to one bit. A common way to represent a bit
is to use 0 and 1. For this Boolean domain, i.e. {0, 1}, we think of a Boolean function as
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Another useful way to represent a Boolean domain is to use {−1, 1}.
To convert from {0, 1} to {−1, 1}, we map 0 to 1 and 1 to −1. That is, for a bit x ∈ {0, 1},
its corresponding bit y in {−1, 1} is y = 1− 2x. Note that we can also convert from {−1, 1}
to {0, 1} using x = (1− 2y)/2.
In this thesis, we may use different Boolean domains in showing different results for the
simplicity of presentation. This will be specified in corresponding sections. For the present
chapter, we will use {0, 1} as the Boolean domain. All the definitions and results stated can
be easily adapted to the {−1, 1} domain in a natural way.
We will also consider polynomials (over the reals) that take inputs from the Boolean cube
{0, 1}n (or {−1, 1}n) and output real numbers. In this case, we treat such a polynomial as
a multilinear polynomial p : {0, 1}n → R viewed as the sum of (multilinear) monomials:







where p̂(S) ∈ R for every S ⊆ [n]. The degree of p is the size of the largest set S ⊆ [n] such




Definition 2.1 (Boolean circuits). A Boolean circuit on n variables is a directed acyclic
graph such that
• there are n input node with in-degree 0;
• there is one output node with out-degree 1;
• all other nodes (henceforth, gates) are labeled by Boolean operations {AND,OR,NOT};
The AND and OR gates have in-degree (henceforth, fan-in) 2 and the NOT gates have
fan-in 1.
The size of the circuit is the number of gates and the depth is the length of the longest
path from the output node to any input node.
We often think of the gates of a circuit as layered, where the gates at a layer take inputs
only from gates at previous layers, so the bottom layer consists of gates depending on only
the inputs and the top layer consists of the output gate.
An n-variate Boolean circuit naturally computes some Boolean function f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}. To solve a decision problem (or decide a language) which is defined by a function
F : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} on every input length, we can use a circuit family. A circuit family is a
collection of circuits {Cn}n∈N where each Cn is an n-variate Boolean circuit. We say that the
circuit family {Cn}n∈N computes F if for every fixed input length n, Cn(x) = F (x) for every
x ∈ {0, 1}n. Note that for a circuit family, we can have different circuits for different input
lengths. Therefore, circuits are thought as a non-uniform computation model, as opposed
to the Turing machine model, which is uniform because we have a single machine for all
input lengths.
It is easy to see that every Boolean function on n bits can be computed by some circuit
of size at most 2n. In fact, it can be shown that every n-bit function has a circuit of size
O (2n/n). On the other hand, it was also observed that almost all functions are hard in the
sense that they require circuits of size Ω (2n/n) [Sha49].
We are interested in the power and limitations of small size circuits. In particular, we
define P/poly to be the class of circuit families that are of polynomial-size, and by abusing
notation also the class of decision problems that can be solved by such circuit families.
It is known that every polynomial-time Turing machine can be simulated by polynomial-
size circuit families (i.e., P ⊆ P/poly). An interesting question is whether problems from
other complexity classes such as NP can also be computed by such circuit families. A
negative answer to this question would show that P 6= NP, which is a central problem in
complexity theory. It is widely believed that NP 6⊆ P/poly. The task of showing that some
explicit function (e.g., a problem in NP) cannot be computed by circuit families of certain
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size is called proving circuit lower bounds, which is the main goal of the circuit complexity
research.
For the rest of the thesis, when speaking of circuit classes, we will simply say “a class
of circuits” instead of “a class of circuit families”.
2.2.2 Small-depth circuits
As discussed in Section 1.4, since general circuits are hard to analyze, the focus of current
research is on restricted types of circuits. This leads to the study of circuits whose depths
are restricted to be small:
• AC0, the class of constant-depth circuits, where the AND and OR gates have un-
bounded fan-in.




-depth circuits, where the AND and OR gates have bounded
fan-in.
Another motivation for studying small-depth circuits is that they capture the notion
of efficient parallel computation, as we can evaluate the outputs of all the gates at the
same layer simultaneously given the outputs of the gates at the previous layer, so the depth
corresponds to the running time of such a parallel algorithm.
Particular success has been found in proving lower bound against AC0 and extensions
such as AC0[p] (obtained by adding MODp gates, where p > 1 is a prime) and AC0[m] (by
adding MODm gates, where m > 1 is a constant). The frontier in this line of research is
to prove lower bounds against TC0, the class of constant-depth circuits with (unbounded
fan-in) MAJORITY gates (see section 1.4).
Another major open question in circuit complexity is to prove circuit lower bounds
against NC1. This task is tightly connected to the study of small formulas, which we discuss
below.
2.2.3 Boolean formulas
Formulas are a special type of circuits that can be represented as a tree.
Definition 2.2 (Formulas). An n-variate formula over a basis B is a directed rooted tree; its
non-leaf vertices (henceforth, internal gates) take labels from B and its leaves (henceforth,
variable gates) take labels from the set of variables {x1, . . . , xn}. Each internal gate has
fan-in 2. The size of a De Morgan formula is the number of its leaf gates.
A De Morgan formula is a formula over the basis {AND,OR,NOT}.
It is easy to see that a formula is a circuit whose non-input gates have fan-out 1. In fact,
it was observed that the class of polynomial-size formulas is exactly the class of logarithmic-
depth circuits (note that logarithmic-depth circuits can have only a polynomial number of
gates).
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Theorem 2.3 ([Spi71]). A function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} can be computed by a polynomial
size formula if and only if it can be computed by a circuit of depth O(logn).
As discussed in the previous chapter, for De Morgan formulas, the size for which we
know how to analyze is only sub-cubic after decades of effort (see section 1.4). For formulas
over arbitrary basis, this size is sub-quadratic.
2.3 Pseudorandomness
Pseudorandomness studies how to construct objects that “look random” using little or no
randomness.
Pseudorandom distributions and generators
For a distribution D (over some sample space), we write “x ∼ D” to mean that x is
sampled according to D. For the Boolean cube {0, 1}n (resp. {−1, 1}n), we will often write
“x ∼ {0, 1}n” to mean x is sampled uniformly at random from {0, 1}n.
For a class of Boolean functions F , a pseudorandom distribution D against F is a
distribution such that every function f in F “behaves” similarly under D and the uniform
distribution, in the sense that the probability that f outputs 1 on D is about the same as
that of the uniform distribution.
Definition 2.4 (Pseudorandom distributions). Let F be a class of Boolean functions, and
0 < ε < 1. Let D be a distribution over {0, 1}n. We say that D ε-fools F if, for every
function f ∈ F , it is the case that∣∣∣∣∣Prz∼D[f(z) = 1]− Prx∼{0,1}n[f(x) = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
Note that for the above definition, we can also write∣∣∣∣∣ Ez∼D[f(z)]− Ex∼{0,1}n[f(x)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
A pseudorandom generator (PRG) against a class of functions F is a deterministic proce-
dure G mapping short Boolean strings (seeds) to longer Boolean strings, so that G’s output
“looks random” to every function in F . In other words, a PRG is a sampling procedure for
some pseudorandom distribution.
Definition 2.5 (Pseudorandom generators). Let G : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}n be a function, F be
a class of Boolean functions, and 0 < ε < 1. We say that G is a pseudorandom generator
of seed length ` that ε-fools F if, for every function f ∈ F , it is the case that∣∣∣∣∣ Ez∼{0,1}`[f(G(z))]− Ex∼{0,1}n[f(x)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
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A pseudorandom generator outputting n bits is called explicit if it can be computed in poly(n)
time.
All PRGs described in the rest of this thesis are explicit, so we will omit the word
“explicit” when stating these PRGs.
Basic pseudorandom constructions
For some targeted class of functions, we want to construct pseudorandom generators with
short seed length (or equivalently a pseudorandom distribution that can be sampled using
few random bits). We describe below some basic pseudorandom constructions that are useful
for constructing PRGs.
A multidimensional distribution is called k-wise independent if any k coordinates of the
distribution are uniformly distributed.
Definition 2.6 (k-wise independence). A distribution X over [m]n is called k-wise inde-
pendent if, for any 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < ik ≤ n and every b1, . . . , bk ∈ [m], we have
Pr[Xi1 = b1, . . . , Xik = bk] = m
−k.
Theorem 2.7 (see [Vad12, Proposition 3.33]). For any positive integers n,m, k, there exists
a k-wise independent distribution over [m]n that can be sampled in poly(n,m, k) time using
k ·max{logn, logm} random bits.
Definition 2.8 (Small-bias distributions). A distribution X over {0, 1}n is called ε-biased
if, for every nonempty subset S ⊂ [n], we have
∣∣Pr[⊕i∈SXi = 1]∣∣ ≤ 12 + ε2 .
Since for every non-constant XOR function1 f , we have Ex∼{0,1}n [f(x)] = 1/2, we have
that ε-biased distributions (ε/2)-fool the class XOR functions.
Theorem 2.9 (see [AGHP92]). For any positive integer n and any 0 < ε < 1, there exists
a ε-biased distribution over {0, 1}n that can be sampled in poly(n) time using O(log(n/ε))
random bits.
2.4 Random restrictions
An important tool in circuits complexity is the method of random restrictions. A restriction
for a n-variate Boolean function f , usually denoted as ρ ∈ {0, 1, ∗}n, specifies a way of fixing
the values of some subset of variables for f . That is, if ρi is ∗, we leave the i-th variable
1An XOR function computes the parity of some fixed set of input bits.
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unrestricted and otherwise fix its value to be ρi ∈ {0, 1}. We denote by fρ the restricted
function after the variables are restricted according to ρ, and denote by ρ−1(∗) the set of
unrestricted variables. A random restriction is then a distribution over restrictions. We will
often view sampling a random restriction as a two-step process: The first step is selecting
(in some random manner) a subset of unrestricted variables (also called the “star” or “∗”
variables) and the second step is fixing (in some random manner) the values of all the
other variables. Then, a random restriction over n variables can also be specified by a pair
(σ, β) ∈ {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n, where σ (as a characteristic string) specifies the set of unrestricted
variables, and β specifies the values for fixing the restricted variables.
We say that a random restriction (or random selection) is p-regular if each variable is
left unrestricted with probability p. One way to generate a p-regular random restriction
is to leave each variable, independently, unrestricted with probability p, and otherwise
assign to it a 0 or a 1, uniformly at random. Such a random restriction is called a (truly)
p-random restriction. Note that to sample such a restriction, we can first pick a string
in {0, 1}n·log(1/p) ∼= [1/p]n to specify the selection of the unrestricted variables, where a
coordinate is unrestricted if and only if all of its corresponding log(1/p) bits are 0, and
then a string in {0, 1}n to specify the values assigned to each of the restricted variables. So
sampling a restriction in this way requires n · log(1/p)+n random bits. We can also generate
a restriction in a pseudorandom manner, which may use fewer random bits. For example,
one way to do this is to use a limited-independence distribution, so that each variable is set
to be unrestricted with probability p, and any k of the variables are independent. Note that
such a “pseudorandom selection” can be obtained using a k-wise independent distribution
on [1/p]n. Also, we can let each variable be assigned a 0 or a 1 uniformly at random in a
way such that any k of the variables are independent; this again can be done using a k-wise
independent distribution on {0, 1}n.
Finally, note that we can also get a restriction by combining a sequence of restrictions
ρ1, . . . , ρt, in a natural way, namely by applying the sub-restrictions one by one. In this
case, we write the final restriction as ρ1 ◦ · · · ◦ ρt.
2.5 Notation
For a positive integer n, we denote the set {1, . . . , n} by [n]. We use Õ(·) (and Ω̃(·))
to hide polylogarithmic factors. That is, for any f : N → N, we have that Õ(f(n)) =
O(f(n) · polylog(f(n))).
We will sometime abuse the notation of a circuit class and use it to mean the “type” of
a circuit. For example, when we say “AC0 circuits of depth d and size s”, we mean circuits




Polynomials and Lower Bounds for
Polynomial Threshold Circuits
3.1 Background and results
Random restrictions of Boolean functions play an important role in the circuit complexity
research. One way to prove that a certain Boolean function h is not computable by a class
C of Boolean circuits is to show that (1) every Boolean function f ∈ C becomes “simplified”
after a random restriction (which randomly fixes some random subset of variables of f),
and (2) the function h “remains hard” after a random restriction. This strategy has been
successfully applied to prove circuit lower bounds for explicit Boolean functions against (i)
De Morgan formulas [Sub61, And87], (ii) AC0 circuits [Ajt83, FSS84, Yao85, Hås89], and (iii)
constant-depth circuits with LTF (linear threshold function) gates [IPS97, CSS18, KW16].
In most of these results, the notion of “simplified” means that a restricted function is
(almost) a constant function; the hard function h is the parity function, which is the ultimate
example of a function that cannot be made (close to) constant under any restriction that
leaves enough variables unrestricted.
Lower bounds against constant-depth circuits with PTF gates. One of the original
motivations for the present work was to extend the lower bounds of [CSS18, KW16] to
the class of constant-depth circuits consisting of general Polynomial Threshold Function
(PTF) gates. Recall that a degree-d PTF is defined to be the sign of a multilinear degree-d
polynomial over the reals. Constant-depth PTF circuits are quite powerful. Every n-variate
Boolean function computable by a polynomial-size AC0[m] circuit (constant-depth circuits
with AND, OR, and MODm gates), for any integer m > 1, has an equivalent depth-2
circuit of quasipolynomial size with d-degree PTF gates, for d ≤ poly(logn) [All89, Yao90].
Moreover, every Boolean function computable by a polynomial-size AC0 circuit can be well
approximated by a single PTF gate of degree d ≤ poly(logn) [LMN93].
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We prove circuit lower bounds against constant-depth PTF circuits of super-constant
degree d as long as d
√
logn/ log logn. This is close to the best possible given the current
knowledge, as virtually nothing is known for PTFs of degree bigger than logn. We state our
circuit lower bounds below in Section 3.1.1. Our main technical tool is a restriction lemma
for PTFs, which we discuss next.
Restriction Lemmas. Let f(x1, . . . , xn) be a Boolean function assuming the values
{1,−1} over the Boolean cube {−1, 1}n. For a parameter 0 < r < 1, a random r-restriction
is defined to leave each variable free (unrestricted) with probability r, and, otherwise (with
probability 1 − r), fixing the variable to either 1 or −1 uniformly at random. For a pa-
rameter 0 < δ < 1, we say that a Boolean function g is δ-close to constant if, for some
v ∈ {−1, 1}, we have g(x) = v for all but at most δ fraction of Boolean inputs x. We show
that a PTF f of degree d is likely to become δ-close to constant after being hit with a
random r-restriction: the probability that f fails to become δ-close to constant is at most
√
r · (log r−1 · log δ−1)O(d2).
This Restriction Lemma for PTFs is sufficient to derive the aforementioned lower bounds
against constant-depth PTF circuits. Moreover, it can also be used to re-derive (as an
immediate corollary) the optimal-exponent average sensitivity bound for degree-d PTFs
due to Kane [Kan14]. But perhaps more interestingly, this Restriction Lemma for PTFs is
a consequence of a more general Restriction Lemma for degree-d polynomials, which has
other applications.
First, we generalize our PTF Restriction Lemma to the case of “structured” random
restrictions. Suppose that the variables of a given Boolean function f(x1, . . . , xn) are parti-
tioned into m disjoint subsets (blocks) of variables. Given such a block partition, a random
block restriction is defined as follows: pick a uniformly random block ` ∈ [m], and assign
each variable outside the chosen block ` a uniformly random value in {−1, 1}. We show
that a degree-d PTF f with an arbitrary block partition into m blocks is likely to become
δ-close to constant after being hit with a random block restriction: the probability that f
fails to become δ-close to constant is at most m−1/2 · (logm · log δ−1)O(d2). It is not hard to
see that a PTF Restriction Lemma for r-random restrictions is a corollary of the m-block
Restriction Lemma when m = 1/r.
The PTF Block Restriction Lemma mentioned above is a consequence of the following
Block Restriction Lemma for polynomials. If a multilinear degree-d polynomial with a given
block partition into m blocks is hit with a random block restriction, it is likely to become
“concentrated” in the sense that its standard deviation becomes quite small relative to its
expectation. It can be shown that if a polynomial is concentrated, then the sign function
of this polynomial (i.e., the corresponding PTF) is close to a constant function. Thus, the
PTF Block Restriction Lemma follows. In addition, this structural property of a polyno-
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mial becoming “concentrated” under random block restrictions is also useful for proving
Littlewood-Offord type anticoncentration results for polynomials.
Littlewood-Offord type anticoncentration bounds. Let p be an arbitrary n-variate
degree-d multilinear polynomial containing at least t disjoint maximal monomials (i.e., not
contained in other monomials), each with a coefficient at least 1 in magnitude. Meka et
al. [MNV16] showed that it is unlikely that, for a random x ∈ {−1, 1}n, the value p(x) will
fall in the interval [0, 1]: the probability that p(x) ∈ [0, 1] is at most (1/
√
t) · (log t)O(d log d) ·
exp(d2 log d). We re-derive this result, in a simple way, from our Block Restriction Lemma
for polynomials. Moreover, we also prove a derandomized version of this bound, which we
discuss next.
Derandomized Block Restriction Lemma and derandomized Littlewood-Offord.
A random block restriction chooses a uniformly random block, and then assigns uniformly
random values to all variables outside that block. Our Block Restriction Lemma says that
such a random block restriction is likely to make an n-variate degree-d multilinear poly-
nomial “concentrated”. A derandomized version of this lemma would say that a similar
conclusion is true for block restrictions that can be sampled with significantly fewer ran-
dom bits. We prove such a derandomized version for pseudorandom m-block restrictions
that are sampled using about (logm)O(d2) · logn random bits.
We then use this derandomized version of the Block Restriction Lemma to obtain de-
randomizations of the Littlewood-Offord type bounds. We show that there is an efficient
pseudorandom generator for sampling inputs x ∈ {−1, 1}n, using significantly fewer than
n random bits, such that the following holds. For any degree-d multilinear polynomial p
with many degree-d monomials that have large coefficients, it is unlikely that p(x) ∈ [0, 1]
for these pseudorandom inputs x ∈ {−1, 1}n. No derandomized versions of the Littlewood-
Offord type anticoncentration bounds were previously known.
Next we provide more details about our main results and our proof techniques.
3.1.1 Results
Lower bounds for constant-depth PTF circuits. We generalize the lower bounds of
[KW16] and [CSS18] to the case of constant-depth circuits with PTF gates of degree d ≥ 1.
For the case of d = 1, our results match those obtained in [KW16, CSS18]. For d > 1, these
appear to be the first super-linear wire complexity lower bounds against constant-depth
circuits with degree-d PTF gates.
The following generalizes the lower bounds against LTF circuits of depth 2 of [KW16].
Theorem 3.1. There is an n-variate Boolean function Fn ∈ P such that every depth-2



















We also generalize to PTF gates (and somewhat strengthen) a lower bound of [KW16]
for depth-3 circuits that have the Majority gate at the top, with depth-2 LTF circuits feeding
in.
Theorem 3.2. There is a polynomial-time computable Boolean function B such that the
following holds. For any 1logn  ε < 1, let C be a majority vote of depth-2 circuits with
degree-d PTF gates such that the top majority gate has fan-in at most 2nε and the total








· (nε · logn)−c·d
2
, where c is a
constant. Then C cannot compute B.
For Boolean functions f, g : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}, define the correlation between f and g
as
Corr(f, g) =
∣∣∣∣∣ Ex∼{−1,1}n [f(x) · g(x)]
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Let PARITYn denote the n-input parity function. We generalize the correlation bounds of
[CSS18], getting the following.
Theorem 3.3. For any D ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ d 
√
logn/ log logn, let C be any depth-D
circuit on n inputs with degree-d PTF gates, of wire complexity at most n1+εD , where εD =






Theorem 3.4. There is an n-variate Boolean function Gn ∈ P such that the following
holds. For any D ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ d  (logn/ log logn)1/(2D−1), let C be any depth-D circuit
on n inputs with degree-d PTF gates, of wire complexity at most n1+µD,d, where µD,d =
(E · d)−(2D−1), for some constant E > 0. Then we have
Corr(C,Gn) ≤ exp(−nµD,d/2).
Restriction lemmas for polynomials. Our main tool is the following structural lemma
showing that a PTF is likely to become an almost constant function after being hit with a
random restriction. Below, we denote by ρ ∼ Rr the process of picking a random restriction
ρ that leaves a variable free with probability r, and otherwise fixes uniformly at random to
1 or −1. We denote by fρ the function f restricted by ρ. We say that a Boolean function f
is δ-close to constant if, for some value v ∈ {−1, 1}, we have f(x) = v for all but at most δ
fraction of Boolean inputs x.
Lemma 3.5 (PTF Restriction Lemma). For any PTF f(x) = sgn(p(x)) of degree d ≥ 1,
and any 0 < δ, r ≤ 1/16, we have
Pr
ρ∼Rr
[fρ is not δ-close to constant] ≤
√
r · (log r−1 · log δ−1)O(d2).
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We note that the bound r1/2 in this lemma has an optimal exponent.
The above lemma is a consequence of a more general result, the Block Restriction
Lemma, which deals with certain structured restrictions that we define next. Suppose the
variables of a given function are arbitrarily partitioned into m blocks. For the given block
partitioning, a random block restriction ρ ∼ Bm is defined by picking a block ` ∈ [m] uni-
formly at random, and assigning each variable outside block ` the value 1 or −1 uniformly
at random. We show that, for an arbitrary partitioning of input variables into m blocks, the
probability that a degree-d PTF is not δ-close to constant, after being hit with a random
block restriction ρ ∼ Bm, is at most the same as the bound in the PTF Restriction Lemma
above, with r = 1/m.
Lemma 3.6 (Block Restriction Lemma: Simplified version). For any PTF f(x) = sgn(p(x))
of degree d ≥ 1, any m ≥ 16 , and any 0 < δ ≤ 1/16, we have
Pr
ρ∼Bm
[fρ is not δ-close to constant] ≤ m−1/2 · (logm · log δ−1)O(d
2).
Note that a standard random restriction ρ ∼ Rr can be obtained by first randomly
partitioning the input variables into m = 1/r blocks, and then applying a random block
restriction from Bm. So the Block Restriction Lemma implies the PTF Restriction Lemma.
Our actual Block Restriction Lemma (Lemma 3.37) shows something even stronger.
If a degree d multilinear polynomial p is hit with a random block restriction, it becomes
“concentrated around the expectation” in the sense that its standard deviation becomes
quite small relative to its expectation (in particular, implying that the restriction of the
PTF sgn(p) is close to constant).
Other applications. Apart from the aforementioned circuit lower bound applications,
our Block Restriction Lemma also immediately implies two other results. We get the average
sensitivity bound on degree-d PTFs, with an optimal exponent, first shown by Kane [Kan14]
in the context of the Gotsman-Linial conjecture [GL94]; see Theorem 3.61 below.
We also get the following Littlewood-Offord type anticoncentration bound for degree-d
multilinear polynomials, due to Meka et al. [MNV16], which is an extension of the classical
Littlewood-Offord result for linear polynomials [LO43, Erd45].
Theorem 3.7 ([MNV16]). For any real interval I, and any n-variate degree-d multilinear
polynomial p such that there exists a set of t disjoint monomials in p, each of which is
maximal (i.e., not contained by any other monomials) and has coefficient at least |I| in
magnitude, we have
Pr[p(A) ∈ I] ≤ t−1/2 · (log t)O(d log d) · 2O(d2 log d),
where A is the uniform distribution over {−1, 1}n.
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Derandomization. We prove a derandomized version of the Block Restriction Lemma
mentioned above.
Theorem 3.8 (Derandomized Block Restriction Lemma: Simplified version). For any 0 <
δ ≤ 1/16 and 0 < ζ < 1, there is a polynomial-time algorithm for sampling block restrictions
ρ ∈ Bm, for any m ≥ 16, that uses at most mζ · logn random bits, so that the following




[fρ is not δ-close to constant] ≤ m−1/2 ·
(
logm · log δ−1
)O(ζ−1·d2)
.
Our actual version of this lemma (see Theorem 3.64) shows that a degree-d polynomial
p is likely to become “concentrated” under a pseudorandom block restriction. This in turn
is used to prove the following derandomized versions of Theorem 3.7.
Theorem 3.9. For any positive integers t and d, and 0 < ζ < 1, there exists a distribution
D on {−1, 1}n, samplable in poly(n) time using tζ/d · logn random bits, such that the
following holds. For any real interval I, and any n-variate degree-d multilinear polynomial
p that has at least t disjoint degree-d monomials with coefficient at least |I| in magnitude,
we have
Pr [p(D) ∈ I] ≤ t−
1
2d · (log t)O(ζ−1·d2).
Theorem 3.10. For any positive integers t and d, and 0 < ζ < 1, there exists a distribution
D on {−1, 1}n, samplable in poly(n) time using tζ ·logn random bits, such that the following
holds. For any real interval I, and any n-variate degree-d multilinear polynomial p with at
least t · nd−1 degree-d monomials whose coefficients are at least |I| in magnitude, we have
Pr [p(D) ∈ I] ≤ t−
1
2 · (log t)O(ζ−1·d2).
Note that it is possible to use PRGs for PTFs directly to get a derandomized Littlewood-
Offord anticoncentration bound. However, using the best currently known PRGs for PTFs,
such a derandomization will have large error and seed length. In particular, for dense poly-
nomials with t = n1−o(1), Theorem 3.10 achieves error less than 1/n0.49 with the seed size
at most polylogarithmic in n; such parameters are beyond reach of the best available PRGs
for PTFs.
3.1.2 Related work
Random restrictions. The concept of random restrictions for Boolean functions was
introduced by Subbotovskaya [Sub61], who applied it to show that the n-bit parity func-
tion requires De Morgan formulas1 of size Ω(n1.5) (later improved to the optimal bound
1De Morgan formulas are built using AND, OR, and NOT gates.
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Ω(n2) by [Khr71]). Andreev [And87] combined random restrictions with a counting argu-
ment to show a stronger lower bound against De Morgan formulas for a function in P
(resulting in the n3/poly(logn) bound, when using Håstad’s improved restriction lemma for
De Morgan formulas [Hås98]). Random restrictions were also used for showing the afore-
mentioned exponential lower bounds against AC0 circuits computing the parity function
[Ajt83, FSS84, Yao85, Hås89], as well as for the lower bounds against constant-depth LTF
circuits by [IPS97, CSS18, KW16]. A common feature in all of these lower bound proofs is
a structural result showing how “easy” Boolean functions (of appropriately small formula
or circuit complexity) become much “simpler” (e.g., become almost constant) after being
hit with random restrictions. In contrast, the parity function is the ultimate “restriction-
resistant” function that does not simplify under random restrictions, but rather stays the
parity function (albeit on a smaller number of variables).
Two classical examples of restriction lemmas are the Shrinkage Lemma for De Morgan
formulas [Sub61, IN93, PZ93, Hås98, Tal14], and Håstad’s Switching Lemma for AC0 circuits
[Hås89] (see also [RST15, Hås16]). The Shrinkage Lemma says that a De Morgan formula
of size s is expected to shrink to size about r2 · s, after being hit with a random restriction
ρ ∼ Rr that leaves each variable free with probability r, and otherwise fixes the variable
to a uniform bit. Håstad’s Switching Lemma says that any given k-CNF formula (the
conjunction of clauses of size at most k each) is very likely to become expressible as a k-
DNF (the disjunction of size-k terms), after being hit with a random restriction ρ ∼ Rr
for r = O(1/k). By repeatedly applying this Switching Lemma to a given AC0 circuit (of
not too large size), level by level, we can merge the adjacent levels, thereby collapsing the
original circuit to depth at most 2. Once the original AC0 circuit is thus “simplified”, one
can argue directly that the new circuit is too weak to compute the restriction of the original
function (e.g., the parity function).
A similar strategy was used by Impagliazzo et al. [IPS97] to show that the parity function
is hard for constant-depth LTF circuits. The main technical result of [IPS97] shows that a
depth d LTF circuit (of not too large size) can be reduced to a depth d− 1 LTF circuit by
fixing not too many input variables. This is argued by showing that there exists a particular
restriction of input variables, chosen adaptively, that will make all LTF gates at the bottom
level of the circuit to be constants (or depend on at most one input). To extend the worst-
case lower bounds of [IPS97] to the average-case correlation bounds, Chen et al. [CSS18]
extended the restriction lemma of [IPS97] to the setting of truly random, non-adaptive
restrictions. So too did Kane and Williams [KW16] to get a lower bound against depth-2
LTF circuits for Andreev’s function; their restriction lemma is for certain “block-structured”
random restrictions, as required by Andreev’s original argument.
Our restriction lemma, Lemma 3.5, can be used to re-derive the same lower bounds
(up to polylogarithmic factors) for LTF circuits as in [CSS18, KW16]. Moreover, it extends




Comparison with [KW16], [CSS18] and [Nis94]. Kane and Williams [KW16] prove
an LTF Restriction Lemma with similar parameters to our PTF Restriction Lemma (for d =
1), for certain random block restrictions and for the case of the restricted LTF becoming a
constant function (rather than close to constant). For the proof, they rely on the Littlewood-
Offord lemma from additive combinatorics [LO43, Erd45]. It is not clear how to extend such
a proof to the case of higher degree PTFs.
Chen et al. [CSS18] obtain a quantitatively weaker version of the LTF Restriction
Lemma, using proof techniques similar to ours, but with worse parameters. We get bet-
ter (almost optimal) parameters for both LTFs and higher degree PTFs, by using the more
refined proof techniques developed in [Kan14].
Nisan [Nis94] obtains an almost linear Ωd(n1−o(1)) gate complexity lower bound against
circuits with degree-d PTF gates of any depth, using the techniques from communication
complexity, which are quite different from those in [KW16, CSS18] and this work. It is not
clear how such techniques can be used to obtain super-linear lower bounds for wire or gate
complexity. For degree d = 1, our lower bound result for depth-2 PTF circuits recovers
the super-linear n1.5−o(1) gate complexity lower bounds against depth-2 LTF circuits first
shown in [KW16]. For higher degrees, this result cannot give super-linear lower bounds and
does not match Nisan’s lower bounds. On the other hand, both our results for depth-2 and
higher constant depth PTF circuits give a super-linear wire complexity lower bound, which
is not implied by [Nis94] or prior works.
Lower bounds against TC0. For depth-2 circuits with majority gates (equivalently, LTF
gates with polynomially small weights), Hajnal et al. [HMP+93] showed an exponential size
lower bound for the Inner Product modulo 2 (IP2) function. For the parity function, Paturi
and Saks [PS94] showed a nearly optimal Ω̃(n) gate complexity lower bound against depth-2
majority circuits. This was extended by Siu et al. [SRK94] to depth-D such circuits, showing
that n-bit Parity requires at least Ω̃(D ·n1/(D−1)) gates; they also showed a matching upper
bound of O(D · n1/(D−1)) gates.
Goldmann et al. [GHR92] (improving upon [SB91]) proved a surprising result that any
general LTF circuit of constant depth D has an equivalent majority circuit of polynomially
related size and depth D + 1. Thus any superpolynomial lower bound against majority
circuits of constant depth D would immediately yield a superpolynomial lower bounds
against general LTF circuits of depth D − 1. (This connection may explain the lack of
any strong lower bounds even for depth-3 majority circuits.) Allender and Koucký [AK10]
show that proving superpolynomial circuit lower bounds against TC0 circuits (for an NC1-
complete function) is equivalent to proving super-linear, n1+ε, lower bounds for every depth
D ≥ 2, where ε > 0 is independent of the depth D.
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PTFs. PTFs have also been studied in the context of learning [STT12, DOSW11, DSTW14],
pseudorandomness [DGJ+10, DKN10, Kan11, Kan12, MZ13, Kan14, Kan15], approximate
counting [DDS14, DS14], and extremal combinatorics [Sak93, GL94, OS08, DRST14, Kan14].
3.1.3 Techniques
Block Restriction Lemma. The proof of our Block Restriction Lemma (Lemma 3.6)
relies on the techniques in [Kan14]. An oversimplified proof sketch is as follows. We first
show that if a degree-d multilinear polynomial is not “concentrated” (i.e., has the standard
deviation much larger that the expectation), then it is expected to have a relatively large
directional derivative compared to its actual value. We then use anticoncentration bounds
for polynomials to argue that it is unlikely that a random restriction of a degree-dmultilinear
polynomial will have such a property.
One issue is that strong enough anticoncentration bounds for polynomials (e.g., the
Carbery-Wright bound [CW01], or the bound from [Kan14] that we will actually use) are
true only under the Gaussian measure rather than the uniform distribution over the Boolean
cube. To use these anticoncentration results, we thus need to move from the Bernoulli
distribution to the Gaussian distribution over the inputs of polynomials. Such change of the
probability measure is possible thanks to the celebrated Invariance Principle of [MOO10].
It applies to “regular” polynomials only, but fortunately there is a “regularity lemma” of
[DSTW14] (or a variant from [Kan14]) that allows one to reduce the analysis of arbitrary
polynomials to the case of regular ones, at a small cost.
The next problem is that the Invariance Principle incurs significant (and unavoidable)
losses that have a bad dependence on the degree d of the polynomial in question. To mitigate
such losses, we apply a random block restriction ρ in a series of few steps, viewing ρ as a
composition of t restrictions ρ1 ◦ ρ2 ◦ · · · ◦ ρt (for not too large value t ≥ 1), where each ρi
is on relatively small number of blocks mi. This allows us to ensure that the loss from the
Invariance Principle at each step i is “absorbed” by the parameter mi.
Thus we get a recursive proof, where in each step we apply the regularity lemma, the
Invariance Principle, and the anticoncentration bound. Carrying out such a proof directly,
we get a weak version of the Block Restriction Lemma (see Lemma 3.34). By a more careful
recursive analysis (using a “soft” measure of “non-concentration” for polynomials), we get
the stronger version stated in Lemma 3.37.
Derandomized Block Restriction Lemma. To prove a derandomized version of the
Block Restriction Lemma (Theorem 3.8), we first observe that a block restriction ρ makes a
given degree-d polynomial “concentrated” if and only if a certain PTF of degree 2d evaluates
to −1 on ρ. Thus finding a good-restriction ρ is reduced to the task of fooling degree-2d
PTFs. For the latter, we can use known constructions of pseudorandom generators (PRGs)
for PTFs, e.g., the construction due to Meka and Zuckerman [MZ13]. Unfortunately, the
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parameters of the known PRGs for PTFs are far from optimal. Using such a PRG in a single
step would yield a derandomized Block Restriction Lemma with very poor parameters.
Instead, we use a recursive strategy similar to the recursive proof of Lemma 3.6 above. We
build a pseudorandom block restriction in a sequence of steps, where in each single step we
are facing a block partition on a relatively small number of blocks, and so can afford the
relatively poor parameters of the PRG construction from [MZ13].
Derandomized Littlewood-Offord. To prove Theorem 3.9 and Theorem 3.10, we first
argue that bounded-wise independent hash functions can be used to produce a block par-
tition of input variables such that, with high probability, every polynomial p satisfying the
assumptions of these theorems will contain within each block a high-degree monomial with
a large coefficient. Once we have a good partition, we can use our derandomized Block
Restriction Lemma to generate the required pseudorandom inputs x for the polynomial p
so that p(x) is unlikely to be contained within a small interval.
Organization of this chapter. We give the necessary background in Section 3.2. In
Section 3.3, we prove a simpler Block Restriction Lemma as a warm-up. In Section 3.4,
we prove another Block Restriction Lemma that achieves the optimal exponent in the
parameter m (the number of blocks). It is a weaker version of our final Block Restriction
Lemma, which illustrates our proof techniques. The stronger version is then proved in
Section 3.5. In Section 3.6, we give our applications of the Block Restriction Lemma: we
prove Theorems 3.1–3.4; re-derive Kane’s average sensitivity bound for degree-d PTFs in
Section 3.6.4; and show a Littlewood-Offord type anticoncentration bound for degree-d
multilinear polynomials in Section 3.6.5. We prove our derandomized restriction lemma and
derandomized Littlewood-Offord type anticoncentration bounds in Section 3.7. Section 3.8
contains some open problems.
3.2 Preliminaries
Here we present some definitions and results on polynomials and polynomial threshold
functions, and introduce some basic notions in the analysis of Boolean functions. For more
details on these (and related) topics, the reader is referred to [O’D14].
Notation
Throughout this chapter, we will use {−1, 1} as the Boolean domain.
We will denote by X,Y, Z standard multidimensional Gaussian random variables. That
is, for dimension n, we have X ∼ N(0, 1)n, where X = (X1, . . . , Xn) and all components
Xi ∼ N(0, 1) are independent Gaussians. Similarly, we denote by A,B,C multidimensional
Bernoulli variables, where, for dimension n, A = (A1, . . . , An), and all components Ai ∼
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{−1, 1} are independent fair coin flips. Occasionally, for results that hold for both Gaussian
and Bernoulli distributions, we use I, J to denote distributions that may be either standard
n-dimensional Gaussian, or Bernoulli distributions.
Boolean functions and polynomial threshold functions
We think of an n-variate Boolean function f as f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}. For two Boolean
functions f, g : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} and a parameter δ ∈ [0, 1], we say that f and g are
δ-close if Prx∼{−1,1}n [f(x) 6= g(x)] ≤ δ. We say that a Boolean function f is δ-close to
constant if there is a constant function v, where v = −1 or v = 1, such that f and v are
δ-close.
Definition 3.11. A degree-d polynomial threshold function (PTF) is a function f : {−1, 1}n →
{−1, 1} of the form f = sgn(p), where p : Rn → R is a multilinear polynomial of degree at
most d, and sgn : R → {−1, 1} is the sign function defined to be 1 on all positive inputs,
and −1 on all negative inputs and on 0.2
Concentration and anticoncentration for polynomials
Definition 3.12 (Lt norm). For f : Rn → R and a real number t ≥ 1, the Gaussian






where I is an n-dimensional Gaussian (Bernoulli) random variable.
It is easy to see that the Gaussian and Bernoulli L2 norms are the same for any multi-
linear polynomial p, i.e.,
E[|p(X)|2] = E[|p(A)|2].
We denote by ‖p‖2 the L2 norm of a multilinear polynomial p under Gaussian (or Bernoulli)
distribution. For multilinear polynomials p, we also have
E[p(X)] = E[p(A)].
Hence the variance of p is the same under Gaussian and Bernoulli measures, and we will
denote this variance by Var[p].
The hypercontractivity results of [Bon70] relate the Lt norm of a polynomial to its L2
norm, both for Gaussian and Bernoulli measures. For multilinear d-degree polynomials p,
2Without loss of generality, we may assume for every PTF f = sgn(p) that p(x) 6= 0 for all x ∈ {−1, 1}n.
The reason is that we may always change p to a new polynomial p̃ = p + η, for a small constant η ∈ R, so
that, for every x ∈ {−1, 1}n, we have both sgn(p(x)) = sgn(p̃(x)) and p̃(x) 6= 0.
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the relevant hypercontractive inequality is
‖p‖t ≤ (t− 1)
d/2 · ‖p‖2 , (3.1)
where the Lt norm on the left-hand side may be either Gaussian or Bernoulli.
The following strong concentration bound for polynomials is an immediate consequence
of Equation (3.1) and the Markov inequality.
Theorem 3.13 (Concentration bound). For every d-degree multilinear polynomial p : Rn →
R, and for every K ≥ 2d, we have





where I is an n-dimensional Gaussian or Bernoulli random variable.
The following weak anticoncentration result for polynomials is also an immediate con-
sequence of Equation (3.1) (for t = 4) and the Paley-Zygmund inequality (applied to p2).
Theorem 3.14 (Weak anticoncentration bound). For every d-degree multilinear polynomial
p : Rn → R, we have
Pr [|p(I)| ≥ (1/2) · ‖p‖2] ≥ (1/2) · 9
−d,
where I is an n-dimensional Gaussian or Bernoulli random variable.
A stronger anticoncentration result for polynomial with respect to the Gaussian measure,
due to Carbery and Wright [CW01], shows that |p(X)| is likely to exceed ε · ‖p‖2.
Theorem 3.15 (Anticoncentration bound [CW01]). For any non-zero degree-d polynomial
p and any ε > 0, we have
Pr [|p(X)| ≤ ε · ‖p‖2] = O(d · ε
1/d).
The anticoncentration bound above has poor dependence on the degree d. For an im-
proved dependence on d, we use a version of the anticoncentration result due to Kane [Kan14],
where |p(X)| is compared to the directional derivative of p, rather than the norm of p.
Definition 3.16 (Directional derivative). For an n-variate function g(x1, . . . , xn) from Rn
to R, and u, v ∈ Rn, the directional derivative of g at u in the direction v, denoted Dv g(u),
is defined as










is the gradient of g, and “·” denotes the usual inner product of vectors.
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Theorem 3.17 (Strong anticoncentration bound [Kan14]). For any non-zero polynomial p
of degree d and any ε > 0, we have
















where I and J are either independent Gaussians, or independent Bernoulli distributions.
In turn, the quantity on the right-hand of Equation (3.2) can be related to the variance
Var[p], via the notion of influence, to be discussed in the next subsection.
We conclude this subsection with the following useful relationship between the direc-
tional derivative and the gradient.
Lemma 3.18. For any non-negative integer k and any degree-d multilinear n-variate poly-






























































which implies Equation (3.3).
We now prove Equation (3.4). For a fixed A, let





Note that qA is a degree-1 polynomial in the variables B with ‖qA‖22 =
‖∇p(A)‖22
|p(A)|2 . Then by






















Y = Y (A,B) = |DB p(A)|
2
|p(A)|2 .
By Equation (3.5), Y ≥ X/4 with probability at least 1/18. Next we have
E
A,B










[min {k,X/4} | Y ≥ X/4]
]
≥ 172 ·EA [min {k,X}] ,
where in the last step we dropped the expectation over B since X does not depend on
B.
Invariance principle for polynomials
For a Boolean function f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} and i ∈ [n], the influence of coordinate i on
f , denoted Inf i[f ], is defined as
Inf i[f ] = Pr
x∼{−1,1}n
[f(x) 6= f(x⊕i)],
where x⊕i is x with the ith coordinate xi replaced with −xi. The total influence (also known
as average sensitivity) of f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}, denoted Inf [f ], is defined as




For a function f : {−1, 1}n → R, the definition of influence becomes:

















The following is a well-known fact about influence; we sketch the proof for completeness.
Theorem 3.19. For every d-degree multilinear polynomial p : Rn → R, we have
Var[p] ≤ Inf [p] ≤ d ·Var[p].
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Proof. For a multilinear polynomial p(x1, . . . , xn) and a set S ⊆ [n], denote by p̂(S) the
coefficient of p at the monomial
∏
i∈S xi (the Fourier coefficient of p at S). The proof is
obtained from the following (easily verifiable) identities: Inf i[p] =
∑
S3i p̂(S)2, and Var[p] =∑
∅6=S⊆[n] p̂(S)2.
Definition 3.20 (τ -regular). We say that a polynomial p is τ -regular if for all i.
Inf i[p] ≤ τ ·Var[p].
A polynomial threshold function f(x) = sgn(p(x)) is ε-regular if p is τ -regular.
The following result shows that, for every PTF f , there exists a partitioning of the
Boolean cube {−1, 1}n into few sub-cubes so that, on most of these sub-cubes, the PTF f
restricted to the sub-cube is either regular or has small variance relative to its L2 norm.
Theorem 3.21 ([Kan14]). For all 1/4 > τ, δ, ε > 0 and γ > 0, every degree-d multilinear
polynomial p can be expressed as a decision tree of depth at most
τ−1 · (d · log τ−1 · log δ−1)O(γ·d) · log ε−1,
so that, with probability at least 1 − ε, a random leaf ω (reached from the root of the tree
by branching uniformly at random at each internal node) defines a restricted polynomial pω
(obtained from p by setting the variables on the branch leading to ω to the values specified
by the branch) such that the polynomial pω(y) either is τ -regular or satisfies Var[pω] ≤(
log δ−1
)−γ·d · ‖pω‖22.
The following is a version of the Invariance Principle of Mossel et al. [MOO10] in the
form that will be convenient for us.
Theorem 3.22 (Invariance principle [Kan14]). Let p and q be two polynomials such that
for some τ > 0, Inf i[p], Inf i[q] ≤ τ for all i and that ‖p+ q‖2 , ‖p− q‖2 ≥ 1. Then





Corollary 3.23. For any d-degree τ -regular non-constant multilinear polynomial p, and
any ε > 0, we have
Pr[|p(A)| ≤ ε · |DB p(A)|] = O
(
d2 · ε+ d · τ−1/8d
)
.
Proof. The idea is to apply the Invariance Principle of Theorem 3.22, and then the strong
anticoncentration bound of Theorem 3.17. To this end, we need to argue that the assump-
tions of these two theorems are satisfied. First, we normalize our polynomial p so that the
new polynomial has all influences at most τ .
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For the given multilinear polynomial p(x1, . . . , xn), define







which is easily seen to be a multilinear polynomial of degree at most d. Let σ =
√
Var[p].
Since p is a non-constant function, we have σ 6= 0. Define the normalized polynomial
p′ = p/σ. We have Var[p′] = 1, and, by the definition of influence in Equation (3.6), we
also have for all i ∈ [n] that
Inf i[p′] = Inf i[p]/Var[p]
≤ τ, (3.9)
since Inf i[p] ≤ τ ·Var[p] for all i ∈ [n] by assumption. By the linearity of differentiation,
we also get that q′ = q/σ is the directional derivative of p′. Thus our task is reduced to
upper-bounding the probability
Pr[|p′(A)| ≤ ε · |DB p′(A)|]. (3.10)
To apply the Invariance Principle of Theorem 3.22 to Equation (3.10), we need to upper-








































= d · Inf i[p′] (by Equation (3.6))
≤ dτ. (by Equation (3.9))
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Thus all of the influences of p′ and q′ are at most dτ .
Finally, for every λ ∈ R, we have for independent n-dimensional standard Gaussians A
and B that
∥∥p′ + λ · q′∥∥22 = E [|p′(A) + λ · q′(A,B)|2]
= E[|p′(A)|2] + λ2 ·E[|q′(A,B)|2] + (2λ) ·E[p′(A) · q′(A,B)]. (3.11)
By Equation (3.8), we get that E[p′(A) · q′(A,B)] = 0. Hence, we get from Equation (3.11)
that ‖p′ + λ · q′‖22 ≥ ‖p′‖
2
2 ≥ Var[p′] = 1.
Thus p′ and q′ satisfy all assumptions of Theorem 3.22, with the influences bounded by
dτ . Applying Theorem 3.22 and then Theorem 3.17, we get the required upper bound on
the probability in Equation (3.10), concluding the proof.
Random block restrictions and concentrated polynomials
Definition 3.24 (Random block restriction). Suppose the variables of a polynomial are ar-
bitrarily partitioned into m blocks. A random block restriction ρ is obtained by the following
process:
1. Uniformly at random pick a block ` ∈ [m].
2. Assign each variable that is outside the chosen block ` a uniformly random value in
{−1, 1}, independently.
We use Bm to denote the distribution over all possible restrictions ρ generated by the above
process.
We need the following notion of “concentration” for polynomials.
Definition 3.25 (δ-concentrated polynomials). Let p be a degree-d multilinear polynomials
and f = sgn(p). For a universal constant L = 192, and parameters 0 < δ ≤ 1/2 and γ > 0,
we call p (and f) (δ, γ)-concentrated if
Var[p] ≤
(
L · log δ−1
)−γ·d
· ‖p‖22 .
We refer to (δ, 1)-concentrated polynomials as δ-concentrated.
A useful property of concentrated PTFs is that they are close to constant.
Lemma 3.26. For every degree PTF f = sgn(p) and every 0 < δ ≤ 1/2, if p is δ-
concentrated, then f is δ2-close to constant.
Proof. Let p′ = p − µ, where µ = E[p(A)], and let ν = (L · log δ−1)d for a constant L > 0
to be determined. Since p is δ-concentrated and ‖p‖22 = µ2 + Var[p], we get
µ2 ≥ (ν − 1) ·Var[p] ≥ ν4 ·Var[p],
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Note that for all points x ∈ {−1, 1}n where |p′(x)| < |µ|, we have sgn(p(x)) = sgn(µ).
Therefore,










≤ δ2, (by Theorem 3.13)
where the last inequality holds if we choose L ≥ 32.
3.3 Block Restriction Lemma: A simple bound
As a warm-up, we first prove a simpler bound on the probability that under random block
restrictions, a degree-d multilinear polynomial does not become concentrated.
Lemma 3.27 (Block Restriction Lemma: Simple Bound). For any degree-d multilinear
polynomial p, and any m ≥ 16, γ ≥ 1, 0 < δ ≤ 1/16, we have
Pr
ρ∼Bm








In this section, we show that it suffices to consider only regular polynomials. We start with
the following definition.
Definition 3.28. Let P(d,m, δ, γ) be the supremum, over all degree-d multilinear polyno-
mials p and all possible partitions of the variables into m blocks, of the probabilities
Pr
ρ∼Bm
[pρ is not (δ, γ)-concentrated] .
Let Preg(d,m, δ, γ, τ) be the same as P but only for τ -regular polynomials. We will use
P(d,m, δ) (resp. Preg(d,m, δ, τ)) for P(d,m, δ, 1) (resp. Preg(d,m, δ, 1, τ)).
Claim 3.29. For any m ≥ 1/16, γ > 0, and 0 < δ, τ ≤ 1/4, we have









Proof. Let p be a degree-dmultilinear polynomial with its variables petitioned intom blocks.
By Theorem 3.21, there exists a decision tree of depth at most
H = τ−1 · (d · log τ−1 · log δ−1)O(γ·d)
such that for a random leaf ω of the tree, the restricted polynomial pω (obtained from p
by fixing the variables on the branch leading to ω, as specified by the branch) is either
τ -regular or (δ, γ + 1)-concentrated, with probability at least 1 − δ. The given decision
tree partitions the Boolean cube {−1, 1}n into disjoint regions (sub-cubes) according to
the partial restrictions labelling the branches of the tree. Let us call a random restriction
ρ partition-respecting if it is consistent with some partial restriction labelling one of the
branches of the decision tree (i.e., the restriction does not select a block containing any of
the variables appearing on the branch, and the assignment to those variables agrees with
their corresponding values on the branch). We claim that the probability that a random
restriction ρ ∼ Bm is not partition-respecting is at most H/m.
Indeed, first note that choosing a random restriction ρ ∼ Bm is equivalent to first picking
a uniformly random assignment to all variables, and then un-assigning the variables in a
uniformly random block i ∈ [m]. Picking a uniformly random assignment to all variables is
equivalent to picking a random branch in our decision tree (setting some of the variables
to constants), and then randomly assigning the remaining variables (not appearing on the
branch). For each fixed variable on the branch, the probability that its corresponding block
is chosen when we pick a uniformly random block i ∈ [m] is 1/m. It follows by the union
bound that the overall probability that a random block i ∈ [m] contains some variable from
the given branch is at most H/m.







d · log τ−1 · log δ−1
)O(γ·d)
,
it suffices to upper-bound the probability
Pr
ρ∼Bm
[pρ is not (δ, γ)-concentrated]
only for partition-respecting restrictions ρ. This probability can be expressed as the expec-
tation over random leaves ω of the decision tree for f of the probability
Pr
ρ′∼Bm
[(pω)ρ′ is not (δ, γ)-concentrated],
where fω is the restriction of f to the leaf ω, and ρ′ is a random restriction on the variables
of fω (those not fixed by the branch leading to ω).
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Finally, as pω is neither τ -regular nor (δ, γ+ 1)-concentrated with probability at most δ
over random leaves ω, and a polynomial that is (δ, 2)-concentrated will stay (δ, 1)-concentrated
with probability at least 1− δ by Lemma 3.35, we get that









3.3.2 Proof of the simple bound
Given Claim 3.29, it remains to upper-bound the quantity Preg(d,m, δ, γ, τ). Here we show
the following.
Lemma 3.30. There is a constant c > 0 such that, for any m ≥ 1/16, γ ≥ 1, and
0 < δ, τ ≤ 1/4, we have









First we prove the following property of non-concentrated polynomials.
Lemma 3.31. For any 0 < δ ≤ 1/4 and γ ≥ 1, if a degree-d multilinear polynomial p is
not (δ, γ)-concentrated, then
Pr
[
|DB p(A)|2 ≥ (1/16) ·
(




≥ (1/4) · 9−d,
where L > 0 is the constant from Definition 3.25.
Proof. For the given multilinear polynomial p(x1, . . . , xn), define







which is easily seen to be a multilinear polynomial of degree at most d. Applying Theo-
rem 3.14 to q, we get that
Pr
[
|q(C)|2 ≥ (1/4) · ‖q‖22
]
≥ (1/2) · 9−d. (3.13)










= Inf [p] (by Equation (3.7))
≥ Var[p]. (by Theorem 3.19)
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Together with Equation (3.13), this implies that
Pr
[
|DB p(A)|2 ≥ (1/4) ·Var[p]
]
≥ (1/2) · 9−d. (3.14)
Applying the Markov inequality to p2, we get
Pr
[
|p(A)|2 ≥ (4 · 9d) · ‖p‖22
]
≤ (1/4) · 9−d. (3.15)
We conclude from Equations (3.14) and (3.15) that, with probability at least (1/4) ·9−d,
we have both
|DB p(A)|2 ≥ (1/4) ·Var[p] (3.16)
and
|p(A)|2 ≤ (4 · 9d) · ‖p‖22 . (3.17)
As p is assumed to be (δ, γ)-concentrated, we also have
Var[p] ≥
(
L · log δ−1
)−γ·d
· ‖p‖22 . (3.18)
Combining Equations (3.16) to (3.18) yields the required claim.
Definition 3.32. For p a non-zero polynomial, we define









By Lemma 3.31, we get the following.
Corollary 3.33. There is a constant c > 0 such that, for any 0 < δ ≤ 1/4 and γ ≥ 1, if a
degree-d multilinear polynomial p is not (δ, γ)-concentrated, then
α(p) ≥
(
c · log δ−1
)−γ·d
.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 3.30.
Proof of Lemma 3.30. For a block, `, we let A` denote the random assignment to the vari-
ables in ` and let A¯̀ denote the random assignment to the variables that are not in `. Then
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by the definition of random block restriction, we have
Pr
ρ∼Bm

















c · log δ−1
)γ·d














































































If p is a constant function, then its directional derivative is always 0, and hence the expec-































Combining Equations (3.19) and (3.20), we conclude that
Pr
ρ∼Bm










We can now finish the proof of Lemma 3.27.
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Proof of Lemma 3.27. Combining Claim 3.29 and Lemma 3.30, we get












d · log τ−1 · log δ−1
)O(γ·d)
.
Setting τ = m−
8d
8d+1 , we get the desired bound.
3.4 Block Restriction Lemma with optimal exponent: Weak
version
The bound in Lemma 3.27 has an undesirable dependence on the degree d in the exponent
of the interested parameter m. In this section, we prove a better bound that achieves the
optimal exponent in m. To illustrate the ideas of the proof techniques, we first prove the
following weaker version.
Lemma 3.34 (Block Restriction Lemma: Weak Version). For any degree-d multilinear
polynomial p, and any m ≥ 16, γ ≥ 1, and 0 < δ ≤ 1/16, we have
Pr
ρ∼Bm






d · logm · log δ−1
)O(γ·d2·log logm)
.
Our road map for the proof is as follows. We set up a recurrence (in Section 3.4.1),
reducing the analysis of random restrictions from Bm to that of random restrictions from
Bm/b, for a parameter b > 0. Solving this recurrence (in Section 3.4.2) will conclude the
proof of Lemma 3.34.
The reason for the recursive analysis is to be able to control the error coming from an
application of the invariance principle, Theorem 3.22. That error (of the form τ1/(8d)) has
an undesirable dependence on the degree d in the exponent, which would be overwhelming
if we try to apply a random block restriction ρ ∼ Bm in a single step, as in the proof of
Lemma 3.27 in Section 3.3. However, by viewing ρ as a two-step process, where we first
apply a random block restriction ρ1 ∼ Bb, and then apply another random block restriction
ρ2 ∼ Bm/b, we only need to ensure that the error coming from the invariance principle is
small relative to the value of 1/b (more precisely, b−1/2). By choosing b so that b−1/2 is equal
to τ1/(8d), we ensure that the error from the invariance principle is not overwhelming when
we reduce from the case of Bm to the case of Bm/b. Then we repeat this recursive process
enough times to get the final bound.
For simplicity, we only prove Lemma 3.34 for γ = 1. It is easy to modify the proof for
any γ.
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3.4.1 Setting up the recurrence
By Claim 3.29, we have
Pr
ρ∼Bm
[pρ is not δ-concentrated] ≤ Pr
ρ∼Bm





d · log τ−1 · log δ−1
)O(d)
+ 2δ,
where q is some τ -regular polynomial of degree at most d.
We now upper bound
Pr
ρ∼Bm
[qρ is not δ-concentrated].
Consider the following equivalent way of choosing a random block restriction ρ ∼ Bm. Let
0 < b ≤ m be an integer parameter.
1. Partition the m blocks of variables of p into b disjoint super-blocks, where each super-
block has m/b blocks.
2. Uniformly at random pick a super-block ` ∈ [b], and assign each variable that is
outside the chosen super-block ` a uniformly random value in {−1, 1}, independently.
3. Uniformly at random pick a block within super-block `, and assign each variable that
is outside the chosen block a uniformly random value in {−1, 1}, independently.
To avoid some technicalities due to divisibility that can be overcome easily by adding dummy
blocks, we assume here that m is divisible by b.
Note that step 2 above is an application of random block restriction on b blocks, and
step 3 is an application of random block restriction on m/b blocks. Then we have
Pr
ρ∼Bm
[qρ is not δ-concentrated] = Pr
ρ1∼Bb,ρ2∼Bm/b
[(qρ1)ρ2 is not δ-concentrated].
Let E(ρ1) denote the random event that qρ1 is (δ, 2)-concentrated. By conditioning on this
event, we get that the probability above equals
Pr
ρ1,ρ2
[(qρ1)ρ2 is not δ-concentrated | E(ρ1)] ·Prρ1 [E(ρ1)]
+ Pr
ρ1,ρ2
[(qρ1)ρ2 is not δ-concentrated | ¬E(ρ1)] ·Prρ1 [¬E(ρ1)]. (3.21)
The first summand in Equation (3.21) contains the quantity
Pr
ρ1,ρ2
[(qρ1)ρ2 is not δ-concentrated | qρ1 is (δ, 2)-concentrated]. (3.22)
To bound this quantity, we use the following which says a concentrated polynomial is likely
to remain concentrated under random block restrictions.
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[pρ is not (δ, γ)-concentrated] ≤ δ.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary block ` ∈ [m]. Let S be the set of variables in block ` and S̄ be the
set of variables outside block ` (i.e., S is the set of unrestricted variables and S̄ is the set
of restricted variables). Then we can write
p(AS , AS̄) = q(AS , AS̄) + r(AS̄) + µ,
where r contains all the monomials in p that only depend on variables in S̄, and µ = E[p(A)].
Also, for ρ ∈ {−1, 1}|S̄|, let µ′(ρ) = r(ρ) + µ, and define Q(ρ) = ‖q(AS , ρ)‖22 = Var[pρ]. It








Inf [p] ≥ 13d · ‖Q‖2 . (3.23)
Now let ν =
(
L · log δ−1





Var[pρ] ≥ ν−γ · ‖pρ‖22
]
≤ δ. (3.24)




Q(ρ) ≥ ν−γ · |µ′(ρ)|2
]
≤ δ. (3.25)
We first prove the following claim.






8 · d · 3d · ‖Q‖2
]
≤ δ/2.
Proof. We have for all ρ,
|µ′(ρ)| = |µ+ r(ρ)|
≥ |µ| − |r(ρ)|
≥
√




2 ·Var[p]− |r(ρ)|, (3.26)
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where the third line above is by the assumption that p is (δ, γ + 1)-concentrated. Also, by

































































8 · d · 3d · ‖Q‖2
]




Q(ρ) ≥ ν8 · d · 3d · ‖Q‖2
]
+ δ/2
≤ δ, (by Theorem 3.13)
which completes the proof of Equation (3.24) and hence the lemma.
Now by Lemma 3.35, the quantity in Equation (3.22) is at most δ. The second summand
in Equation (3.21) is the product of two probabilities, the first of which is the same as for
the original problem but with the restriction parameter m/b instead of m, and so can be
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analyzed inductively. By our arguments above, we get the recurrence:





d · log τ−1 · log δ−1
)O(d)
. (3.28)
Therefore, to reduce from P(d,m, δ) to P(d,m/b, δ), it remains to bound
Preg(d, b, δ, 2, τ).
However, by Lemma 3.30, we know that









3.4.2 Solving the recurrence
We are now ready to finish the proof of Lemma 3.34.
Proof of Lemma 3.34. Let b = dm1/(8d)e and τ = m−1/2. Note that b−1/2 ≤ m−1/(16d). Then
by Equation (3.28) and Equation (3.29) we get that
P(d,m, δ) ≤ m−1/2 ·
(








c · log δ−1
)2d
·m−1/(16d) · P(d,m/b, δ). (3.30)
We now show the following:
P(d,m, δ) ≤ (m−1/2 + δ) · (d · logm · log δ−1)16Ed2 log logm, (3.31)
where E is a sufficiently large constant.
We proceed by induction on m. The base case is m ≤ 2d. In this case, the right hand
side of Equation (3.31) is greater than 1 when E is sufficiently large and Equation (3.31)
holds trivially. Now suppose Equation (3.31) holds for all smaller values of m. Let M =
d · logm · log δ−1. By Equation (3.30), we obtain the recurrence
P(d,m, δ) ≤ (m−1/2 + δ) ·ME·d +m−1/(16d) · P(d,m/b, δ) ·ME·d, (3.32)
for a sufficiently large constant E. Then by the induction hypothesis, we get
m−1/(16d) · P(d,m/b, δ) ·ME·d
≤ m−1/(16d) · (2 ·m−1/2+1/(16d) + δ) · (d · log(m/b) · log δ−1)16Ed2 log log(m/b) ·ME·d
≤ 2 · (m−1/2 + δ) ·M16Ed2 log log(m/b) ·ME·d, (3.33)
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where the first inequality above uses the fact that (m/b)−1/2 ≤ 2 ·m−1/2+1/(16d) for m > 2d.
Combining Equation (3.32) and Equation (3.33), we have
P(d,m, δ) ≤ (m−1/2 + δ) · 3 ·M16Ed2 log log(m/b)+E·d.
Note that
log log(m/b) ≤ log log(m1−1/(8d))
= log(1− 1/(8d)) + log logm
≤ −1/(8d) + log logm.
Therefore, when E is sufficiently large, we have
3 ·M16Ed2 log log(m/b)+E·d ≤ 3 ·M16Ed2 log log(m)−E·d ≤M16Ed2 log log(m),
as required.
3.5 Block Restriction Lemma with optimal exponent: Strong
version
In this section, we prove a stronger version of Lemma 3.34. Note that for d = 1, the notation
O(d · log d) below should be interpreted as O(1) (rather than 0).
Lemma 3.37 (Block Restriction Lemma: Strong Version). For any degree-d multilinear
polynomial p, any m ≥ 16, γ ≥ 1, and 0 < δ ≤ 1/16, we have
Pr
ρ∼Bm
[pρ is not (δ, γ)-concentrated] ≤ (m−1/2 + δ) · (logm)O(γ·d·log d) · (log δ−1)O(γ·d
2).
We follow a strategy similar to that in the proof of Lemma 3.34, except we do not
bound the number of blocks where the polynomial p restricted to that block has its α
function (see Definition 3.32) greater than some fixed threshold
(
c · log δ−1
)−d. Using such
a rigid threshold for declaring a polynomial not δ-concentrated results in significant losses
at each iteration of the recursion. To get an improved analysis, we instead keep track of an
upper bound on the expected value of the function α(p), throughout the recursion. Such an
upper bound provides a soft measure of the likelihood that the current function is still not
δ-concentrated (cf. Corollary 3.33).
Thus, our proof of Lemma 3.37 will be as follows. We first argue (in Section 3.5.1) that
it suffices to consider regular polynomials. Then we set up a recurrence (in Section 3.5.2),
reducing the case of restrictions from Bm to that of restrictions from Bm/b, for a parameter
b > 0. Finally, we solve the recurrence (in Section 3.5.3) to conclude the proof of Lemma 3.37.
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As in the previous section, we only show for γ = 1 and note that the proof works for
any γ.
3.5.1 Regularization
We shall modify our earlier definition of P and Preg, using the function α from Defini-
tion 3.32.
Definition 3.38. Let P(d,m, δ, a) be the supremum, over all degree-d polynomials p with
α(p) ≤ a and all possible partitions of the variables into m blocks, of the probabilities
Pr
ρ∼Bm
[pρ is not δ-concentrated] .
Let Preg(d,m, δ, a, τ) be the same as P but only for τ -regular polynomials.
We show that the analysis of P can be reduced to that of Preg.
Lemma 3.39. For any real 0 < τ, δ < 1/4 and a > 0, integer m > 4 and d, b ≥ 1, we have
P(d,m, δ, a) ≤ 1
m
· τ−1 · (d · log τ−1 · log δ−1)O(d) + 2δ + E
ℵ
[Preg(d,m, δ,ℵ, τ)],
where ℵ is a non-negative random variable with E[ℵ] ≤ O (a).
Proof. Let p be a degree-dmultilinear polynomial with its variables petitioned intom blocks
and α(p) ≤ a. Consider the decision tree given by Theorem 3.21 with ε = δ and γ = 2. Note
that the depth of this decision tree is
H = τ−1 · (d · log τ−1 · log δ−1)O(d).
We view ρ as ρ = (`, λ), where ` is the selected block and λ is an uniform restriction
to the variables outside block `. For each leaf ω, let Rω be the set of random restrictions
consistent with the branch leading to ω. As observed above, the probability ξ of choosing a
restriction from the complement of ∪ωRω is at most H/m. We get
Pr
ρ∼Bm
[pρ is not δ-concentrated] ≤ (1− ξ) · Pr
ρ∈∪ωRω
[pρ is not δ-concentrated] + ξ. (3.34)




[pρ is not δ-concentrated | ρ ∈ Rω] ·Pr[ρ ∈ Rω | ρ ∈ ∪ωRω].
Note that the probability of choosing ρ ∈ Rω conditioned on ρ ∈ ∪ωRω is 2−`ω · (1 −
ξ)−1, where `ω is the length of the branch leading to ω. Hence, the right-hand side of
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[pρ is not δ-concentrated]] + ξ.
Each restriction ρ = (`, λ) ∈ Rω can be viewed as a restriction of the variables on
the branch leading to ω (as specified by the branch) plus an uniform restriction λ′ to the
remaining variables outside block `. So we can express pρ as (pω)ρ′ , where ρ′ = (`, λ′).
Note that ρ′ is a random block restriction on m blocks, which comes from the set of
those restrictions that chose block ` outside at most H blocks containing the variables on
the branch leading to ω. The set of all such restrictions ρ′ has the probability mass at least
1 −H/m within the set of all random block restrictions ρω (which pick block ` uniformly
















[(pω)ρω is not δ-concentrated]] + ξ + 2(H/m),














Note that a leaf ω can be in one of the three cases.
1. The polynomial restricted by ω is neither τ -regular nor (δ, 2)-concentrated.
2. The polynomial restricted by ω is (δ, 2)-concentrated.
3. The polynomial restricted by ω is not (δ, 2)-concentrated but τ -regular.
Then the contribution from the ω’s in case i ∈ [3] to the expected value in Equation (3.35)
is ∑
ω in case i
Pr
ρω∼Bm
[(pω)ρω is not δ-concentrated] ·Pr[ω].
By Theorem 3.21, the contribution form those ω’s in the first case is at most ε = δ. If ω is in
the second case, then by Lemma 3.35, the probability over ρω that (pω)ρω is not δ-concentrated
is at most δ, so those ω’s contribute at most δ. Finally, the contribution from those ω’s in
the third case is at most
E
ω
[Preg(d,m, δ, α(pω), τ)] .
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Therefore, we have
P(d,m, δ, a) ≤ 1
m
· τ−1 · (d · log τ−1 · log δ−1)O(d) + 2δ + E
ω
[Preg(d,m, δ, α(pω), τ)].
To complete the proof, we need to show that
E
ω














































≤ 72 · a,
as required.
3.5.2 Setting up the recurrence
We show the following recurrence relation for regular polynomials.
Lemma 3.40. For any real 0 < τ, δ < 1/4 and a > 0, integer m > 4 and d, b ≥ 1, we have
Preg(d,m, δ, a, τ) ≤ E
ℵ
[P(d,m/b, δ,ℵ)],





We shall need the following analogue of the function α(p) for the Gaussian case.
Definition 3.41. For p a non-zero polynomial, we define









The functions α(p) and β(p) are related in the following way.
Lemma 3.42. Let p be a degree-d, τ -regular, non-zero polynomial. Then









































In Lemma 3.40, we want to keep track of α(p) in the recurrence, and so we need a
version of the anticoncentration bound that takes α(p) into account. This is achieved by
the following version of Theorem 3.17 that takes β(p) into account.
Theorem 3.43 ([Kan14]). For any d-degree polynomial p and any 0 < ε < 1, we have





We get the following.
Corollary 3.44. For any d-degree τ -regular non-constant multilinear polynomial p, and
any ε > 0, we have
Pr[|p(A)| ≤ ε · |DB p(A)|] = O
(
d3 · ε · β(p) + d · τ1/(8d)
)
.
Proof. The proof is the same as that of Corollary 3.23, with Theorem 3.43 replacing Theo-
rem 3.17.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 3.40.
Proof of Lemma 3.40. Let p be a τ -regular, degree-d, multilinear polynomial with Var[p(x)] =
1 and α(p) ≤ a. Consider the way of choosing a random block restriction as described in
Section 3.4.1. Recall that ρ1 is a random block restriction on b blocks and ρ2 is a random




[pρ is not δ-concentrated] = Pr
ρ1∼Bb,ρ2∼Bm/b










[P(d,m/b, δ, α(pρ1))] .
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where A¯̀ is a random assignment to the variables that are not in block `. From the calcu-


















































3.5.3 Solving the recurrence
Since α(p) ≤ 1 by definition, we have P(d,m, δ) = P(d,m, δ, 1). Thus, to prove Lemma 3.37,
it suffices to prove the following stronger result, and apply it with a = 1.
Theorem 3.45. There is a constant B > 0 such that, for any d > 0, m ≥ 16, 0 < δ ≤ 1/16
and 0 < a ≤ 1, we have
P(d,m, δ, a) ≤ (a ·m−1/2 + δ) · (logm)B·d·log d · (log δ−1)B·d2 . (3.37)
Proof. First we argue that, for a sufficiently large constant B > 0, we may assume that a
and m are relatively large.
Claim 3.46. For a sufficiently large constant B > 0, we may assume that both
a ≥ (c · log δ−1)−2d, (3.38)
and
m1/(32·d) ≥ (c · log δ−1)2d, (3.39)
where c > 0 is the constant from Corollary 3.33.
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Proof of Claim 3.46. If Equation (3.38) is false, then, by Corollary 3.33, the given poly-
nomial is (δ, 2)-concentrated, and by Lemma 3.35, the probability that its random block
restriction is not δ-concentrated is at most δ, and so Equation (3.37) is satisfied. Next,
assume Equation (3.38), and suppose that Equation (3.39) is false. Then we get that
a·m−1/2 > (log δ−1)−T ·d2 , for some constant T > 0, implying that a·m−1/2·(log δ−1)B·d2 > 1,
for B ≥ T + 1. Hence, the right-hand side of Equation (3.37) is greater than 1 in this case,
and so Equation (3.37) holds.
By Claim 3.46, we can assume for the rest of the proof that Equations (3.38) and (3.39)
both hold.
Claim 3.47. There is a constant E > 0 such that, for any m ≥ 16 and 0 < δ ≤ 1/16, we
have
P(d,m, δ, a) ≤ 12 · (a ·m




where ℵ is a non-negative random variable with E[ℵ] = O
(
d4 · a ·m−1/(32d)
)
.
Proof. Let τ = m−1/2 and b = dm1/(16d)d. By Lemma 3.39, we get that
P(d,m, δ, a) ≤ m−1/2 · (d · logm · log δ−1)O(d) + 2δ + E
ℵ1
[Preg(d,m, δ,ℵ1,m−1/3)], (3.41)
for some non-negative random variable ℵ1 with E[ℵ1] ≤ O (a). By Equation (3.38), we get
m−1/2 · (d · logm · log δ−1)O(d) +2δ ≤ 12 · (a ·m
−1/2 +δ) · (logm)E·d·log d · (log δ−1)E·d2 , (3.42)
for a sufficiently large constant E > 0. Next, by Lemma 3.40, we get
E
ℵ1










for some non-negative random variable ℵ with
E[ℵ] = O
(








d4 · a ·m−1/(32d)
)
. (by Equations (3.38) and (3.39))
Equations (3.42) and (3.43) imply Equation (3.40).
We now prove Theorem 3.45 by induction on m. We start with the base case m ≤ 2d.
By Equation (3.38), we only need to consider a ≥ (c · log δ−1)−2d. Note that in this case, the
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bound in Theorem 3.45 is greater 1 when B is sufficiently large. Now suppose Theorem 3.45
holds for all smaller values of m. Let M = (logm)Bd log(d) · (log δ−1)Bd2 for B > E to be
determined, where E is the constant in Claim 3.47. By Claim 3.47, we have
P(d,m, δ, a) ≤ 12 · (a ·m
−1/2 + δ) ·M + E
ℵ
[P(d,m/dm1/(16d)d, δ,ℵ)],
where ℵ is a non-negative random variable with E[ℵ] = C · d4 · a ·m−1/(32d) and C is some







(ℵ · 2 ·m−1/2+1/(32d) + δ) · (logm1−1/(16d))Bd log(d) · (log δ−1)Bd2
]
≤ 2 · (E
ℵ
[ℵ] ·m−1/2+1/(32d) + δ) · (1− 1/(16d))Bd log(d) ·M
≤ 2 · (C · d4 · a ·m−1/(32d) ·m−1/2+1/(32d) + δ) · (1− 1/(16d))Bd log(d) ·M
= 2 · C · d4 · (1− 1/(16d))Bd log(d) · (a ·m−1/2 + δ) ·M
≤ 2 · C · d4 · e−B log(d)/16 · (a ·m−1/2 + δ) ·M
≤ 12 · (a ·m
−1/2 + δ) ·M,
where the last inequality holds if B is sufficiently large.
Note that the only reason why we have the factor (log δ−1)O(d2) rather than (log δ−1)O(d)
in Equation (3.37) is to justify the assumption in Equation (3.39). If we assume this con-
dition explicitly, then we get the following slightly stronger version of the PTF restriction
lemma for δ not too small.
Lemma 3.48. For any degree-d multilinear p, any m ≥ 16, and any 0 < δ < 1/16 such
that m1/(64·d) ≥ (c · log δ−1)d for the constant c > 0 from Corollary 3.33, we have
Pr
ρ∼Bm
[pρ is not δ-concentrated] ≤ (m−1/2 + δ) · (logm)O(d log d) · (log δ−1)O(d).
3.6 Applications
3.6.1 Lower bounds for depth-2 circuits with PTF gates
Here we generalize the gate and wire complexity lower bound of [KW16] for Andreev’s
function against depth-2 circuits with LTF gates, to depth-2 circuits with degree-d PTF
gates, for any d ≥ 1. Our lower bounds match those of [KW16] for the case of d = 1 (up to
polylogarithmic factors), and extend to any degree d
√
(logn)/(log logn).
The main technical tool used by [KW16] was a restriction lemma saying, roughly, that an
n-variate LTF function hit by some “structured” random restriction that leaves (logn) vari-




lemma is then combined with a careful counting argument to show that Andreev’s function
requires depth-2 LTF circuits with at least Ω(n1.5/(log3 n)) gates, and Ω(n2.5/(log7/2 n))
wires.
The restriction lemma of [KW16] is proved using the Littlewood-Offord lemma from
additive combinatorics [LO43]. It is not clear how to prove a similar restriction lemma for
higher degree d > 1 using the same tools. However, we show that our Block Restriction
Lemma yields such a generalization for any 1 ≤ d 
√
(logn)/(log logn). The reason is
that we can make the parameter δ in Lemma 3.37 very small compared to the number of
unrestricted variables so that, for the restricted function being δ-close to constant is the
same as being constant. We start by proving the following restriction lemma for PTFs.
Lemma 3.49. Let f be any n-variate degree-d PTF. Let P be a partition of [n] into parts
of equal-sized with |P| ≤ n/16 , and let RP be the distribution on restrictions ρ : [n] →
{−1, 1, ∗} that randomly selects one variables from each part of P and restricts all other
variables uniformly at random. Then
Pr
ρ∼RP
[fρ is not a constant] ≤
1√
n
· (|P| · logn)O(d
2) . (3.44)
Moreover, if f depends on at most w of its inputs, then
Pr
ρ∼RP
[fρ is not a univariate function] ≤
1
n3/2
· w · (|P| · logn)O(d
2) . (3.45)
Proof. Consider the following equivalent way of choosing a random restriction ρ ∼ RP .
1. Create m = n|P| blocks. For each part in P, randomly assign the
n
|P| variables in the
part to the m blocks so that each block takes exactly one of the variables from the
part.
2. Apply a random block restriction ρ′ ∼ Bm based on the partition in the previous step.
By Lemma 3.37 and Lemma 3.26, for any partition into blocks generated in the first step
above, the probability over the restrictions in the second step that the restricted PTF is
not δ-close to constant is at most√ |P|
n
+ δ












. In this case, the restricted function, which is on |P|
variables and δ-close to constant, is indeed a constant. Note that for such δ, Equation (3.46)
implies Equation (3.44).
Next, for each wire i ∈ [w], define the following random event Ei: the function fρ
depends on wire i and on some other wire. Note that if Ei happens, then wire i is assigned
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∗ by ρ which happens with probability |P|/n, and that both (fρ)wi=−1 and (fρ)wi=1 are
non-constant functions. It is not hard to see that given wire i is assigned ∗, the probability





[((fρ1)w=−1)ρ2 is not a constant], (3.47)
where ρ1 is a random partial assignment to the wires (except wire i) in the part that
contains wire i, and ρ2 is a restriction that randomly selects one variable from each of
the rest |P| − 1 parts and fixes all other variables uniformly at random. Then the inner
probability in Equation (3.47) can be upperbounded by Equation (3.44).
Pr
ρ∼RP






≤ w · |P|
n
· 2 · 1√
n
· ((|P| − 1) · logn)O(d
2) ,
implying Equation (3.45).
To simplify the presentation, we only argue the worst-case lower bound; a correlation
bound as in [KW16] can also be proved in a similar way. We prove a lower bound for the
Andreev’s function.
Definition 3.50. Define Andreev’s function An : {−1, 1}5n → {−1, 1} as follows:
An(x1, . . . , x4n, y1, . . . , yn) = xi,
where i ∈ [4n] is a positive integer uniquely given by the binary string z ∈ {−1, 1}log 4n
obtained as follows: partition [n] into log 4n parts so that each part has t = nlog 4n variables,
and the j-th part Pj is the set {y(j−1)·t+k : k = 1, . . . , t}. Then zj =
∏
yk∈Pj yk.
For simplicity, we assume here that n is divisible by log 4n. We show the following gate
and wire lower bounds for An against depth-2 circuits with d-degree PTF gates; for d = 1,
these bounds match those of [KW16], up to polylogarithmic factors.
Theorem 3.51 (Lower bounds for depth-2 degree-d PTF circuits). Every depth-2 circuit on


















For the proof of Theorem 3.51, we shall need the following straightforward generalization
to degree-d PTFs of the result in [RSO94] about the number of LTFs on s inputs, where each
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input is some Boolean function of n variables; the latter result is in turn a generalization of
[Win61, Cho61].
Theorem 3.52 ([RSO94]). For any degree-d PTF g on s variables, and any collection of
Boolean functions f1, . . . , fs : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}, the n-variate Boolean function
h(~x) = g(f1(~x), . . . , fs(~x))
where ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {−1, 1}n, can be completely specified using O(sd · n) bits.
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.52, we get the following.
Corollary 3.53. Every depth-2 circuit on n inputs with s degree-d PTF gates can be com-
pletely specified using at most O
(
(s+ n)d · n+ (s+ n) · nd+1
)
bits.
Now we are ready to complete the proof of Theorem 3.51.
Proof of Theorem 3.51. For an arbitrary ~a = (a1, . . . , a4n) ∈ {−1, 1}4n, let
F (y1, . . . , yn) = An(a1, . . . , a4n, y1, . . . , yn).
Towards contradiction, suppose that An, and hence also F , is computable by a depth-2
circuit with degree-d PTF gates of wire or gate complexity less than the bounds claimed
in the theorem statement (for sufficiently large constants in the O(d2) exponents of the
polylog factors). Let P be the partition of [n] into log 4n parts of equal size as specified in
Definition 3.50. We then apply a random restriction ρ ∼ RP to the function F (y1, . . . , yn).
Then Fρ can be used to reconstruct, in the information-theoretic sense (say, in the sense of
Kolmogorov complexity) the string ~a (by the definition of An). More precisely, to reconstruct
~a, it suffices to know the restriction ρ plus the description of some circuit computing Fρ.
The restriction ρ can be described using at most 2n bits (by specifying for each i ∈ [n]
whether it is 1, −1, or unrestricted). Next we bound the size of a circuit computing Fρ, for
some ρ satisfying the above condition.
By Lemma 3.49, the expected number of bottom PTF gates of the depth-2 circuit
computing Fρ(y1, . . . , yn) is at most s0 = n1/d/(logn)O(d
2) (if either the number of gates or
the number of wires of F is small). By the Markov inequality, the probability over ρ ∼ RP
that the actual number s of gates of the circuit for Fρ is more than 2 · s0 is at most 1/2.
It follows that with probability at least 1/2, we get a random restriction ρ ∼ RP such
that Fρ has at most 2 · s0 gates. By Corollary 3.53, the circuit for Fρ is described with at
most n bits.
We conclude that every ~a ∈ {−1, 1}4n can be described with at most 2n+ n = 3n bits.
However, by a simple counting argument, we know that almost all 4n-bit strings ~a require
the description size strictly greater than 3n. A contradiction.
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3.6.2 Lower bounds for depth-3 circuits with PTF gates
Here we generalize the lower bound of [KW16] against circuits that are majority votes of
depth-2 LTF circuits, to majority votes of depth-2 circuits with degree-d PTF gates. In
[KW16], it was shown that there exists a polynomial time function that requires circuits




wires. Here, we show a lower bound
against circuits that can have sub-exponential size as long as the total fan-in of the bottom
layer gates is small.
We first define a generalized Andreev function. Recall that a (ζ, L)-list-decodable code
is a function K : {−1, 1}k → {−1, 1}n that maps k-bits messages to n-bits codewords such
that for any codeword y ∈ {−1, 1}n, there are at most L codewords in the range of K that
have relative hamming distance within ζ from y. We will use the following list-decodable
code (see, e.g., [CKK+15] for its construction).
Theorem 3.54. For any given 0 < ε < 1, there exists a binary code K mapping 4n-bit mes-








. Furthermore, there is a polynomial-time algorithm for computing K(x)
in position z, for any inputs x ∈ {−1, 1}4n and z ∈ {−1, 1}n
ε
.
Definition 3.55. Let 0 < ε < 0. Define the function Bn,ε : {−1, 1}5n → {−1, 1} as follows:
Bn,ε(x1, . . . , x4n, y1, . . . , yn) = K(x)i,
where K is the code from Theorem 3.54, and i ∈ [2nε ] is a positive integer uniquely given
by the binary string z ∈ {−1, 1}n
ε
obtained as follows: partition [n] into nε/d2 parts so that




Note that the function above is polynomial-time computable since we can compute K(x)
in position i in polynomial time.
We are now ready to prove the lower bound.
Theorem 3.56. For any 1logn  ε < 1, let C be a majority vote of depth-2 circuits with
degree-d PTF gates such that the top majority gate has fanin at most 2nε and the total








· (nε · logn)−c·d
2
, where c is a
constant. Then C cannot compute Bn,ε.
Proof. Let a ∈ {−1, 1}4n be a string with Kolmogorov complexity at least 4n, and let
F (y1, . . . , yn) = Bn,ε(a1, . . . , a4n, y1, . . . , yn).
Let D be an arbitrary depth-2 circuit in nε variables with degree-d PTF gates, of size
at most s0 = n1/d−O(ε·d
2). Note that by Corollary 3.53, D can be described with at most n
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bits. Let P be the partition of [n] into nε parts of equal size as specified in Definition 3.55.
We claim that for any ρ ∼ RP ,
Corr(Fρ, D) < 2−n
ε
.
Toward a contradiction, suppose D agrees with Fρ on at least 1/2 + 2−nε of the inputs for
some ρ. Then we can recover a as follows. We first use the circuit D and the string ρ to
compute the corrupted codeword K ′ such that K ′ and K(a) have relative hamming distance





which must contain K(a). Finally, we use an index string of length at most log(L) to get
K(a) from the list of codewords and recover a. This shows that we can use fewer than 4n
bits to describe a, which contradicts the assumption that a has Kolmogorov complexity at
least 4n.
Next, let Ca be the circuit obtained from C by setting the first 4n variables to be a, and
let ρ0 ∼ RP be a restriction such that (Ca)ρ0 has at most s0 gates on the bottom layer. The
existence of such a restriction is guaranteed by Equation (3.45), when the total fanin of the
bottom layer gates is at most w and c is sufficiently large. By the nature of majority function
and a simple averaging argument, we know that (Ca)ρ0 must have correlation at least 2−n
ε
with one of its sub-circuits, which is a depth-2 circuit in nε variables with degree-d PTF
gates, of size at most s0. Thus, we conclude that Ca cannot compute F .
3.6.3 Lower bounds for constant-depth circuits with PTF gates
Here we extend the wire complexity correlation bounds of [CSS18] for parity and the gener-
alized Andreev’s function against constant-depth circuits with LTF gates to constant-depth
circuits with degree-d PTF gates, for any d ≥ 1. We do this by generalizing the structural
lemma for LTFs used in [CSS18] to degree-d PTFs.




[fρ is not δ-close to constant] ≤ (
√
r + δ) · (log r−1 · log δ−1)O(d2).
Proof. Let r0 be so that r−10 = br−1c. Then we have
Pr
ρ∼Rr
[fρ is not δ-close to constant] = Pr
ρ1∼Rr0 ,ρ2∼Rr/r0
[(fρ1)ρ2 is not δ-close to constant] .
(3.48)
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Let E(ρ1) denote the random event that fρ1 is δ2-close to constant. Then Equation (3.48)
can be expressed as
Pr
ρ1,ρ2
[(fρ1)ρ2 is not δ-close to constant | ¬E(ρ1)] ·Prρ1 [¬E(ρ1)]
+ Pr
ρ1,ρ2
[(fρ1)ρ2 is not δ-close to constant | E(ρ1)] ·Prρ1 [E(ρ1)] (3.49)
By the fact that a function δ2-close to constant is expected to remain δ2-close to constant un-
der random restrictions and by Markov’s inequality, the second summand in Equation (3.49)






r + δ) · (log r−1 · log δ−1)O(d2).








r0 + δ) · (log r−10 · log δ−1)O(d
2). (3.50)
Equation (3.50) follows immediately from Lemma 3.37 and Lemma 3.26 by noting the
following equivalent way of choosing a random restriction ρ1 ∼ Rr0 .
1. Randomly partition the variables of f into m = 1/r0 disjoint blocks, where each
variable is assigned to block i ∈ [m], independently, with probability 1/m.
2. Apply a random block restriction ρ′ ∼ Bm based on the partition in the previous step.
We now state our correlation bounds against constant-depth circuits with PTF gates.
Let PARITYn denote the parity function on n variables, and let A′n ∈ P denote the variant
of Andreev’s function on 5n variables as defined in [CKK+15].3 For Boolean functions
f, g : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}, recall that the correlation between f and g is
Corr(f, g) =
∣∣∣∣∣ Ex∼{−1,1}n [f(x) · g(x)]
∣∣∣∣∣ .
We get the following correlation bounds.
Theorem 3.58. For any D ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ d 
√
logn/ log logn, let C be any depth-
D circuit on n inputs with degree-d PTF gates, of wire complexity at most n1+εD , where
3We have A′n(x1, . . . , x4n, y1, . . . , yn) = Enc(x1, . . . , x4n)Ext(y1,...,yn), where Enc(·) denotes the encoding
with a certain error-correcting code, and Ext(·) is a certain extractor; see [CKK+15] or [CSS18] for more
details.
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Theorem 3.59. For any D ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ d (logn/ log logn)1/(2D−1), let C be any depth-
D circuit on 5n inputs with degree-d PTF gates, of wire complexity at most n1+µD,d, where
µD,d = (E · d)−(2D−1), for some constant E > 0. Then we have
Corr(C,A′n) ≤ exp(−nµD,d/2).
Remark 3.60. In Theorem 3.58, the exponent εD in the correlation bound does not de-
pend on the degree d of the PTF gates in the circuit C, and stays polynomially small
even for super-constant degree d 
√
logn/ log logn. In Theorem 3.59, the correlation
bound is exponentially small for a constant degree d, and is super-polynomially small for
d (logn/ log logn)1/(2D−1).
The proofs of Theorem 3.58 and Theorem 3.59 are analogous to those in [CSS18] for
the case of LTF circuits, with just a couple of changes. The proofs are by induction on
the depth D. For the proof of correlation bounds with parity in [CSS18], the base case is
the noise sensitivity bound for LTFs due to Peres [Per04]; for the proof of Theorem 3.58,
we can use the noise sensitivity bound for degree-d PTFs due to Kane [Kan14]. For the
correlation bounds with Andreev’s function, the base case in [CSS18] needs an upper bound
on the number of distinct LTFs on n variables; we can use the bound for PTFs given by
Theorem 3.52. Finally, for the inductive step, [CSS18] use their LTF restriction lemma to
show that, under a particular type of random restriction, with high probability, a depth-D
circuit with LTF gates will become close to some circuit of depth D − 1. We can use our





, for a sufficiently large constant c).
3.6.4 Influence bound for PTFs
Here we show that Kane’s bound on the total influence (average sensitivity) of degree-d
PTFs is a corollary of our Block Restriction Lemma.
Theorem 3.61 ([Kan14]). For any d-degree PTF f on n > 1 variables, we have
Inf [f ] ≤
√
n · (logn)O(d log d) · 2O(d2 log d).
Proof. We first partition the variables into n blocks so that each block contains exactly
one variable. We then apply a variant of our Block Restriction Lemma, Lemma 3.48, with
δ = 1/n2. For
d ≤
√
(logn)/(c′ · log logn), (3.51)
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for some constant c′ > 0, the assumption of Lemma 3.48 on the largeness of δ is satisfied.
Note that since the restricted function is on one variable, being (1/n2)-close to constant is
the same as being constant. Therefore, by Lemma 3.48 and Lemma 3.26, we get
Pr
ρ∼Bn
[fρ is not a constant] ≤ n−1/2 · (logn)O(d log d). (3.52)
Also, by the definition of random block restriction, we have
Pr
ρ∼Bn









fAī is not a constant
]
, (3.53)









[f(x) 6= f(x⊕i)] = Inf i[f ]. (3.54)
Combining Equation (3.53) and Equation (3.54), we have
n∑
i=1
Inf i[f ] = n · Pr
ρ∼Bn
[fρ is not a constant] .
Together with Equation (3.52), we get
Inf [f ] ≤
√
n · (logn)O(d log d). (3.55)
Note that Equation (3.55) holds for small degrees d satisfying Equation (3.51). If we multiply
the right-hand side of Equation (3.55) by 2O(d2 log d), we ensure that the bound on influence
holds also for all large d (as then the right-hand side of Equation (3.55) becomes at least
n, which is a trivial upper bound on Inf [f ]).
3.6.5 Littlewood-Offord type anticoncentration bounds for polynomials
Here we use our Block Restriction Lemma to drive the following anticoncentration bounds
for degree-d multilinear polynomials.
Theorem 3.62 ([MNV16]). For any real interval I, and any degree-d multilinear polynomial
p such that there exists a set of t disjoint monomials in p, each of which is maximal (i.e.,
not contained by any other monomials) and has coefficient at least |I| in magnitude, we
have
Pr[p(A) ∈ I] ≤ t−1/2 · (log t)O(d log d) · 2O(d2 log d).
Proof. Our proof is very similar to that of [MNV16], except they used Kane’s bound of
Theorem 3.61, whereas we use a variant of our Block Restriction Lemma (Lemma 3.48).
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Without loss of generality, we can assume I is centered at 0; otherwise, the center of I is c
and we can bound the probability that the polynomial p′ = p − c takes values within the
interval I ′ centered at 0 with |I ′| = |I|.
We first partition the variables into t blocks so that p restricted to each block (i.e., the
restricted polynomial that only depends on the variables in that block) has at least one
monomial with the coefficient at least |I| in magnitude. Consider the following equivalent
way of sampling a uniformly random input to p: apply a block restriction based on the
partition above and randomly assign 1 or −1 to the variables in the unrestricted block.
Then we have that





[pρ(C) ∈ I | pρ is not δ-concentrated] ·Pr
ρ
[pρ is not δ-concentrated]
+ Pr
ρ,C
[pρ(C) ∈ I | pρ is δ-concentrated] ·Pr
ρ
[pρ is δ-concentrated], (3.56)
where C is a multidimensional Bernoulli random variable.
Let δ = t−1/2. By Lemma 3.48, we have
Pr
ρ∼Bt
[pρ is not δ-concentrated] ≤ t−1/2 · (log t)O(d log d) · 2O(d
2 log d). (3.57)
Note that we multiply by the factor 2O(d2 log d) on the right-hand side of Equation (3.57)
so that it holds for all degrees. This bounds the first summand of Equation (3.56). To
bound the second summand of Equation (3.56), we use the following observation from a
preliminary version of [MNV16].
Claim 3.63. For any real interval I centered at 0, and any δ-concentrated degree-d mul-
tilinear polynomial q that has at least one monomial with coefficient greater than |I| in
magnitude, we have
Pr[q(A) ∈ I] ≤ δ.
Proof. Let q = q′ + µ where µ = E[q(A)], and let ν = (L · log δ−1)d where L > 0 is the
constant from Definition 3.25. Since q is δ-concentrated and has at least one monomial with
coefficient greater than |I| in magnitude, we have
|µ|2 ≥ (ν − 1) ·Var[q] ≥ (ν − 1) · |I|2 ≥ 4 · |I|2.
Now since |µ| ≥ 2 · |I|, we note that for all points x ∈ {−1, 1}n where q(x) ∈ I, it must be
the case that |q′(x)| ≥ |µ| − |I|. Also, we have
|µ| − |I| ≥ |µ|2 ≥
√











Pr[q(A) ∈ I] ≤ Pr
[











≤ δ. (by Theorem 3.13)
By Claim 3.63, we get
Pr
ρ,C
[pρ(C) ∈ I | pρ is δ-concentrated] ≤ δ,
which bounds the second summand of Equation (3.56). This completes the proof.
3.7 Derandomization
3.7.1 Derandomized Block Restriction Lemma
In this subsection, we show how to derandomize our Block Restriction Lemma, by giving an
algorithm for sampling pseudorandom block restrictions (using significantly fewer random
bits) so that the probability a given degree-d polynomial is not concentrated under such a
pseudorandom block restriction is about the same as that for true random block restrictions.
Our pseudorandom block restriction will pick a uniformly random block, and then fix the
variables in the remaining blocks in a pseudorandom fashion (using few truly random bits).
Theorem 3.64 (Derandomized Block Restriction Lemma). For any 0 < δ ≤ 1/16 and
0 < ζ < 1, there is a polynomial-time algorithm for sampling block restrictions ρ ∈ Bm, for
any m ≥ 16, that uses at most mζ · logn random bits, so that the following holds. For any








· (logm)O(ζ−1·d·log d) · (log δ−1)O(ζ−1·d2).
We first define our pseudorandom block restrictions that yields Theorem 3.64. We start
with some notations. Let D be a distribution on {−1, 1}n. Let S be a set of K coordinates
and let ω be an assignment for the coordinates in S. We define Dω to be the distribution
on the remaining n−K unfixed coordinates such that for any a ∈ {−1, 1}n−K ,
Pr[Dω = a] = Pr[D[n]−S = a | DS = ω].
We will refer to Dω as the distribution D conditioned on fixing S to ω.
61
The main idea of our pseudorandom block restriction is to fix the variables using the
output of a pseudorandom generator (PRG) for PTFs. Recall that a function G : {−1, 1}s →
{−1, 1}n is a PRG of seed length s that ε-fools PTFs of degree d if, for any degree-d PTF
f , we have ∣∣∣∣∣ Prz∼{−1,1}s[f(G(z)) = −1]− Prx∼{−1,1}n[f(x) = −1]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
Definition 3.65. Suppose the variables of a polynomial are arbitrarily partitioned into m
blocks. We call a random block restriction ρ (m, ε)-fooling if it selects a block uniformly
at random and fixes all variables outside the selected block using some distribution D that
ε-fools PTFs of degree 2d (in the appropriate number of variables). Moreover, we call such
a random block restriction (m, ε,K)-fooling if D ε-fools PTFs of degree 2d even conditioned
on fixing at most K coordinates and is
(
192 · d · log δ−1 +K
)
-wise independent.
We will use the construction of PRGs for PTFs due to Meka and Zuckerman. First
recall that a multidimensional distribution on {−1, 1}n is called k-wise independent if any k
coordinates of the distribution are independent. A family of hash functions H = {h : [n]→
[`]} is called k-wise independent if for any (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ [n]k, where x1, . . . , xk are distinct,
and any (y1, . . . , yk) ∈ [`]k, we have
Pr
h∼H
[h(x1) = y1 ∧ · · · ∧ h(xk) = yk] = 1/`k.
There exist k-wise independent distributions that can be sampled in poly(n, k) time using
O (k · logn) random bits, and there exist k-wise independent hash families H such that a
random h ∈ H can be sampled using O (k · log(n · `)) bits (see, e.g., [Vad12]).
The generator in the following theorem views its random seed as a tuple of `+1 disjoint
random strings (for a certain parameter ` ≥ 1), and uses the first string to sample a
hash function h, and the remaining ` strings to get ` samples from a k-wise independent
distribution.
Theorem 3.66 ([MZ13]). For 0 < ε < 1, let ` = 2O(d) · log2(ε−1) · ε−(4d+1). Let G :
{−1, 1}s → {−1, 1}n be the following process of generating an assignment for n coordinates
using s = 2O(d) · (logn) · ε−(8d+3) random bits:
1. Partition the n coordinates into ` buckets using a function h : [n] → [`] randomly
picked from a 2-wise independent hash family.
2. For each bucket, generate a (`+ 4d)-wise independent distribution for the coordinates
in that bucket.
Then G is a PRG that ε-fools n-variate PTFs of degree d.
Lemma 3.67. For 0 < ε < 1, there exists a (m, ε,K)-fooling random block restriction that
is samplable using s = 2O(d) ·
(
ε−(16d+3) + ε−(8d+2) · (K + log δ−1)
)
· logn random bits.
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Proof. Let ` = 2O(d) · log2(ε−1) · ε−(8d+1). Consider the distribution D sampled as follows:
1. Partition the n coordinates into ` buckets using a function h : [n] → [`] randomly
picked from a 2-wise independent hash family.
2. For each bucket, generate a
(
`+ 4d+K + 192 · d · log δ−1
)
-wise independent distri-
bution for the coordinates in that bucket.
Note that by Theorem 3.66, D ε-fools PTFs of degree 2d even conditioned on fixing at most
K coordinates. This is because D has sufficient bounded independence for each bucket even
conditioned on fixing K coordinates. Also, D is
(
192 · d · log δ−1 +K
)
-wise independent.
Note that D is samplable using s random bits. We then define our (m, ε,K)-fooling random
block restriction as the restriction that randomly selects a block and fixes all variables
outside the selected block using D. Finally, note that the number of random bits needed to
select a block is at most logn.
While it is possible to use a (m, ε,K)-fooling random block restriction to obtain a
derandomized block restriction lemma, it requires large seed length to get small error if
we do this in one shot. To deal with this issue, we use a sequence of pseudorandom block
restrictions, so that, in each step, we only set the error parameter to match the probability
that a random block restriction does not make the polynomial concentrated in the current
step. Consider a random block restriction defined as follows. Let m,κ ≥ 16.
1. Partition the m blocks of variables of p into b = m1/κd disjoint super-blocks, where
each super-block has m/b blocks.
2. Apply a (b, ε = b−1,K)-fooling random block restriction on the b super-blocks.
3. Repeat the above two steps for the remaining blocks with m replaced by m/b until
there is at most 2d blocks, in which case we randomly choose a single block and fix
the other variables using a
(
192 · d · log δ−1 +K
)
-wise independent distribution.
If at any round the blocks cannot be partitioned evenly into super-blocks, we can divide
them so that the sizes of any two super-blocks differ by at most 1. We then select a super-
block with probability proportional to its size. This makes sure that a block is selected
uniformly at random. To avoid some technicalities that can be overcome easily, we assume
here that at each round, the blocks can be partitioned evenly into super-blocks. Note that
a random block restriction ρ generated as above can be decomposed into a sequence of sub-
restrictions ρ1, . . . , ρt, ρt+1, where t = O (κ · d · log logm) so that there are at most 2d blocks
remaining after ρ1, . . . , ρt, and each ρi, except the last one, is a (bi, b−1i ,K)-fooling random
block restriction with bi = m(1−1/κd)
i−1/κd. Also, the last restriction fixes the variables
using some
(
192 · d · log δ−1 +K
)
-wise independent distribution. We call such a random
block restriction (m,κ,K)-good. By the above, we have
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Lemma 3.68. There exists a (m,κ,K)-good block restriction that is samplable using
2O(d) ·
(
m(19/κ) +m(10/κ) · (K + log δ−1)
)
· logn · κ · log logm
random bits.
To prove Theorem 3.64, we will show that the argument in Section 3.5 still goes through
if we replace a truly random block restriction with our pseudorandom block restriction de-
scribed above. We will need versions of the key lemmas in Section 3.5 for our pseudorandom
block restrictions. In particular, we need a version of Lemma 3.35 for k-wise independent
distributions. We first show a version of Theorem 3.13 for k-wise independent distributions.
The following can be proved in the same way as Theorem 3.13.




-wise independent distribution D on {−1, 1}n, we have
Pr [|p(D)| ≥ T · ‖p‖2] ≤ exp
(
−(1/4) · T 2/d
)
.
Proof. Let W = T 2/d2 . By Markov’s inequality, we have
Pr [|p(D)| ≥ T · ‖p‖2] = Pr
[







Since D is a (d·W )-wise independent distribution on {−1, 1}n, we get, using Equation (3.1),
that
E[|p(D)|W ] = ‖p‖WW ≤
(




W d/2 · ‖p‖2
)W
. (3.60)
Combining Equations (3.59) and (3.60), we get
Pr
[














Claim 3.70. For any degree-d multilinear polynomial p that is (δ, γ + 1)-concentrated, let
ρ be a random block restriction for p that picks a uniformly random block and assigns the




[pρ is not (δ, γ)-concentrated] ≤ δ.
Proof. The proof is the same as that of Lemma 3.35, with Claim 3.69 replacing Theo-
rem 3.13.
Next, we show two recurrence relations that are similar to Lemma 3.39 and Lemma 3.40,
but with respect to our pseudorandom block restrictions.
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Definition 3.71. Let Q(d,m, δ, κ,K, a) be the supremum, over all degree-d polynomials p
with α(p) ≤ a, all possible partitions of the variables into m blocks, and all (m,κ,K)-good
random block restrictions ρ, of the probabilities
Pr
ρ
[pρ is not δ-concentrated] .
Let Qreg(d,m, δ, κ,K, a, τ) be the same as P but only for τ -regular polynomials. For simplic-
ity, we will omit some parameters when they are clear in the context. In particular, we will
use Q(m,K, a) (resp. Qreg(m,K, a, τ)) for Q(d,m, δ, κ,K, a) (resp. Qreg(d,m, δ, κ,K, τ)).
Lemma 3.72. For any 0 < τ, δ < 1/4 and a > 0, m > 4, κ ≥ 16, d > 1, and K ≥ H,
where H = τ−1 · (d · log τ−1 · log δ−1)O(d), we have
Q(m,K, a) ≤ 1
m
· τ−1 · (d · log τ−1 · log δ−1)O(d) + 2δ + E
ℵ
[Qreg(m,K −H,ℵ, τ)],
where ℵ is a non-negative random variable with E[ℵ] ≤ O (a).
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 3.39, but has a few critical differences.
For clarity, we provide details for this proof. Let p be a degree-d multilinear polynomial
whose variables are partitioned into m blocks. Let ρ be a (m,κ,K)-good random block
restriction. Consider the decision tree given by Theorem 3.21 with ε = δ and γ = 2. Note
that the depth of this decision tree is H. Since a block is chosen uniformly at random, the
probability that ρ is not consistent with any branch of the decision tree is at most H/m.









[(pω)ρω is not δ-concentrated]
]
+ 3(H/m),
where the expectation is over random leaves ω of the decision tree, pω is the restriction of
p obtained by fixing the variables on the branch leading to ω as specified by the branch, and
ρω is an (m,κ,K −H)-good random block restriction.
Proof. We view ρ as ρ = (`, λ), where ` is the selected block and λ is an assignment to the
variables outside block `. We can view the distribution of λ as a sequence of distributions,
each ε-fooling PTFs of degree 2d even conditioned on fixing at most K coordinates, and
being
(
192 · d · log δ−1 +K
)
-wise independent.
For each leaf ω, let Rω be the set of (m,κ,K)-good random restrictions consistent with
the branch leading to ω. As observed above, the probability ξ of choosing a restriction from
the complement of ∪ωRω is at most H/m. We get
Pr
ρ
[pρ is not δ-concentrated] ≤ (1− ξ) · Pr
ρ∈∪ωRω
[pρ is not δ-concentrated] + ξ. (3.61)
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[pρ is not δ-concentrated | ρ ∈ Rω] ·Pr[ρ ∈ Rω | ρ ∈ ∪ωRω].
As ρ is K-wise independent and K ≥ H, the probability of choosing ρ ∈ Rω conditioned on
ρ ∈ ∪ωRω is 2−`ω · (1− ξ)−1, where `ω is the length of the branch leading to ω. Hence, the





[pρ is not δ-concentrated]] + ξ. (3.62)
Each (m,κ,K)-good restriction ρ = (`, λ) ∈ Rω can be viewed as a restriction of the
variables on the branch leading to ω (as specified by the branch) plus a restriction λ′ to the
remaining variables outside block `. So we can express pρ as (pω)ρ′ , where ρ′ = (`, λ′).
Note that ρ′ is a (m,κ,K − H)-good restriction, which comes from the set of those
(m,κ,K −H)-good restrictions that chose block ` outside at most H blocks containing the
variables on the branch leading to ω. The set of all such restrictions ρ′ has the probability
mass at least 1−H/m within the set of all (m,κ,K −H)-good restrictions ρω (which pick
block ` uniformly at random from the set of all m blocks). Therefore, we can upperbound















[(pω)ρω is not δ-concentrated]] + ξ + 2(H/m),
where the last inequality uses the fact that (1− x)−1 ≤ 1 + 2x whenever 0 < x ≤ 1/2. The
claim follows.
The proof can now proceed in the same way as that of Lemma 3.39, but instead of using
Lemma 3.35 there, we use Claim 3.70 and the fact that ρω fixes the variables (192·d·log δ−1)-
wise independently.
Lemma 3.74. For any real 0 < τ, δ < 1/4 and a > 0, m > 4, κ ≥ 16, K ≥ 0 and d > 1,
we have
Qreg(m,K, a, τ) ≤ E
ℵ
[Q(m1−1/κd,K,ℵ)],
where ℵ is a non-negative random variable with E[ℵ] = O
(
d3am−1/2κd + d4τ1/(8d) +m−1/κd
)
.
Proof. For a (m,κ,K)-good random block restriction ρ, we can decompose it into two
restrictions ρ1 and ρ′, where ρ1 is a (b = m1/κd, ε = m−1/κd,K)-fooling random block
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restriction and ρ′ is a (m1−1/κd, κ,K)-good random block restriction. Then
Pr
ρ


















d3ab−1/2 + d4τ1/(8d) + ε
)
.














Consider a degree-d multilinear polynomial p whose variables are partitioned into m
blocks. Fixed a block `. Let A` be an assignment to the variables in block `, B be a vector
of dimension the same as the number of variables in block `, and t be an arbitrary number.
Define T`,A`,B,t to be the Boolean function on input D such that T`,A`,B,t(D) = −1 if and
only if
|pD(A`)|2 ≤ t · |DB pD(A`)|2.
It is easy to see that T`,A`,B,t is a PTF of degree at most 2d.
Now for a block, `, we let A` denote the random assignment to the variables in ` and
let A¯̀ denote the random assignment to the variables that are not in `. Let D be the
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The other direction can be shown similarly.
We are now ready to prove the following result, which, together with our construction
of (m,κ,K)-good random block restrictions in Lemma 3.68, will imply Theorem 3.64
Theorem 3.75. There exist constants B,C > 0 such that, for any d > 0, m,κ ≥ 16,
0 < δ ≤ 1/16, 0 < a ≤ 1, and K ≥ m8/κ · (d · logm · log δ−1)C·d, we have
Q(d,m, δ, κ,K, a) ≤ (a ·m−1/2 + δ) · (logm)Bκ·d·log d · (log δ−1)Bκ·d2 . (3.63)
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.45. As in the proof of Theorem 3.45, we
can assume, for a sufficiently large constant B > 0, that both
a ≥ (c · log δ−1)−2d, (3.64)
and
m1/(2κ·d) ≥ (c · log δ−1)2d, (3.65)
where c > 0 is the constant from Corollary 3.33. Note that if Equation (3.64) if false.
Then by Corollary 3.33, the polynomial is (δ, 2)-concentrated and by Claim 3.70 such a
polynomial will remain δ-concentrated under restrictions that fix variables (192 ·d · log δ−1)-
wise independently except with probability at most δ.
Now let τ = m−8/κ and H = τ−1 · (d · log τ−1 · log δ−1)O(d). Note that K ≥ H when C is
sufficiently large. Then combining Lemma 3.72 and Lemma 3.74, and proceeding as in the
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proof of Claim 3.47, we have, for a sufficiently large constant E,




where ℵ is a non-negative random variable with E[ℵ] = O
(
d4 · a ·m−1/(2κd)
)
.
To solve the recurrence relation given by Equation (3.66), we again use induction on
m. The base case is m ≤ 2d. As a ≥ (c · log δ−1)−2d, in this case the right hand side of
Equation (3.63) is greater than 1 for when B is sufficiently large. Now suppose Theorem 3.45
holds for all smaller values of m. Let m1 = m1−1/(κd). Then when C is sufficiently large, we
have
K −H ≥ m8/κ1 · (d · logm1 · log δ−1)C·d.
Therefore, we can apply the induction hypothesis on
Q(m1−1/(κd),K −H,ℵ)
in Equation (3.66). After applying the induction hypothesis and proceeding as in the proof
of Theorem 3.45, we can complete the induction step and hence the proof.
By Lemma 3.68 and Theorem 3.75, there exist constants B,C > 0 and a pseudorandom
block restriction samplable using
m(19/κ) · logn · κ · (d · logm · log δ−1)C·d (3.67)
random bits such that for any degree-d multilinear polynomial p,
Pr
ρ




· (logm)B·κ·d·log d · (log δ−1)B·κ·d2 . (3.68)
Note that we can assume without loss of generality that both
κ ≤ logm
d · log d · log logm
and
(d · logm · log δ−1)C·d ≤ m1/κ.
Otherwise, the right hand side of the Equation (3.68) is greater than 1 when B is sufficiently
large. Then Equation (3.67) is at most
mO(1/κ) · logn.
By changing the parameter κ, we obtain Theorem 3.64.
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3.7.2 Derandomized Littlewood-Offord type anticoncentration bounds
Here we show two versions of derandomized anticoncentration bounds for degree-d multi-
linear polynomials. We first show the following.
Theorem 3.76. For any positive integers t and d, and 0 < ζ < 1, there exists a distribution
D on {−1, 1}n, samplable in poly(n) time using tζ/d · logn random bits, such that the
following holds. For any real interval I, and any n-variate degree-d multilinear polynomial
p that has at least t disjoint degree-d monomials with coefficient at least |I| in magnitude,
we have
Pr [p(D) ∈ I] ≤ t−
1
2d · (log t)O(ζ−1·d2).
Let us call a degree-d monomial good if its coefficient is at least |I| in magnitude, and
say that a set of variables contains a monomial if every variable in the monomial is in
the set. Also, let us call a partition of variables into blocks good if every block contains at
least one good monomial. From the analysis in Theorem 3.62, it is easy to see that if we
are explicitly given a degree-d polynomial with at least t disjoint good monomials, then
we can obtain a good partition with t blocks and use our derandomized Block Restriction
Lemma to generate the inputs so that the polynomial will take value inside the interval
with probability at most about t−1/2.
However, we want to derandomize obliviously, without knowing the structure of the poly-
nomial. The idea is to partition the variables randomly, using bounded-independent hashing,
so that we get a good partition with high probability. To show that bounded-independent
hashing will produce a good partition with high probability, we need the following version
of Chernoff bounds for bounded-independent random variables.
Theorem 3.77 ([SSS95]). Let ε ≤ 1. If X is the sum of k-wise independent random
variables taking values in [0, 1], and µ = E[X] such that k ≤ bε2µe−1/2c, then
Pr[|X − µ| > εµ] < exp(−bk/2c).
We now show the following.
Lemma 3.78. Let p be a n-variate degree-d multilinear polynomial with at least t disjoint
good monomials. If the variables are partitioned into m = t1/d/ log2/d(t) blocks using a
random hash function from a (Cd log t)-wise independent hash family, where C > 0 is some
constant, then the probability that the partition is not good is at most 1/t.
Proof. Fix a block `. Let m1, . . . ,mt be the t disjoint good monomials. For i = 1, . . . , t, let
Xi be the indicator random variable for the event that ` contains mi, using a (Cd log t)-wise
independent hashing (i.e., Xi is 1 if every variable in mi is hashed to `, and 0 otherwise).
Note that Pr[Xi = 1] = 1/md for every i, and X1, . . . , Xt are (C log t)-wise independent.
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Let X = X1 + · · ·+Xt and µ = E[X] = t/md = log2 t. By Theorem 3.77, we have
Pr[X = 0] ≤ Pr[|X − µ| > (1/2)µ] ≤ exp(−b(C log t)/2c) ≤ 1/t2,
where the last inequality holds if C is sufficiently large. Taking the union bound over the m
blocks, we conclude that probability that there exists one block that does not contain any
good monomial is at most 1/t.
We will also need the following version of Claim 3.63 for bounded-independent distribu-
tions, whose proof is the same as Claim 3.63, with Claim 3.69 replacing Theorem 3.13.
Claim 3.79. For any real interval I centered at 0, any δ-concentrated degree-d multilinear
polynomial q that has at least one monomial with coefficient greater than |I| in magnitude,
and any
(
192 · d · log δ−1
)
-wise independent distribution D on {−1, 1}n, we have
Pr[q(D) ∈ I] ≤ δ.
Proof of Theorem 3.76. Consider the following process of sampling from D.
1. Partition the variables of p into m = t1/d/ log2/d(t) blocks using (Cd log t)-wise inde-
pendent hashing, where C is the constant from Lemma 3.78.
2. Apply the derandomized Block Restriction Lemma (Theorem 3.64) based on the par-
tition in the previous step with δ = m−1/2.
3. Fix the variables in the last block (i.e., the unrestricted block after applying random
block restriction in the previous step) using a (192 · d · log δ−1)-wise independent
distribution.
The amount of random bits used in the first step is O (d · log t · logn), and the amount
of random bits needed in the second step is at most
mζ · logn ≤ tζ/d · logn.
The last step only needs O
(
d · log δ−1 · logn
)
random bits. Therefore, the total amount of





We now show the correctness. By Lemma 3.78, the probability that the partition ob-
tained in the first step is not good is at most 1/t. Given that the partition in the first step is
good, any restricted polynomial after the second step will have at least one good monomial,
and by Theorem 3.64 the probability that the restricted polynomial is not δ-concentrated









Finally, given that the restricted polynomial in the second step has at least one good mono-
mial and is δ-concentrated, the probability that it falls inside the interval I after taking an
input from a (192 · d · log δ−1)-wise independent distribution is at most δ by Claim 3.79.
Therefore, by noting δ = m−1/2, the probability that an input obtained in the above process






−1·d2) +m−1/2 ≤ t−1/(2d) · (log t)O(ζ
−1·d2) .
This completes the proof.
Next, we show another derandomized anticoncentration bound that is quantitatively
better when the polynomials are dense (i.e., have many good monomials).
Theorem 3.80. For any positive integers t and d, and 0 < ζ < 1, there exists a distribution
D on {−1, 1}n, samplable in poly(n) time using tζ ·logn random bits, such that the following
holds. For any real interval I, and any n-variate degree-d multilinear polynomial p with at
least t · nd−1 degree-d monomials whose coefficients are at least |I| in magnitude, we have
Pr [p(D) ∈ I] ≤ t−
1
2 · (log t)O(ζ−1 ·d2).
Remark 3.81. For dense polynomials with t = n1−o(1) and any ε > (C ·d2 · log logn)/ logn,
where C is some constant, setting
ζ = (C · d2 · log logn)/(ε · logn),
we get that the bound in Theorem 3.80 is at most n−1/2+o(1)+ε, matching the bound in Theo-
rem 3.62 up to the no(1)+ε factor, and that the seed length is at most (logn)O(ε−1·d2). Such a
short seed is beyond reach of the naive derandomization using the PRG from Theorem 3.66,
when the error is inverse-polynomially small.
To show Theorem 3.80, we a gain use bounded-independent hashing to partition the
variables.
Lemma 3.82. Let p be a n-variate degree-d multilinear polynomial with at least t · nd−1
good monomials. If the variables are partitioned into m = t/(C log t) blocks using a random
hash function from a (Cd log t)-wise independent hash family, where C is a constant, then
the probability that the partition is not good is at most 1/t.
Proof. We first consider using full randomness to partition the variables. It will be conve-
nient to view a set of variables as an n-bit characteristic string, where a coordinate i is 1 if
the ith variable is in the set, and 0 otherwise. For a set S, we will also use S to denote its
characteristics string. Let K = (C/2) log t, and let p be so that 1− (1− p)K = 1/m.
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Consider a random set U that picks each variable independently with probability p.
Note that U can be viewed as a random n-bit string such that each coordinate is 1 with
probability p. Also, given U , we can compute the number of good monomials contained in
U , using a degree-d polynomial, which is simply the sum of the t ·nd−1 monomials of p. Let
q denote this polynomial and let µ = E[q(U)]. Now define r(U) = (q(U)− µ)2. Note that r
is a polynomial of degree at most 2d and, given our value of p, we have
µ2 > 2 ·E[r(U)]. (3.69)
Also, if U does not contain any good monomial, then r(U) = µ2.
Let U1, . . . , UK be K independent random sets, where each Ui picks each variable inde-
pendently with probability p. Let T be a random set that picks each variable independently
with probability 1/m = 1 − (1 − p)K . Note that U1 ∪ · · · ∪ UK and T have the same
distribution. Given a set T , consider the following way of picking a tuple of K random
subsets V T = V T1 , . . . , V TK of T : pick V T from the distribution of U1, . . . , UK , conditioned
on U1 ∪ · · · ∪ UK = T . Now define f as








Note that f can be written as a polynomial of degree at most 2dK. To see this, consider the
following equivalent way of picking V T0 for some T0: for each variable that appears in T0,
we assign it to each of the K subsets with probability p, conditioned on at least one subset
containing the variable. Now consider picking a tuple of K random sets W = W1, . . . ,WK
in the above way, with T0 = {1, . . . , n}. Then it is easy to see that, for any given set T ,
W ∩T = W1 ∩T, . . . ,W1 ∩T (i.e., after we pick W we remove all the variables that are not
in T ) and V T have the same distribution. Therefore, we have





r(Wi ∩ T )
]
,
which is clearly a polynomial of degree at most 2dK since r is of degree at most 2d. Note
that since each V Ti is a subset of T , if T does not contain any good monomial, then
f(T ) = µ2K . (3.70)
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Also, by the definition of the distribution for V T , we have
E
T





















< µ2K/2K , (3.71)
where the last inequality is by Equation (3.69).
Now consider partitioning the n variables into m blocks, using a (Cd log t)-wise inde-
pendent hash family H. Let D be a random n-bits string such that the coordinates are
(2dK)-wise independent and each coordinate is 1 with probability 1/m. Let T be a random




[` does not contain any good monomial under h]
≤ Pr
D


















where the forth line above is by the fact that f is a polynomial of degree at most 2dK =
Cd log t and that D is (Cd log t)-wise independent, and the second last line is by Markov’s
inequality. Finally, by the union bound over them blocks, and for C sufficiently large, we get
that the probability that there exists one block that does not contain any good monomial
is at most 1/t.
Given Lemma 3.82, Theorem 3.80 is now proved in the same way as Theorem 3.76.
3.8 Open problems
We proved a restriction lemma for PTFs of degree d ≥ 1, and used it to derive new
lower bounds against constant-depth circuits with PTF gates. What are other applica-
tions of the (derandomized) PTF Restriction Lemma? For example, can it be used to get a
74
PRG for constant-depth PTF circuits? Finally, what are the applications of derandomized




for Small Polynomial Threshold
Circuits
4.1 Background and results
Satisfiability and derandomization are famous examples of “circuit analysis” problems that,
apart from being important algorithmic problems in their own right, are also intimately
related to the notoriously difficult problem of proving circuit lower bounds. In this chapter,
we give several algorithmic results for these problems for the class of Boolean circuits with
polynomial threshold functions (PTFs) as gates.
We next describe in more detail the the class of PTF circuits for which we consider in
this work. We then state our main results, and discuss our techniques.
PTF circuits. The focus of the present work is on circuits whose gates are polynomial
threshold functions. Recall that an n-variate polynomial threshold function (PTF) is defined
as the sign sgn(p) of a multi-linear polynomial p : {0, 1}n → R. Here, for v ∈ R, we define
the sign function sgn(v) to be 1 on v > 0, and 0 on v < 0. There are two common complexity
measures for PTFs: degree, which is the degree of p, and sparsity, which is the number of
monomials in p, where a monomial1 is of the form
∏
i∈S(xi⊕bi) where S ⊆ [n] and bi ∈ {0, 1}
for each i ∈ S. We call the PTF s-sparse if p(x1, . . . , xn) is the sum of at most s monomials.
PTFs of degree 1 are called linear threshold functions (LTFs). Thus an s-sparse PTF can be
equivalently defined as an LTF of at most s terms, where each term is an AND of literals
(variables and their negations).
1Note that our definition of a monomial is different from the usual definition, where a monomial is a
product of some variables (rather than literals, i.e., possibly negated variables). Our definition makes the class
of s-sparse PTFs, for fixed sparsity s, much more expressive. For example, the polynomial p(x1, . . . , xn) =∏n
i=1(xi ⊕ 1) =
∏n
i=1(1− xi) has sparsity 1 by our definition, but sparsity 2
n by the usual definition.
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Polynomial threshold circuits are circuits whose gates are PTFs. We will study both
circuits with low-degree PTF gates and circuits with sparse PTF gates. We call a circuit
a degree-∆ PTF circuit if its gates are degree-∆ PTFs. Similarly, a circuit is called an s-
sparse PTF circuit if its gates are s-sparse PTFs. We note that when discussing circuits, the
word “sparse” is often used to describe circuits with a small number of wires (recall that
the number of wires is the sum of fan-ins over all gates of the circuit). To avoid ambiguity,
we clarify that in this thesis the word “sparse” always refers to PTFs. For example, a
sub-quadratically sparse PTF circuit means a circuit with gates that are sub-quadratically
sparse PTFs (i.e., PTFs that have a sub-quadratic number of monomials).
4.1.1 Results
Circuit-SAT for sub-quadratically sparse PTF circuits with n1+ε wires. PTFs
are very powerful even for small sparsity. For example, s-sparse PTFs can encode MAX-
SAT with s clauses and exponential weights, a problem known how to solve nontrivially
only for a sub-quadratic number of clauses. Therefore, a nontrivial SAT algorithm for PTFs
of quadratic sparsity would break the current barrier of solving MAX-SAT with exponential
weights. In fact, since a polynomial of degree-2 has at most a quadratic number of monomi-
als, such an algorithm would also give a nontrivial SAT algorithm for degree-2 PTFs, which
is currently unknown2.
We give the first nontrivial #SAT algorithms (counting the number of satisfying assign-
ments of a given circuit) for the class of constant-depth circuits with PTF gates, where the
PTF circuit has small super-linear wire complexity (defined as the sum of fan-ins over all
gates of the circuit) and each PTF gate has sub-quadratic sparsity. Our main result is the
following.
Theorem 4.1 (#SAT algorithm for sub-quadratically sparse PTF circuits). There is a
constant b1 > 1 such that, for every c ≥ b1 and d > 0, there is a zero-error randomized
algorithm that counts the number of satisfying assignments of any given depth-d, n-variate
circuit with
• (n2−1/c)-sparse PTF gates, and
• at most n1+εd wires.
The running time of this #SAT algorithm is at most 2n−nεd · poly(n), where εd = c−3
d.
2Sakai, Seto, Tamaki and Teruyama [SSTT16] recently reported a faster-than-brute-force algorithm for
MAX-k-SAT for any constant k with arbitrary weights (which implies a satisfiability algorithm for degree-k
PTFs). However, their algorithm is conditional in that it relies on an assumption that one can efficiently
reduce the weights of a given n-variate LTF to integral weights of magnitude at most 2O(n logn). While it
is known that such small weights exist for every LTF [MTT61], it is currently not known how to find them
efficiently.
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We also get an algorithm with better parameters if we further assume that the sparse
PTF gates in the circuit have low degree. Let G∆,c denote the class of Boolean functions
where each function can be computed as an LTF of at most n2−1/(c·∆2) arbitrary ∆-variate
Boolean functions.
Theorem 4.2 (#SAT algorithm for sub-quadratically sparse PTF circuits with low-degree).
There exists a constant b2 > 1 such that, for every d,∆ > 0 and c ≥ b2, there is a zero-
error randomized algorithm that counts the number of satisfying assignments of any given
depth-d, n-variate circuit with
• gates from G∆,c, and
• at most n1+εd,∆ wires.
The running time of this #SAT algorithm is at most 2n−n
εd,∆ · poly(n), where εd,∆ =(
c ·∆2
)−d.
Quantified derandomization for PTF circuits with n1+ε wires in quasi-polynomial
time. As standard derandomization appears difficult even for weak circuit classes, one
considers relaxations. One relaxation is to assume that a given n-input circuit C outputs
an unknown value b ∈ {0, 1} on all but “very few” inputs, e.g., 2n/nω(1) inputs rather than
2n/3 in the case of standard derandomization. Goldreich and Wigderson [GW14] named
this a quantified derandomization problem. More formally, for a class C of circuits, and a
function B : N → N, the (C, B)-quantified derandomization problem is the following: given
a circuit C ∈ C such that C has at most B(n) minority-value inputs in {0, 1}n, determine
the majority value b ∈ {0, 1} for C.
It was immediately observed by [GW14] that for “sufficiently powerful” circuit classes
(e.g., AC0[⊕], polynomial-size constant-depth circuits with unbounded fan-in AND, OR,
parity gates, and negation gates), quantified derandomization is equivalent to standard
derandomization, as one can perform efficient pseudo-random sampling (via randomness
extractors) within the same circuit class. Thus, quantified derandomization may be possible
to achieve (given our current knowledge) only for “very weak” circuit classes. [GW14] gave
quantified derandomization algorithms for AC0 (later strengthened by [Tel17b]) and some
other classes. Recently, Tell [Tel18] showed that quantified derandomization is also possible
for constant-depth LTF circuits of small super-linear wire complexity (and that improving
this to slightly higher super-linear wire complexity is as hard as getting nontrivial standard
derandomization for the circuit class TC0, which in turn would imply TC0 circuit lower
bounds).
We give a quantified derandomization algorithms for the class of PTF circuits with
super-linear wire complexity.
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Theorem 4.3 (Quantified derandomization for low-degree (or sparse) PTF circuits). For
any constant c ≥ 122 and any ∆, d > 0 such that ∆ 
√
logn/(cd · log logn), let C =
C(n, d,∆, c) be the class of n-variate, depth d PTF circuits with
• degree-∆ PTF gates (or n∆/cd-sparse PTF gates), and







-quantified derandomization problem is solvable in time 2(logn)
O(∆2)
.
PRG for PTF circuits with few gates. Finally, we construct a nontrivial pseudo-
random generator (PRG) for PTF circuits (of unrestricted depth) with sub-linearly many
gates
Theorem 4.4 (PRG for PTF Circuits). There exists a constant E > 0 such that the
following holds. For any positive integers α and ∆, let C = C(n, α,∆) be the class of degree-




E · 5α·∆ · log2(n) · log(n/ε)
)
gates.
There exists a poly(n)-time computable PRG G : {0, 1}r → {0, 1}n ε-fooling C, where the
seed length is r = n2/(α+1).
We get the following PRG for a single PTF (by setting α appropriately).
Corollary 4.5 (PRG for PTFs). There exists a PRG G : {0, 1}r → {0, 1}n, computable in









A common way to analyze constant-depth circuits is to apply (random) restrictions, get-
ting some depth reduction, and iterate, until the resulting circuit becomes very simple. Our
#SAT algorithms and quantified derandomization algorithms for constant-depth PTF cir-
cuits also follow this approach, mainly relying on the ideas of [CSS18] for depth reduction,
and [KKL17] for (pseudo-) random restrictions for PTFs. We give more details next.
Satisfiability for small PTF circuits. To get our Circuit-SAT algorithm, we generalize
the analysis of the Circuit-SAT algorithm for small LTF circuits in [CSS18]. An oversimpli-
fied description is as follows. We show that for a depth-d circuit with a slightly super-linear
number of wires, whose gates are sparse PTFs, there exists a shallow decision tree such that,
for most of the leaves, the circuit restricted to that leaf can be “approximated” by some
depth-(d− 1) circuit. Then we recursively apply a Circuit-SAT algorithm to depth-(d− 1)
circuits. However, to actually implement this idea, we need three ingredients.
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1. First, we need a base-case algorithm. In the case of LTF circuits, the base case is a
conjunction of LTFs, and there is a known algorithm by Williams [Wil14a] for such
circuits. In contrast, in our case, the base case is a conjunction of sparse PTFs. Using
the polynomial method in circuit complexity, we are able to design a Circuit-SAT
algorithm for such circuits.
2. Secondly, to construct the decision tree, we need a random restriction lemma showing
that, under a random restriction, a gate in the circuit is likely to be close to constant.
In the case of LTFs, Chen et al. [CSS18] proved such a random restriction lemma
for LTFs. Here, we show such a restriction lemma for sparse PTFs using a restriction
lemma for low-degree PTFs in [KKL17].
3. Finally, since the restricted circuit under a leaf is only “approximated” by some circuit
of lower depth, we need to handle the inputs where these two circuits disagree. This
issue can be handled if we can enumerate the set of inputs where a gate evaluates to its
minority value. As shown in [CSS18], there is an efficient way to do this for functions
whose satisfiability can be decided in polynomial time, such as LTFs. However, we
cannot apply this for sparse PTFs since there is no known polynomial-time SAT
algorithm for sparse PTFs. We overcome this issue for sparse PTFs by reducing to the
case of LTFs, using some ideas from Chen and Santhanam [CS15a].
Quantified derandomization for small PTF circuits. Our quantified derandomiza-
tion algorithm at the high level follows the approach of [GW14]. Given a circuit C with
at most B minority-value inputs, the idea is to come up with a restriction ρ such that ρ
leaves a large number of variables unrestricted, say n′, and that Cρ is very close to some
simple function C̃ (say they agree on all but at most 1/6 fraction of inputs). Then the
number of minority-value inputs for C̃ is at most B + 2n′/6. If B is also at most 2n′/6,
then we can determine the required majority value for C by finding the majority value C̃,
which is a simple function. (This approach is also used by Tell [Tel18] to get a quantified
derandomization algorithm for LTF circuits with a slightly super-linear number of wires.)
Let’s first consider a depth-2 LTF circuit with few wires. In [CSS18], Chen, Santhanam
and Srinivasan proved a random restriction lemma for LTFs, which says that under a random
restriction, an LTF is likely to become very close to an explicit constant. Using this result,
one gets that under such a random restriction, many of the gates in the bottom layer of the
circuit are expected to become close to constants. Since the circuit has only a few wires,
one can further fix a small number of variables so that only those gates that are close to
constants are left. Finally, by replacing these gates with their majority values, we obtain a
single LTF that is close to the original depth-2 circuit.
Such a random restriction lemma was extended to low-degree PTFs in [KKL17], so we
can conclude the same for low-degree PTF circuits. One important issue, though, is that
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the above “depth reduction” argument only holds for random restrictions (but with high
probability). So to get quantified derandomization, one will need to consider all possible
restrictions. To handle this issue, Tell [Tel18] derandomized the random restriction lemma
for LTFs mentioned above so that such a restriction can be sampled using few random bits.
As a result, one only needs to consider a much smaller sample space of restrictions.
Now we need to apply the above idea to a depth-d circuit C. It seems that all we need
to do is applying the pseudorandom restriction d− 1 times. While this is true, the analysis
is much more subtle. For example, after applying the first pseudorandom restriction ρ1, we
get a new circuit C̃ of depth (d− 1) on some n′ variables so that it agrees with Cρ1 on all
but at most say 2n′/6 inputs. Now consider a subsequent restrictions ρ′. Note that the final
number of unrestricted variables n′′ after ρ′ is much smaller than n′. Therefore, (Cρ1)ρ′ and
C̃ρ′ can disagree on all the inputs (since 2n
′
/6  2n′′) so C̃ρ′ cannot be used to determine
the correct output of (Cρ1)ρ′ , which is also the correct output of C. It turns out that this
issue can be handled if we can say that those bottom layer gates, which become close to
constant after applying one step of pseudorandom restriction, will remain close to the same
constant for the subsequent pseudorandom restriction. Such a “bias preservation lemma”
for LTFs is also proved in [Tel18].
Both the pseudorandom restriction lemma for LTFs and the bias preservation lemma
for LTFs in [Tel18] are obtained using a PRG for LTFs. One way to extend those results
to PTFs is to use a PRG for PTFs. However, unlike LTFs, for which a PRG with a very
short seed is known, all known PRGs for PTFs have a large seed length (for small error,
which is needed for the argument). In fact, the only PRG that we can use in this case is the





. To get quasi-polynomial running time, we use a powerful pseudorandom
“block restriction lemma” for PTFs in [KKL17] that uses only a poly-logarithmic number
of random bits, and convert it into a form of pseudorandom restriction lemma that fits
our needs. Also, we use an observation in [KKL17], which says that a concentrated PTF
(see Definition 4.6) is likely to remain concentrated under any random restriction that fixes
variables limited-wise independently, to get a similar bias preservation lemma for PTFs.
PRG for small PTF circuits. Our PRG is based on the celebrated Nisan-Wigderson
“hardness-based” generator (NW PRG) [NW94]. To fool a class C of Boolean functions f ,
the NW PRG construction requires a “hard function” h that cannot be computed correctly
on significantly more than a half of all possible inputs by any Boolean function g in a related
class C̃ of “slightly more powerful” functions than those from C. Thus, sufficiently strong
average-case lower bounds against the class C̃ can be used to build a PRG fooling the class
C.
In our case, the class C contains all those n-variate Boolean functions that are com-
putable by constant depth-d circuits with at most s  n PTF gates of degree-∆. Our
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main observation is that the corresponding class C̃ (for which we require average-case lower
bounds) is the class of Boolean functions computable by constant depth-d circuits with at
most s PTF gates of degree ∆′ = α ·∆, for some parameter α ≥ 1 that we can control (and
which will determine the seed size of our PRG). That is, the class C̃ is the same as C, except
for a somewhat higher degree ∆′ of the allowed PTF gates.
To illustrate the idea of our analysis of the NW PRG for PTF circuits, we consider the
special case of a single n-variate PTF f of degree ∆. That is, f = sgn(p(x1, . . . , xn)) for
some degree-∆ multi-linear polynomial p : {0, 1}n → R. Suppose that the NW generator
based on some “hard” Boolean function h failed to ε-fool this PTF f .
First, the standard NW analysis shows that the function h(z) can be computed, with
probability at least 1/2 + ε/n, by (possibly the negation of) the function
g(z) = f(h1(z), h2(z), . . . , hi(z), bi+1, . . . , bn), (4.1)
for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, fixed bits bi+1, . . . , bn, and Boolean functions h1, . . . , hi, where each
hj(z) depends on at most some α bits in z, for a parameter a ≥ 1 coming from the NW
construction (the maximum overlap between pairs of sets in the NW design; see Section 4.5
for details).
It is well known that every Boolean function on α inputs can be written as a multi-linear
polynomial of degree α over the reals. Plugging in these polynomials for the function hj ’s
in Equation (4.1), we get that g(z) is a PTF of degree at most ∆′ = α ·∆.
Hence, to ensure that this NW generator based on h is indeed ε-fooling for degree-∆
PTFs, we just need h to be such that no PTF of degree-(α · ∆) can compute h(z) on
more than 1/2 + ε/n of inputs z. Such hard functions h turn out to be easy to construct.
For example, we use the average-case hard function for low-degree PTF circuits due to
Nisan [Nis94].
The parameters of our PRG G : {0, 1}r → {0, 1}n (its error ε and seed length r) depend
on the strength of the average-case lower bound for the hard function h. To get a short
seed r, one needs to maximize the aforementioned parameter α, ideally setting α = logn
(as is the case for a standard application of the NW construction). However, we also need
to prove (average-case) lower bounds against PTFs of degree α ·∆, where virtually nothing
is known for the degree logn. Thus we are forced to set α logn, which limits the stretch
of our PRG to be at most only super-polynomial. On the other hand, for such a small α,
our hard function h has exponentially small correlation with degree-(α ·∆) PTFs, thereby
allowing our PRG to have an exponentially small error ε.
4.1.3 Related work and comparison
Circuit Satisfiability. Impagliazzo, Paturi and Schneider [IPS13] gave a Circuit-SAT
algorithm for depth-2 LTF circuits with few wires; this result was improved by Chen and
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Santhanam [CS15a]. A Circuit-SAT algorithm for constant-depth LTF circuits with few
wires was recently given by Chen, Santhanam and Srinivasan [CSS18]. Alman, Chan and
Williams [ACW16] showed a fast satisfiability algorithm for ACC0 ◦LTF◦LTF circuits with
sub-quadratic number of LTF gates on the bottom layer and sub-exponential number of
gates on the other layers, and hence obtained lower bounds against these circuits for an
explicit function in ENP, using the connection between satisfiability algorithms and circuit
lower bounds due to Williams [Wil13, Wil14b]. Also, Tamaki [Tam16] has recently showed
a fast satisfiability algorithm and lower bounds for depth-2 LTF circuits with sub-quadratic
number of gates.
The most closely related previous work is by Chen, Santhanam and Srinivasan [CSS18]
who gave a Circuit-SAT algorithm for circuits with a super-linear number of wires whose
gates are LTFs. In particular, they show that the satisfiability of a depth-d, n-variate circuit
with LTF gates and at most n1+εd wires can be solved by a zero-error randomized algorithm
in time 2n−nεd , where εd = c−d for some constant c. Our results extend their algorithm to
the more general case of circuits with sparse PTF gates. In particular, our algorithm in
Theorem 4.2 for ∆ = 1 subsumes the Circuit-SAT algorithm for LTFs in [CSS18]. Also note
that the sparsity of the PTF gates in our model is almost quadratic in n, which is the input
size of the circuit. “Opening up” the PTF gates in the circuit and expressing them as LTFs
of terms will result in a (constant-depth) LTF circuit that can have an almost quadratic
number of wires, and such a circuit can not be analyzed by the result in [CSS18].
Recently, building on the work of [CSS18, KL18], Bajpai et al. [BKK+19] obtained a
similar #SAT algorithm, but for constant-depth circuits with a super-linear number of wires
whose gates are constant-degree PTFs. Such an algorithm can also be adapted to the case
where the PTF gates are polynomially sparse, and hence subsumes our #SAT algorithm for
sub-quadratically sparse PTF circuits.
Quantified derandomization. The quantified derandomization problem was first in-
troduced by Goldreich and Wigderson in [GW14], where they obtained a polynomial time
algorithm that finds the majority output of a given AC0 circuit that has at most 2n0.999
minority-value inputs. The key tool in their algorithm is a derandomized version of Hås-
tad’s switching lemma [Hås89] with logarithmic seed length. In addition, they obtain quan-
tified derandomization results for log-space algorithms and arithmetic circuits. The quan-
tified derandomization algorithm for AC0 was generalized by Tell [Tel17b] to handle AC0
circuits with at most 2Ω(n/ logd−2 n) minority-value inputs, where d is the depth, with an
increase of the running time to 2Õ(log3 n). As mentioned above, Tell [Tel18] has recently
obtained a quantified derandomization algorithm for depth-d LTF circuits with n1+1/ exp(d)
wires with at most 2n1−1/5d minority-value inputs, running in time n(log logn)2 . Our result
extends this to low-degree PTF circuits and sparse PTF circuits, at the expense of in-
creasing the running time to quasi-polynomial (for constant degree and polynomial spar-
83
sity). For the results on reducing standard derandomization to quantified derandomization,
see [GW14, Tel17b, Tel17a, Tel18].
PRGs. There has been a long sequence of works on constructing PRGs (of varying
strength) for various sub-classes of P/poly. Among these known PRG constructions, some
are NW-style “hardness-based” generators, while others are ad hoc constructions (often us-
ing such standard pseudorandomness tools as hashing, limited-wise independence, expander
graphs, etc.) The previous PRGs for PTFs due to [MZ13, Kan12] are of the latter kind. The
construction uses hashing and limited-wise independence. The analysis is quite involved, and
depends on a number of analytic tools for polynomials (concentration and anti-concentration
results, the invariance principle, hypercontractivity, regularization, etc.). In contrast, our
PRG for PTFs (of Corollary 4.5) is the NW-style construction, whose analysis is simple,
assuming an average-case lower bound for an appropriate class of functions.
For constant degree PTFs and constant error ε, the PRG of [MZ13, Kan12] has expo-
nential stretch (mapping a seed of length O(logn) to an n-bit string fooling n-input PTFs).
However, these PRGs have polynomial dependence in the error 1/ε and cannot handle small
error. Our PRG cannot achieve such exponentially long stretch for constant error, but it
can achieve even exponentially small error ε with a nontrivial (sub-linear) seed size, which
is impossible for the PRGs of [MZ13, Kan12].
In their work studying correlation bounds for AC0 circuits with few symmetric gates [LS11],
Lovett and Srinivasan obtained an average-case hard function for constant depth poly-size
AC0 circuits with few LTF gates and used it to construct a PRG fooling such circuits with
polynomial stretch and exponentially small error, also based on the generic construction of
Nisan and Wigderson. Since a PTF can be viewed as a depth-2 circuit computing an LTF of
ANDs, such a PRG also fools small PTF circuits. While the PRG in [LS11] can fool a more
general model, which is constant-depth AC0 circuits augmented with LTF gates, it can have
only polynomial seed stretch and the circuit can have only constant depth. Our work here
focuses on circuits with only PTF gates. Our PRG can have sub-polynomial seed length
and it can fool PTF circuits regardless of the depth as long as the number of gates is small.
In particular, our PRG for a single PTF with sub-polynomial seed length (Corollary 4.5)
can be used to construct a PRG for degree-2 PTFs with a seed length that is logarithmic
in the input size and sub-polynomial in the error (see [KR18]).
Threshold circuits. It is well known that the class of constant-depth polynomial-size
TC0 circuits is equivalent to the class of constant-depth polynomial-size circuits with LTF
gates [GHR92]. LTF circuits have been intensively studied in complexity theory. PTF cir-
cuits have been previously studied for lower bounds [Nis94, KKL17]. Threshold circuits are
also studied as a model of artificial neural networks [MP43] (see also [Ant01]), where a
threshold gate is also called a neuron.
84
Organization of this chapter. We give the necessary background in Section 4.2. We
describe our satisfiability algorithms (of Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2) in Section 4.3. We
prove our quantified derandomization results (Theorem 4.3) in Section 4.4, and our PRG
result (Theorem 4.4) in Section 4.5. We conclude with some open problems in Section 4.6.
4.2 Preliminaries
Notation
Throughout this chapter, we will use {0, 1} as the Boolean domain.
For a Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, we define the majority value of f to be the
bit value b ∈ {0, 1} that maximizes the quantity Prx∼{0,1}n [f(x) = b], and we call 1− b the
minority value.
We say that two Boolean functions f and g are δ-close if Prx[f(x) 6= g(x)] ≤ δ. We say
that a function f is δ-close to an explicit constant if f is δ-close to some constant function
and such a constant function can be efficiently determined from f .
We will often view an s-sparse PTF as an LTF of at most s AND gates. It is well known
that every LTF on m variables has a canonical representation, where the coefficients are
integers of magnitude at most 2O(m logm) [MTT61]. Therefore, every s-sparse PTF is equiv-
alent to some s-sparse PTF whose coefficients are integers of magnitude at most 2O(s log s).
Without loss of generality, for a circuit with s-sparse PTF gates, we assume the coefficients
of all gates have bit complexity poly(s).
Useful tools for analyzing PTFs
We review some definitions and useful results from Chapter 3.
Definition 4.6 (δ-concentrated PTFs). Let p : {0, 1}n → R be a degree-∆ multi-linear











where E and Var denote the expectation and the variance, respectively, under the uniform
distribution over {0, 1}n. We refer to (δ, 1)-concentrated polynomials as δ-concentrated.
A useful property of concentrated PTFs is that they are close to an explicit constant.
Lemma 4.7 (Concentrated implies close to constant, Lemma 3.26 restated). For any 0 <
δ ≤ 1/2, if a PTF f = sgn(p) is δ-concentrated, then f is δ-close to the constant function
sgn (E[p]).
For a multi-linear polynomial p : {0, 1}n → R, it easy to see that E[p] = p(1/2, . . . , 1/2),
and so the expectation of p can be computed efficiently given access to p (either the evalua-
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tion oracle for p, or the full description of p via its coefficients). Thus, the constant function
sgn(E[p]) from Lemma 4.7 is efficiently computable for a given polynomial p.
Recall that a random block restriction picks the set of unrestricted variables by picking
a block from some arbitrary predetermined partition of variables. More formally, an m-block
random restriction for a function is the following process: given an arbitrary partitioning
of input variables into m disjoint blocks, a random m-block restriction picks a uniformly
random block ` ∈ [m] and fixes all variable outside the chosen block ` to 0 or 1 according
to some distribution.
The following is a random restriction lemma for PTFs which says that a low-degree PTF
is likely to become concentrated under a (truly) random block restriction.
Lemma 4.8 (Random block restriction lemma, Lemma 3.37 restated 3). For any 0 < δ < 1
and any positive integers m,λ, let Bm be a m-block random restriction that fixes variables




[fρ is not (δ, λ)-concentrated] ≤ m−1/2 · (logm · log δ−1)O(λ·∆
2).
There is also a derandomized version of the above random block restriction lemma.
Lemma 4.9 (Pseudorandom block restriction lemma, Theorem 3.64 restated). For any 0 <
δ, γ < 1 and any positive integers m,λ, there is a polynomial-time algorithm for sampling
a m-block random restriction B′m, that uses at most mγ · logn random bits, so that the




[fρ is not (δ, λ)-concentrated] ≤ m−1/2 · (logm · log δ−1)O(λ·∆
2/γ).
Moreover, B′m fixes the variables (192 ·∆ · log(1/δ))-wise independently.
The following lemma says that a sparse PTF is likely to become a low-degree PTF under
a mild (pseudo-)random restriction.
Lemma 4.10 (Degree reduction lemma). For any positive integer D, any (logn)−1  α <
1, let R be a random restriction such that
• R picks the unrestricted variables D-wise independently, each with probability n−α.
3The original result in Lemma 3.37 was stated for PTFs and polynomials for {1,−1} domain. It is easy
to see that it also holds for {0, 1} domain. This is because for every multi-linear polynomial p : {0, 1} → R,
there is the unique polynomial p′ : {1,−1} → R of the same degree such that, for any x ∈ {0, 1}n there
is an unique y ∈ {1,−1}n (that maps the 0’s of x to 1 and the 1’s to −1) such that p(x) = p′(y). More
precisely, for p(x) =
∑
S⊆[n] cS ·Πi∈Sxi, we get p
′(y) =
∑
S⊆[n] cS ·Πi∈S(1− yi)/2. It is easy to see that the
expectation (variance) of p′ over {1,−1}n is the same as that of p over {0, 1}n.
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• R fixes the variables using a (D · α · logn)-wise independent distribution.
Then for any s-sparse PTF f on n variables, we have
Pr
ρ∼R
[deg(fρ) > D] ≤ s · n−D·α/2.
Proof. Let M be any monomial in f .
Suppose |M | ≤ D · α · logn. Then
Pr
ρ∼R





































In above, we use the fact thatR picks the set of unrestricted variablesD-wise independently,
each with probability n−α.





















In above, we use the fact that R fixes the variables using a (D · α · logn)-wise independent
distribution.
The lemma then follows by applying the union bound over all s monomials.
87
4.3 #SAT algorithm for PTF circuits
In this section, we present our counting (#Circuit-SAT) algorithm in Theorem 4.1 for
circuits with sparse PTF gates without any degree restriction on the monomials. We start
with some useful tools.
Definition 4.11 (Probabilistic Polynomials). We say that a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
has an ε-error probabilistic polynomial of degree d if there is a distribution P of polynomials
p(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ F2[x1, . . . , xn] such that, for any x ∈ {0, 1}n, Prp∼P[f(x) 6= p(x)] ≤ ε. We
will call the distribution P a probabilistic polynomial.
There are known constructions of probabilistic polynomials for LTFs and AND/OR
functions that use few random bits.
Theorem 4.12 (Randomness-efficient probabilistic polynomials for LTFs [Sri13, Tam16]).
For any 0 < ε < 1/2 and LTF f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, f has a ε-error probabilistic polynomial
P of degree at most d = O
(√
n · log(1/ε) · log5 n
)










Theorem 4.13 (Randomness-efficient probabilistic polynomials for AND/OR [Raz87, CW16]).
For any 0 < ε < 1/2, AND/OR on n variables has a ε-error probabilistic polynomial P





O (logn · log(1/ε)) random bits.
We need the following useful tools for analyzing polynomials.
Lemma 4.14 (Fast multi-point polynomial evaluation [Yat37, Wil14b]). Let p be a n-
variate polynomial given as a sum of monomials. Then p can be evaluated on all points in
{0, 1}n in time 2n · poly(n).
Theorem 4.15 (Toda’s polynomials [Tod91, BT94]). For any integer ` ≥ 0, there exists
an explicit polynomial F` of degree 2`− 1 such that the following holds
1. if y = 0 mod 2, then F`(y) = 0 mod 2`.
2. if y = 1 mod 2, then F`(y) = 1 mod 2`.
We also need the followings.
Lemma 4.16 (see [CS15b, Section 4.1]). Let φ1, . . . , φs be a sequence of terms whose literals
are from a set of n variables, where s ≥ n. There exists a decision tree with at most
2n−Ω(n2/s) leaves such that restricted to each leaf of the tree, φi contains at most 1 literal,
for all i ∈ [s].
Lemma 4.17 ([CSS18, Proposition 6.2]). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be an LTF with coeffi-
cients of bit complexity poly(n) and let S be the set of inputs on which f evaluates to 0 (or
1). Then S can be enumerated in time |S| · poly(n)
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4.3.1 Conjunction of sparse PTFs
First, we give a #Circuit-SAT algorithm for conjunctions of sparse PTFs, which is needed for
our main algorithm as the base case. The algorithm is based on the framework for designing
satisfiability algorithms developed by Williams [Wil14b]. The idea is to transform a given
constant-depth circuit into a low-degree probabilistic polynomial and solve satisfiability
by evaluating the polynomial on all points in a faster-than-brute-force manner. Applying
this idea naively, we get a randomized SAT algorithm that makes error. Such a base-case
algorithm would result in the final SAT algorithm for PTF circuits that also makes error.
However, using some derandomization ideas similar to those in [CW16, Tam16], we are
able to obtain a deterministic base-case algorithm that can count the number of satisfying
assignments. This allows us to make our final SAT algorithm for PTF circuits to be zero-
error randomized algorithm that counts the number of satisfying assignments.
Lemma 4.18. There exists a deterministic algorithm that counts the number of satisfying
assignments of every n-variate circuit C that is a conjunction of k s-sparse PTF gates,









The following lemma says that a conjunction of sparse PTFs has low degree probabilistic
polynomial that can be constructed using few random bits.
Lemma 4.19. For any 0 < ε < 1/2 and n-variate circuit C that is a conjunction of k s-
sparse PTF gates, C has an ε-error probabilistic polynomial P of degree d =
√
s ·(log s)O(1) ·




·poly(n) using (log s)O(1) ·log k ·log(1/ε)
random bits.
Proof. Let f1, . . . , fk be the s-sparse PTFs at the bottom (closest to the inputs) layer of C.
We first consider the probabilistic polynomial for a single sparse PTF.
Claim 4.20. Each fi, i ∈ [k], has a ε-error probabilistic polynomial of degree at most
d =
√




·poly(n) using (log s)O(1) · log(1/ε)
random bits.
Proof of claim. We view fi as an LTF of s AND gates. We first represent each of the
AND gates at the bottom by a 110·s -error probabilistic polynomial of degree O (log s), using
Theorem 4.13. This takes O (logn · log s) random bits for a single AND gate. Then we
represent the LTF gate (on s variables) with a 110 -error probabilistic polynomial of degree
O
(√
s · log5 s
)




random bits. By composing the
probabilistic polynomial for the bottom ANDs with the probabilistic polynomial for the
top LTF, we obtain, by the union bound, a 15 -error probabilistic polynomial of degree
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√
s · (log s)O(1) for fi. Note that since we are taking the union bound over the bottom AND
gates here, we can use the same random bits to construct the probabilistic polynomials for
all the AND gates. Finally, we sample O (log(1/ε)) independent copies of such polynomials
for fi and take the majority. Note that the majority function on t variables can be computed
by a polynomial of degree t. By a standard concentration bound, we conclude that each fi
has an ε-error probabilistic polynomial of degree at most
√
s · (log s)O(1) · log(1/ε).
By Claim 4.20, we now can represent each fi in C with a 110·k -error probabilistic poly-
nomial of degree
√
s · (log s)O(1) · log k. This takes (log s)O(1) · log k for a single fi. Also, we
represent the top AND gate of C by a 110 -error probabilistic polynomial of constant degree.
We then obtain a 15 -error probabilistic polynomial for C of degree
√
s · (log s)O(1) · log k.
Again we use the same random bits for the fi’s as we are taking the union bound. Finally,
by standard error reduction as described above, we get an ε-error probabilistic polynomial
for C of degree
√
s · (log s)O(1) · log k · log(1/ε).
We are now ready to describe our #Circuit-SAT algorithm for conjunctions of sparse
PTFs.
Proof of Lemma 4.18. Consider a subset of n′ variables and a partial assignment a ∈
{0, 1}n
′
. Denote by Ca the restricted circuit where the values of these n′ variables are
fixed to a. We enumerate all such partial assignments in {0, 1}n
′
and obtain a list of r = 2n′









Now let Pi be an 13r -error probabilistic polynomial of Cai of degree
√
s ·(log s)O(1) · log k ·
log(r) given by Lemma 4.19. Consider the following quantity:
Ri(x) =
∑
p∈Pi (p(x) mod 2)
|Pi| .
Here we view p ∈ Pi as a polynomial with integer coefficients rather than a polynomial over





Then, we get ∑
i∈[r]
Ri(x) = Q(x)± 13 .




note that for all i ∈ [r],
|Pi| = M = 2(log s)O(1)·log k·log r.
Let ` = (log s)O(1) · log k · log r so that 2` ≥ r ·M . Let F be a degree 2`−2 polynomial given




























Note that Q′ is a polynomial of degree at most
` ·
√
s · (log s)O(1) · log k · log(r) ≤ (n′)2 ·
√
s · (log s)O(1) · log2 k.
Moreover, Q′ can be explicitly computed in time 2(n′)2·
√
s·(log s)O(1)·log2 k. We then do fast
multi-point evaluation (Lemma 4.14) ofQ′ to obtain the valuesQ′(x) for each x ∈ {0, 1}n−n
′
.
Note that we can recover
∑
i∈[r]R
i(x), hence also Q(x), from Q′(x). We then sum over all
x’s in {0, 1}n−n
′
to obtain the number of satisfying assignments of C. In total, the running












s · (log s)O(1) · log2 k
)1/2
completes the proof.
4.3.2 Depth reduction for sparse PTF circuits with few wires
In this section, we show how to use the random restriction lemma for PTFs (Lemma 4.8)
to simplify a sparse PTF circuit with few wires.
Lemma 4.21. For any integer d ≥ 2 and any (logn)−1  ε < 1, let
• β = E · ε, where E is some constant,
• s ≤ nO(1),






• C be any depth-d, n-variate, s-sparse PTF circuit with at most w = n1+ε wires.
Then there exists a decision tree T of depth n − n1−β such that, for a random leaf σ of
T , with probability at least 1− exp(−nε), we have the following: Cσ is a depth-d circuit of
wire complexity at most w such that its bottom layer has at most n gates that are δ-close
to an explicit constant and at most nβ gates that are not δ-close to an explicit constant.





We need the following which is implicit in [CSS18].
Lemma 4.22 (see [CSS18, Section 4.3]). For any integer d ≥ 2 and any 0 < ε < 1, let
• β = E · ε, where E is some constant,
• r = n−β/2,
• G be any class of Boolean functions such that for each g ∈ G,
Pr
ρ∼Rr
[gρ is not δ-close to an explicit constant] ≤ rΩ(1),
where Rr denotes the truly r-random restriction,
• C be any depth-d, n-variate circuit with gates from G and at most w = n1+ε wires.
Then there exists a decision tree T of depth n − n1−2β such that, for a random leaf σ of
T , with probability at least 1− exp(−nε), we have the following: Cσ is a depth-d circuit of
wire complexity at most w such that its bottom layer has at most n gates that are δ-close to
constant and at most nβ gates that are not δ-close to constant. Moreover, such a tree can





Proof of Lemma 4.21. The proof uses Lemma 4.22 and we need to show that a sparse
PTF is likely to become close to an explicit constant under a r-random restriction. More
specifically, we need to show that for any s-sparse PTF f ,
Pr
ρ∼Rr
[fρ is not δ-close to an explicit constant] ≤ nΩ(β) = rΩ(1).
Let
• r1 = r2 =
√
r, where r = n−β/2,
• δ = exp(−nβ3/c1), where c1 < B is a sufficiently large constant,
• D = c2 · β−1, where c2 < c1 is a sufficiently large constant,
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By Lemma 4.10, we have
Pr
ρ1∼Rr1
[deg(fρ1) ≥ D] ≤ s · n−c2/8 ≤ rΩ(1). (4.2)
Next, consider any degree-D PTF g and the random restriction Rr2 . Note that Rr2 can
be sampled equivalently as follows: first randomly partitioning the variables into m = 1/r2
disjoint blocks so that each variable is assigned to each block with probability r2, and then
applying a random m-block restriction, where we fixes the variables outside of the chosen
block uniformly at random. Then by Lemma 4.8 and Lemma 4.7, for every partition of
variables, the probability that g restricted by a random block restriction is not δ-close to
an explicit constant is at most
√
r2 · (log(1/r2) · log(1/δ))O(D




[fρ is not δ-close to an explicit constant]
≤ Pr
ρ1,ρ2
[(fρ1)ρ2 is not δ-close to an explicit constant | deg(fρ1) < D] + Prρ1 [deg(fρ1) ≥ D]
≤ rΩ(1). (by Equations (4.2) and (4.3))
4.3.3 Enumerating minority outputs of sparse PTFs
In our main algorithm, we will need to apply the depth reduction lemma (Lemma 4.21)
to the circuit to conclude that many of the gates at the bottom layer will become close to
constant so that we can replace them with actual constants. This changes the function of
the circuit and we need to deal with the inputs where these gates do not evaluate to their
majority values. As we will see, we can handle this issue if given a sparse PTF we can find
the set of all inputs where it evaluates to its minority value, in a relatively efficient way.
Then for the case of sparse PTF, we use Lemma 4.16 to reduce to the case of LTF, where
we can perform this task efficiently using Lemma 4.17.
Lemma 4.23. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a s-sparse PTF with coefficients of bit complexity
poly(n), where s ≥ n and let S be the set of inputs on which f evaluates to 0 (or 1). Then





Proof. We view f as an LTF of s AND gates. By Lemma 4.16, there exists a decision tree
for f with at most 2n−Ω(n2/s) leaves such that Φ restricted to each leaf is an LTF. We then
go through each leaf σ and enumerate the set of inputs on which fσ evaluates to 0. Let Sσ
be the size of such set. By Lemma 4.17, this enumeration takes time Sσ · poly(n). The total
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running time is the time for going through the leaves of the decision tree, which is at most
2n−Ω(n2/s), and the time to enumerate the set of inputs evaluating to 0, which is at most∑
σ Sσ · poly(n) ≤ |S| · poly(n).
4.3.4 Putting it all together





and βd = E · εd, where E is a sufficiently large constant. We show the
following.
Theorem 4.24. For any integer d ≥ 1, the number of satisfying assignments of a depth-d,
n-variate circuit with (n2−10β2)-sparse PTF gates and at most n(1+εd) wires can be computed
by a zero-error randomized algorithm in time 2n−n
Ω(β3d) · poly(n).
Definition 4.25 (Skew Circuits). We say that a circuit C is (d, n, t, s)-skew if it is a n-
variate circuit that can be expressed as a conjunction of some circuit C ′ and at most t
s-sparse PTFs, where C ′ is a depth-d circuit with s-sparse PTF gates and has at most
w = n1+εd wires. We call C ′ the skew subcircuit of C.
Let T (d, n, t, s) denote the supremum, over all (d, n, t, s)-skew circuits C, of the random-
ized running time of counting the number of satisfying assignments of C. Throughout this
subsection, we will assume that the constant E in the definition of εd and βd is a sufficiently
large constant.
The following lemma says that we can reduce the task of counting satisfying assignments
of depth-d circuits to that of depth-(d− 1) circuits. This is done in a way that is similar to
that in [CSS18].
Lemma 4.26. If s ≤ n2−5βd, then
T (d, n, t, s) ≤ 2n−n1−2βd · 2nβd · T
(




Proof. Let C be any (d, n, t, s)-skew circuit, where its skew subcircuit is C ′. To count the
number of satisfying assignments of C. We first apply Lemma 4.21 to C ′ to get a decision
tree with the claimed property. We then count the number of satisfying assignments at each
leaves. For those “bad” leaves for which the conditions in Lemma 4.21 are not satisfied, we
will simply do brute force on all n1−2βd variables. The time to perform this is
2n−n1−2βd · exp(−nεd) · 2n1−2βd ≤ 2n−nεd . (4.4)
Next, consider a “good” leaf σ that satisfies the conditions in Lemma 4.21. We now describe
how to count the number of satisfying assignments of Cσ. We call a gate imbalanced if it
is δ-close to an explicit constant and balanced otherwise. Let (g1, . . . , g`≤n) be the set of
imbalanced gates and (a1, . . . , a`) be their majority values. Let (h1, . . . , ht≤nβd ) be the set
of balanced gates.
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We first count the number of satisfying assignments of Cσ in the following subset of
inputs:
S = {x : ∃ i ∈ [`] for which gi(x) 6= ai}.
To do so, for each of the imbalanced gates, we enumerate the set of inputs on which it
evaluates to its minority value, and keep those that satisfy the circuit Cσ. By Lemma 4.23,







+ 2n1−2βd · δ
)
· poly(n), (4.5)















so Equation (4.5) is at most
2n1−2βd−n
Ω(β3d) · poly(n). (4.6)
We do this for every imbalanced gate and obtain a set of satisfying inputs. In the end we
simply take the union of these sets to get the satisfying assignments in S.
Next, we counts the number of satisfying assignments in
T = {0, 1}n − S.
Let C ′σ,a be the circuit with those imbalanced gates in C ′σ replaced with their majority
values (i.e., the values given by (a1, . . . , a`)). Instead of counting the number of satisfying
assignments for the original circuit Cσ, we consider the following circuit:







It is easy to see that D(x) = 0 for every x ∈ S and D(x) = Cσ(x) for every x ∈ T . We
now need to count the number of satisfying assignments of D. We first partition T into 2t
subsets, each of which is indexed by some b = (b1, . . . , bt) ∈ {0, 1}t, where the subset Tb
given by the index b is
Tb = {x : x ∈ T, h1(x) = b1, . . . , ht(x) = bt}.
To count the number of satisfying assignments of D in Tb. We consider the following circuit:








where Db is the circuit D with the balanced gates replaced by the values b1, . . . , bt ∈ {0, 1}.
Again, we have Eb(x) = 0 for every x ∈ [n] − Tb and Eb(x) = D(x) for every x ∈ Tb.
Now our task is reduced to counting the number of satisfying assignments of Eb for each
b ∈ {0, 1}t. But note that each Eb is a conjunction of some depth-(d − 1) circuit (i.e., the
skew subcircuit of Eb) and k s-sparse PTFs, where k = t+ n+ nβ ≤ t+ 2n. Also, the skew






Therefore, each Eb is a
(
d− 1, n1−2βd , t+ 2n, s
)
-skew circuits, and its number of satisfying
assignments can be computed in time T
(
d− 1, n1−2βd , t+ 2n, s
)
. Then the total time for
counting the number of satisfying assignments of the original circuit Cσ in the subset T is
2t · T
(
d− 1, n1−2βd , t+ 2n, s
)
≤ 2nβd · T
(
d− 1, n1−2βd , t+ 2n, s
)
. (4.7)
Therefore, by Equation (4.6) and Equation (4.7), counting the number of satisfying
assignments of Cσ can be done in time
2n1−2βd−n
Ω(β3d) · poly(n) + 2nβd · T
(
d− 1, n1−2βd , t+ 2n, s
)
. (4.8)
There are at most L = 2n−n1−2βd such leaves. Multiplying L by the running time in Equa-
tion (4.8) and combining Equation (4.4) yields the desired running time.
Given the recursion in Lemma 4.26, we are now ready to prove Theorem 4.24.
Proof of Theorem 4.24. It suffices to show
T
(
d, n, 0, s = n2−10β2
)
≤ 2n−n
Ω(β3d) · poly(n). (4.9)
We will iteratively apply Lemma 4.26 until we reach d = 1. Then we use the base case
algorithm (Lemma 4.18) for the depth 1 case.
Recall that βi = E/E3
i−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ d. We will always assume E is a sufficiently large
constant. Let nd = n and ni = n
1−2βi+1
i+1 . That is, ni is the number of variables of the circuit
after its skew subcircuit has depth i. It is easy to see by induction that for 1 ≤ i ≤ d,∑d




j=i+1 βj ≥ n1−4βi+1 . (4.10)
By Lemma 4.26, if s ≤ n2−5·βd , then
T (d, n, t, s) ≤ 2n−nd−1 · 2nβd · T (d− 1, nd−1, t+ 2n, s) + 2n−n
Ω(β3d) · poly(n) (4.11)
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Now note that using Equation (4.10), we have for all 3 ≤ i ≤ d,
n2−5·βii ≥ n
(1−4βi+1)(2−5βi) ≥ n2−10β2 = s.
Using Equation (4.11), we unwind T (d, n, 0, s) d− 1 times, and we get
T (d, n, 0, s) ≤ 2n−n1 ·2n
β2












i=2 2ni ≤ 2dn.
We now upper bound Equation (4.12). We first upper bound the first summand in
Equation (4.12). By Lemma 4.18 and Equation (4.10), we have
2n
β2











so the first summand is at most 2n−n
Ω(β3d) .






















i · 2n−nE·βi/2 ≤ 2n−n
Ω(β3d)
. (4.13)
Therefore, the second summand is also bounded by
2n−n
Ω(β3d) · poly(n).
4.3.5 Circuits with gates that are LTFs of few functions
In this section, we describe our #Circuit-SAT algorithm in Theorem 4.2 for circuits whose
gates are LTFs of few functions of small arity. The algorithm is similar to that in the previous
subsections, and we only provide a sketch here.
We need a different base-case algorithm, as now the base case is a circuit that is a
conjunction of gates each of which is an LTF of few arbitrary functions of bounded arity.
We need the following #Circuit-SAT algorithm for such circuits.
Lemma 4.27. Let Gs,∆ be the class of Boolean functions computable by an LTF of s arbi-
trary ∆-variate functions, and let C be an n-variate circuit that is a conjunction of k Gs,∆
gates. There exists a deterministic algorithm that counts the number of satisfying assign-
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ments of every such circuit C and runs in time at most
2n−
√
n·(s1/4·(log s)O(1)·(log k)·∆)−1 · poly(n).
The proof of the above algorithm is similar to that of Lemma 4.18. We first show that
a conjunction of k functions from the class Gs,∆ has a probabilistic polynomial of degree at
most
√
s · (log s)O(1) · log k · log(1/ε) ·∆,
as in the proof of Lemma 4.19. The only difference is that for a function f from Gs,∆, viewed
as an LTF of functions with bounded arity ∆, we can simply replace those bottom functions
with bounded arity ∆ with polynomials of degree ∆ (instead of using Theorem 4.13), since
any function on ∆ variables can be computed by a polynomial of degree ∆ (over any field).
As for random restriction lemma, we can directly use Lemma 4.8, since every function
in Gs,∆ can be expressed as a degree-∆ PTFs. Following an argument similar to the proof
of Lemma 4.21, we get that
Lemma 4.28. For any integers ∆ ≥ 1, d ≥ 2, let
• εd,∆ = (E ·∆)−(2d−1) and βd,∆ = E ·∆2 ·εd,∆, where E is a sufficiently large constant,





• C be any depth-d, n-variate, degree-∆ PTF circuit with at most w = n1+ε wires.
Then there exists a decision tree T of depth n − n1−2βd,∆ such that, for a random leaf σ
of T , with probability at least 1 − δ, we have the following: Cσ is a depth-d circuit of wire
complexity at most w such that its bottom layer has at most n gates that are δ-close to
an explicit constant and at most nβd,∆ gates that are not δ-close to an explicit constant.






Finally, to enumerate the set of inputs where a function from Gs,∆ evaluates to its
minority value, we can use the following.
Lemma 4.29 (see [CS15b, Section 3.2]). Let φ1, . . . , φs be a sequence of arbitrary ∆-
constraints whose literals are from a set of n variables, where S ≥ n. There exists a decision
tree with at most 2n−Ω(n2/(s·∆2)) leaves such that restricted to each leaf φi, i ∈ [s], contains
at most 1 literal.
Then combining with Lemma 4.16, we have the following which is analogous to Lemma 4.23
Lemma 4.30. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be an LTF of at most s arbitrary ∆-variate functions
with coefficients of bit complexity poly(n), where s ≥ n, and let S be the set of inputs on







The final algorithm then follows from an argument that is similar to that of Section 4.3.4
with a different settings of parameters, which now are εd,∆ and βd,∆.
4.4 Quantified derandomization for PTF circuits
In this section, we prove our quantified derandomization results.
4.4.1 Pseudorandom restrictions for PTFs
We prove in this subsection some pseudorandom restriction lemmas for both low-degree
PTFs and sparse PTFs, which will be used to reduce the depth of a PTF circuit with few
wires. We obtain these pseudorandom restriction lemmas from the pseudorandom block
restriction lemma (Lemma 4.9). We first show for low-degree PTFs.
Lemma 4.31 (Pseudorandom restriction lemma for low-degree PTFs). For any constant
c1 > 0, any α1 < 1 and any positive integer ∆ such that ∆ 
√
α1 · logn/ log logn, there
is a random restriction R1 such that the following holds:
• R1 picks the unrestricted variables (logn)-wise independently, each with probability
n−α1.
• R1 fixes the variables (600 · c1 ·∆ · logn)-wise independently.
• R1 can be sampled in polynomial time using (logn)O(∆2) random bits.
• For any degree-∆ PTF f on n variables,
Pr
ρ∼R1
[fρ is not (n−c1 , 3)-concentrated] ≤ n−α1/3.
Proof. We define R1 by describing the following process of sampling a random restriction
from R1:





-block pseudorandom restriction from Lemma 4.9 for degree-∆ PTFs,
with parameters
• δ = n−c1 and λ = 3.
• γ = (c1 ·∆2 · log logn)/(α1 · logn), where c1 is a sufficiently large constant (note
that γ < 1 for ∆
√
α1 · logn/ log logn).
We now argue that the random restriction R1 has the desired properties. For the first
item, it is easy to see from the above that R1 picks the set of unrestricted variables
(logn)-wise independently, each with probability 1/n−α1/2. The second item follows from
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Lemma 4.9 that the pseudorandom block restriction fixes the variables (600 · c1 ·∆ · logn)-
wise independently. For the third item, note that to sample from R1, we need polylog(n)
random bits for its first step, and the number of random bits for its second step is
nα1·γ · logn ≤ (logn)O(∆2).
Finally, for the last item, note that in the above process of sampling R1, for any partition
into nα1 blocks generated in the first step, by Lemma 4.9, the probability over the restrictions




[fρ is not (n−c1 , 3)-concentrated] ≤ n−α1/2 · (logn)O(∆
2/γ) ≤ n−α1/2 · nα1/6 ≤ n−α1/3.
To obtain a similar pseudorandom restriction lemma for sparse PTFs, we combine the
pseudorandom restriction lemma for low-degree PTFs (Lemma 4.31) and the degree reduc-
tion lemma (Lemma 4.10) to get the following pseudorandom restriction lemma for sparse
PTFs.
Lemma 4.32 (Pseudorandom restriction lemma for sparse PTFs). For any constant c2 > 0,
any α2 < 1 and any positive integer ∆ such that ∆ 
√
α2 · logn/ log logn, there is a
random restriction R2 such that the following holds:
• R2 picks the unrestricted variables (logn)-wise independently, each with probability
n−α2.
• R2 fixes the variables (600 · c2 ·∆ · logn)-wise independently.
• R2 can be sampled in polynomial time using (logn)O(∆2) random bits.
• For any n∆·α2-sparse PTF f on n variables,
Pr
ρ∼R2
[fρ is not a degree-(4∆) (n−c2 , 2)-concentrated PTF] ≤ n−α2/5.
Proof. The idea is first applying a random restriction from Lemma 4.10 to reduce the degree
of the sparse PTFs, and then using a random restriction from Lemma 4.31 for low degree
PTFs.
Let ρ1 be a random restriction that picks the set of unrestricted variables (logn)-wise
independently, each with probability n−α2/2, and fixes the other variables using a (600 ·
c2 · ∆ · logn)-wise independent distribution. Note that, by Lemma 4.10 (with parameters
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D = 4∆ and α = α2/2), we have
Pr
ρ1
[deg(fρ1) > 4∆] ≤ n−α2/2.
Let ρ2 be a random restriction from Lemma 4.31 for degree-4∆ PTFs with parameters
β0 = α2/2.
Define R2 to be the random restriction ρ1 ◦ ρ2. Note that since both ρ1 and ρ2 pick the
set of unrestricted variables (logn)-wise independently, each with probability n−α2/2, the set
of unrestricted variables is picked by R2 (logn)-wise independently, each with probability
n−α2 . For the second item, note that ρ1 can be sampled using polylog(n) random bits and
ρ2 can be sampled using (logn)O(∆
2) random bits. Therefore, the total number of random
bits needed to sample ρ is at most (logn)O(∆2). Finally, we have
Pr
ρ∼R
[fρ is not a degree-(4∆) (n−c2 , 2)-concentrated PTF]
= Pr
ρ1,ρ2
[(fρ1)ρ2 is not a degree-(4∆) (n−c2 , 2)-concentrated PTF]
≤ Pr
ρ1,ρ2
[(fρ1)ρ2 is not (n−c2 , 2)-concentrated | deg(fρ1) ≤ 4∆] + Prρ1 [deg(fρ1) > 4∆]
≤ n−α2/4 · (logn)O(∆2/γ) + n−α2/2
≤ n−α2/4 · (logn)O(∆2/γ)
≤ n−α2/4 · nα2/20
= n−α2/5,
as desired.
Finally, we will need the following lemma which says that a concentrated PTF is likely
to remain concentrated under any random restriction that fixes variables limited-wise inde-
pendently.
Lemma 4.33 (see the proofs of Lemma 3.35 and Claim 3.70 ). Let f = sgn(p) be any
degree-∆ PTF that is (δ, λ + 1)-concentrated. Let ρ be a random restriction that fixes any
subset of variables according to some (192 ·∆ · log δ−1)-wise independent distribution. Then
with probability at least 1− δ we have
• fρ is (δ, λ)-concentrated.
• sgn(E(pρ)) = sgn(E(p)).
The above means that if a PTF is (δ, 2)-concentrated and hence close to some constant.
Then the restricted PTF is likely to remain close to the same constant.
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4.4.2 Quantified derandomization for sparse PTF circuits
Let G be a class of Boolean functions, we say that a circuit C is a (n, d, w, s,G)-sparse PTF
circuit if
1. C is an n-variate circuit of depth-d with at most w wires and
2. C has s-sparse PTFs as its gates except for the top gate, which is a function from G.
Similarly, we use (n, d, w,∆,G)-low-degree PTF circuits for the analogous type of circuits
whose gates (except for the top gate) are degree-∆ PTFs.
For a class of Boolean functions G, we denote by Apprn,ε(G) the running time, given an
n-variate function g from G, of approximating the acceptance probability of g to within an
additive error ε.
We first show the following.
Theorem 4.34. For any constant E ≥ 11 and any positive integers ∆ and d such that
∆
√
εd · logn/ log logn, where εd = E−2(d−1), let C be the class of
(
n, d, n1+εd , n∆·εd ,G
)
-








Theorem 4.34 implies Theorem 4.3 for sparse PTF circuits since we can always add a
dummy gate (e.g., AND) to the top of a PTF circuits, which only increase the depth by 1.
We will iteratively use the pseudorandom restriction lemma (Lemma 4.32) to reduce the
depth of the circuit until the circuit has depth 1. We first show how to do this in one step.
Lemma 4.35. For any constants E ≥ 11, c > 0, any ε ≤ 1/(7E), and any positive integer
∆ such that ∆
√
E · ε · logn/ log logn, there is a polynomial time algorithm that, given a(
n, d, n1+ε, n∆·ε,G
)
-sparse PTF circuit C and a random seed of length (logn)O(∆2), outputs
the following with probability at least 1− nε:
• A restriction ρ ∈ {0, 1, ∗}n that leaves n′ = n1−3E·ε variables unrestricted and that the
restricted variables are fixed (600 · c ·∆ · logn)-wise independently.
• A
(
n′, d− 1, (n′)1+7E·ε, (n′)2∆·ε,G
)
-sparse PTF circuit C̃ such that for all subsequent
random restriction ρ′ that fixes the variables in a (600 · c ·∆ · logn)-wise independent
manner, with probability 1− n−c over ρ′, it holds that C̃ρ′ is n−c-close to (Cρ)ρ′.
For the second item, we say that the restriction ρ′ is good (for C̃ and Cρ) if it holds that
C̃ρ′ is n−c-close to (Cρ)ρ′.
The proof of Lemma 4.35 is similar to that in [Tel18], which is based on the argument
in [CSS18], but requires some critical modifications. We sketch the proof below and highlight
these modifications.
Proof sketch. Let β = E ·ε and p = n−β. The restriction ρ consists of three sub-restrictions.
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ρ1: Preprocessing. Fix each of the variables with fan-out greater than 2nε using a (600 ·
c ·∆ · logn)-wise independent distribution. Since the number of wires is at most n1+ε, it can
be easily seen that the number of variables needed to be fixed is at most n1+ε/(2nε) = n/2.
ρ2: Pseudorandom restriction to simplify PTFs. Let ρ2 be a random restriction
from Lemma 4.32 with parameters α2 = β and c2 = 2c. Note that ρ2 fixes the variables
(600 · c ·∆ · logn)-wise independently. Now by Lemma 4.32, after ρ2, we expect all but at
most a fraction of n−β/5 of the gates in the bottom layer to become (n−2c, 3)-concentrated.
Moreover, since the number of unrestricted variables is picked in a (logn)-wise independent
manner, by a Chernoff-type concentration bound (for k-wise independence), the fan-in of
each of the non-concentrated gates (there are only about a fraction of n−β/5 of such gates)
will shrink by a factor of p with high probability, assuming they have large fan-ins. Then
we can expect to eliminate all those non-concentrated gates by fixing a small number of
variables. As for the gates with small fan-ins, using a simple graph theoretic argument
along with the condition given by the preprocessing step, we can also eliminate those gate





, over the random restriction ρ2, the following holds: there is
a set T of variables such that all the bottom layer gates that are not (n−2c, 3)-concentrated
can be replaced by constants after fixing the variables in T . The number of unrestricted
variables after applying ρ2 and fixing T is at least n1−3E·ε.
ρ3: Eliminate non-concentrated gates. We will use a (600·c·∆·logn)-wise independent
distribution to fix the variable in the set T described above. Note that the number of
unrestricted variables is at least n′ = n1−3E·ε. We may further fix additional variables so
that the number of unrestricted variables is exactly n′. Although this restriction eliminates
all non-concentrated gates in the bottom layer, it may also cause some concentrated gates to
become non-concentrated. However, by Lemma 4.33, the probability that each of these gates
is not (n−2c, 2)-concentrated is at most n−2c. By the union bound, we get with probability
all but n−2c · n1+ε ≤ n−c, all these gates remain (n−2c, 2)-concentrated.




, we have a restriction
ρ such that all the bottom layer gates of Cρ are (n−2c, 2)-concentrated and hence close
to some associated constants. Let’s call these constants V . C̃ is the circuit obtained from
Cρ by replacing those concentrated gates in the bottom with the constants V . Let’s argue
that C̃ρ′ and (Cρ)ρ′ are n−c-close to each other for any subsequent random restriction ρ′
that fixes the variables (600 · c ·∆ · logn)-wise independently. Consider such a subsequent
random restriction ρ′ and the restricted circuit (Cρ)ρ′ . By Lemma 4.33, with probability
except n−2c, the bottom layer gates of (Cρ)ρ′ , which are just the bottom layer gates of Cρ,
are still (n−2c)-concentrated. Moreover, they are close to the same constants V . Now by
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replacing these gates in (Cρ)ρ′ with the constants V , we obtain a circuit C ′. By a union
bound, C ′ and (Cρ)ρ′ are (n−c)-close to each other. On the other hand, consider the circuit
C̃, which is obtained by replacing the concentrated gates in the bottom Cρ with the constant
V . Note that C̃ρ′ = C ′. Thus, C̃ρ′ and (Cρ)ρ′ are n−c-close to each other. Finally, we need to
show that C̃ is a
(
n′, d− 1, (n′)1+4E·ε, (n′)∆·E·ε,G
)
-sparse PTF circuit. As for the number
of wires in C̃, note that
(n′)1+7E·ε = n(1−3E·ε)·(1+7E·ε) ≥ n1+ε.
Also, we have
(n′)2∆·ε = n(1−3E·ε)·2∆·ε ≥ n∆·ε.
We are now ready to describe our quantified derandomization algorithm.
Proof of Theorem 4.34. For 1 ≤ i ≤ d, define εi = E−2(i−1). Also define nd = n and
ni = n1−3E·εi+1i+1 . It is easy to see by induction that for 1 ≤ i ≤ d,
∑d





j=i+1 εj ≥ n1−6E·εi+1 . (4.14)
Let ρ be a sequence of d random restriction ρ1, · · · , ρd, such that ρi is a random re-
striction from Lemma 4.35 with parameters εi and c = 1. We say that the restriction ρi is
successful if the two items in Lemma 4.35 are satisfied.
We claim the following.




i ≤ 1/10. The probability, over ρ, that Cρ is not (Kd)-close





Proof of claim. We prove by induction on the depth d. The base case d = 2 follows from
Lemma 4.35. Now suppose the claim holds for d− 1, we show that it holds for d. We have
Pr
ρ
[Cρ is not Kd-close to G]
≤ Pr
ρ1,ρ′=ρ2,...,ρd
[(Cρ1)ρ′ is not Kd-close to G | ρ1 is successful] + Prρ1 [ρ1 is not successful]
≤ Pr
ρ1,ρ′





[ρ′ is not good] + n−εd
≤ Pr
ρ1,ρ′
[(Cρ1)ρ′ is not Kd-close to G | ρ1 is successful and ρ′ is good] ·Pr
ρ′
[ρ′ is good]
+ 2 · n−εd . (4.15)
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Now if ρ1 is successful and ρ′ is good, then by Lemma 4.35, (Cρ1)ρ′ is n−1-close to some
circuit C̃ρ′ , where C̃ is a
(
n′, d− 1, (n′)1+7E·εd , (n′)2∆·εd ,G
)
-sparse PTF circuit, with
• n′ = n1−3E·εd = nd−1.
• (n′)1+7E·εd ≤ (nd−1)1+εd−1 .
• (nd−1)2∆·εd ≤ (nd−1)∆·εd−1
Also, if (Cρ1)ρ′ is n−1-close to C̃ρ′ and C̃ρ′ is (Kd−1)-close to G, then (Cρ1)ρ′ would be
Kd-close to G. Therefore, Equation (4.15) is at most
Pr
ρ1,ρ′
[C̃ρ′ is not (Kd−1)-close to G | ρ1 is successful and ρ′ is good] ·Pr
ρ′
[ρ′ is good] + 2 · n−εd
≤ Pr
ρ′
[C̃ρ′ is not (Kd−1)-close to G | ρ′ is good] ·Pr
ρ′
[ρ′ is good] + 2 · n−εd
≤ Pr
ρ′
[C̃ρ′ is not (Kd−1)-close G] + 2 · n−εd .





If the original circuit C has at most 2n1−7/E bad inputs, then Cρ (on n1 ≥ n1−6/E
variables) also has at most 2n1−7/E bad inputs. Now suppose the restriction ρ is successful









n1 + 2n1−7/E ≤ 16 · 2
n1
bad inputs. If we now approximate the acceptance probability of this G function within
error 1/6, we can correctly determine the correct value.
Finally, we can enumerate all the possible seeds and take the majority vote to decide
the correct answer.
4.4.3 Quantified derandomization for low-degree PTF circuits
Here, we briefly describe the quantified derandomization algorithm for low-degree PTF
circuits.
Theorem 4.37. For any constant E ≥ 11 and any positive integers ∆ and d such that
∆ 
√
εd · logn/ log logn, where εd = E−2(d−1), let C be the class of
(
n, d, n1+εd ,∆,G
)
-




-quantified derandomization problem can be
solved in time 2(logn)
O(∆2)
·Apprn,1/6(G).
The above result can be proved in the same way as Theorem 4.34, using the following
one-step pseudorandom restriction for low-degree PTF circuits.
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Lemma 4.38. For any constants E ≥ 11, c > 0, any ε ≤ 1/(7E), and any positive integer
∆ such that ∆ 
√





-low-degree PTF circuit C and a random seed of length (logn)O(∆2),
outputs the following with probability at least 1− nε:
• A restriction ρ ∈ {0, 1, ∗}n that leaves n′ = n1−3E·ε variables unrestricted and that the
restricted variables are fixed (600 · c ·∆ · logn)-wise independently.
• A
(
n′, d− 1, (n′)1+7E·ε,∆,G
)
-sparse PTF circuit C̃ such that for all subsequent ran-
dom restriction ρ′ that fixes the variables in a (600 · c · ∆ · logn)-wise independent
manner, with probability 1− n−c over ρ′, it holds that C̃ρ′ is n−c-close to (Cρ)ρ′.
The proof of the above lemma is similar to Lemma 4.35 for the sparse PTF gate case,
but uses Lemma 4.31 instead of Lemma 4.32. Given Lemma 4.38, we can prove Theorem 4.3
in the same way as proving Theorem 4.3 in the previous section.
4.5 PRG for PTF circuits
In this section, we present our NW-style PRG for low-degree PTF circuits with few gates.
Theorem 4.39. There exists a constant E > 0 such that for any positive integers α,∆ and




E · 5α·∆ · log2(n) · log(n/ε)
)−1
gates, there exists a poly(n)-time computable PRG G : {0, 1}r → {0, 1}n ε-fooling C, with
the seed length r = n2/(α+1).
We first need a (average-case) hard function for such circuits.
Theorem 4.40 ([Nis94]). There exists a constant E > 0 such that for any degree ∆ ≥ 1,
there exists a polynomial-time computable function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} such that for any er-
ror parameter ε and any n-variate degree-∆ PTF circuit C with at most n·
(





[C(x) = f(x)] ≤ 12 + ε.
Next we apply the Nisan-Wigderson construction to the hard function of Theorem 4.40.
We will use the following (standard) combinatorial designs.
Claim 4.41 (NW Designs [NW94]). For any positive integers n, α, there exists an efficiently
computable family of sets S1, . . . , Sn such that
• Si ⊂ [r], ∀i ∈ [n], where r = n2/(α+1),
• |Si| = ` = n1/(α+1), ∀i ∈ [n], and
• |Si ∩ Sj | ≤ α, ∀i, j ∈ [n] such that i 6= j.
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Proof. We view the set [r] as the set of pairs F` × F`, for a finite field F` of size `. Let
e1, . . . , e` be the elements in F`, and p1, . . . , pn all univariate degree-α polynomials over F`.
For each i ∈ [n], define Si = {(e1, pi(a1)), . . . , (e`, pi(e`))}. The third condition follows from
the fact that a non-zero univariate polynomial of degree α has at most α roots.
Proof Theorem 4.39. For ` = n1/(α+1), let f : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} be the hard function for
degree-(α · ∆) PTF circuits from Theorem 4.40. By Theorem 4.40 and assuming E is a
sufficiently large constant, we have that for any degree-(α ·∆) PTF circuit D on ` variables
of size at most s,
Pr
z∼{0,1}`
[D(z) = f(z)] ≤ 12 + ε/n. (4.16)
Let S1, . . . , Sn be the sets from Claim 4.41. Define the generator Gα,∆ : {0, 1}r → {0, 1}n
as follows:
Gα,∆(y) = f(y|S1), . . . , f(y|Sn),
where, for i ∈ [n], y|Si denotes the substring of y indexed by the set Si.
Toward a contradiction, suppose
| Pr
x∼{0,1}n
[C(x) = 1]− Pr
y∼{0,1}r
[C(Gα,∆(y)) = 1]| > ε. (4.17)
By a standard argument via “reduction from distinguishing to predicting” as in [NW94],
Equation (4.17) implies that there exist an i ∈ [n], and bits bi+1, . . . , bn ∈ {0, 1}, such that
Pr
z∼{0,1}`
[C ′(h1(z), . . . , hi(z), bi+1, . . . , bn) = f(z)] > 1/2 + ε/n, (4.18)
where
• C ′ = C or C ′ = ¬C, and
• h1, . . . , hi are Boolean functions such that each depends on at most α bits of its input
z.
First, note that each gate in C ′ is always a PTF of degree at most ∆. Next, observe that
every Boolean function that depends on at most α variables can be computed by a multi-
linear polynomial of degree at most α over the reals. Replacing our functions h1, . . . , hi with
such degree α polynomials p1, . . . , pi inside C ′, we get
C ′(p1(z), . . . , pi(z), bi+1, . . . , bn).
Now we can we merge the polynomials pi’s into every PTF gate in the circuit that reads
from them. This yields a new circuit with exactly the same number of gates, and of degree
at most α ·∆. Denote this new circuit by C ′′. Note that C ′′ is a degree-(α ·∆) PTF circuit
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on ` variables of size at most s. By Equation (4.18), this PTF circuit C ′′ computes the
function f with probability greater than 1/2 + ε/n, contradicting Equation (4.16).
Next, we show how to obtain the PRG in Corollary 4.5 for PTFs from the result in
Theorem 4.39.
Proof of Corollary 4.5. In order to make sure our PRG in Theorem 4.39 fools any degree-∆





E · 5α·∆ · log2(n) · log(n/ε)
)
.
Let’s pick α so that the seed length of our PRG in Theorem 4.39 is
r = n2/(α+1) = 2L·
√
∆·logn · log2(1/ε), (4.19)
where L > 0 is a some sufficiently large constant. Then the numerator of s is
n
1




∆·logn · log(1/ε). (4.20)
On the other hand, Equation (4.19) implies that
α = 2 logn
L · (
√
∆ · logn+ 2 log log(1/ε))





Plugging the above into the denominator of s, we get(
E · 5α·∆ · log2(n) · log(n/ε)
)





∆·logn · log2 n · log(n/ε),
which is less than the numerator of s given in Equation (4.20).
4.6 Open problems
An interesting open problem is to derandomize our zero-error randomized algorithms to get
deterministic #Circuit-SAT algorithms of similar time complexity.
Can we get any nontrivial standard derandomization for constant-depth PTF (LTF)
circuits of small wire complexity? For PRGs, can we get a nontrivial PRG for depth-2 LTF
circuits with a super-linear number of gates?
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Chapter 5
Algorithms and Lower Bounds for
Formulas of Low-Communication
Leaf Gates
5.1 Background and results
A (De Morgan) Boolean formula over {0, 1}-valued input variables x1, . . . , xn is a binary tree
whose internal nodes are labeled by AND or OR gates, and whose leaves are marked with
a variable or its negation. The power of Boolean formulas has been intensively investigated
since the early years of complexity theory (see, e.g., [Sub61, Nec66, Khr71, And87, PZ93,
IN93, Hås98, Tal14, DM18]). The techniques underlying these complexity-theoretic results
have also enabled algorithmic developments. These include learning algorithms [Rei11b,
ST17], satisfiability algorithms (cf. [Tal15]), compression algorithms [CKK+15], and the
construction of pseudorandom generators [IMZ19] for Boolean formulas of different sizes.
But despite many decades of research, the current non-trivial algorithms and lower bounds
apply only to formulas of less than cubic size, and understanding larger formulas remains a
major open problem in circuit complexity.
In many scenarios, however, understanding smaller formulas whose leaves are replaced by
certain functions would also be very useful. Motivated by several recent works, we initiate
a systematic study of the FORMULA ◦ G model, i.e., Boolean formulas whose leaves are
labelled by an arbitrary function from a fixed class G. This model unifies and generalizes a
variety of models that have been previously studied in the literature:
– Oliveira, Pich, and Santhanam [OPS19] show that proving certain lower bounds
against formulas of size n1+ε over parity (XOR) gates would have significant conse-
quences in complexity theory. Note that de Morgan formulas of size n3+ε can simulate
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such devices. Therefore, a better understanding of the FORMULA◦G model even when
G = XOR is necessary before we are able to analyze super-cubic size formulas.1
– Tal [Tal17b] obtains almost quadratic lower bounds for the model of bipartite formu-
las, where there is a fixed partition of the input variables into x1, . . . , xn and y1, . . . , yn,
and a formula leaf can compute an arbitrary function over either ~x or ~y. This model
was originally investigated by Pudlák, Rödl, and Savický [PRS88], where it was re-
ferred to as graph complexity. The model is also equivalent to PSPACE-protocols in
communication complexity (cf. [GPW18]).
– Abboud and Bringmann [AB18] consider formulas where the leaves are threshold
gates whose input wires can be arbitrary functions applied to either the first or the
second half of the input. This extension of bipartite formulas is denoted by F2 in
[AB18]. Their work establishes connections between faster F2-SAT algorithms, the
complexity of problems in P such as Longest Common Subsequence and the Fréchet
Distance Problem, and circuit lower bounds.
– Polytopes (i.e. intersection of half-spaces), which corresponds to G being the family
of linear-threshold functions, and the formula contains only AND gates as internal
gates. The constructing of PRGs for this model has received significant attention in
the literature (see [OST19] and references therein).
We obtain in a unified way several new results for the FORMULA ◦ G model, for natural
classes G of functions which include parities, linear (and polynomial) threshold functions,
and indeed many other functions of interest. In particular, we show that this perspective
leads to stronger lower bounds, general satisfiability algorithms, and better pseudorandom
generators for a broad class of functions.
5.1.1 Results
We now describe in detail our main results and how they contrast to previous works. Our
techniques will be discussed in Section 5.1.2, while a few open problems are mentioned in
Section 5.1.3.
We let FORMULA[s] ◦ G denote the set of Boolean functions computed by formulas
containing at most s leaves, where each leaf computes according to some function in G. The
set of parity functions and their negations will be denoted by XOR.
We use the following notation for communication complexity. For a Boolean function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, we let D(f) be the two-party deterministic communication complexity
of f , where each party is given an input of n/2 bits. Similarly, for a Boolean function
1We remark that even a single layer of XOR gates can compute powerful primitives, such as error-
correcting codes and hash functions.
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g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, we denote by R(k)δ (g) the communication cost of the best k-party
number-on-forehead (NOF) communication protocol that computes g with probability at
least 1 − δ on every input, where the probability is taken over the random choices of the
protocol. For simplicity, we might omit the superscript (k) from R(k)δ (g) when k = 2. One
of our results will also consider k-party number-in-hand (NIH) protocols, and this will be
clearly indicated in order to avoid confusion. We always assume a canonical partition of
the input coordinates in all statements involving k-party communication complexity, unless
stated otherwise. We generalize these definitions for a class of functions G in the natural
way. For instance, we let R(k)δ (G) = maxg∈G R
(k)
δ (g).
Our results refer to standard notions in the literature, but in order to fix notation,
Section 5.2 formally defines communication protocols, Boolean formulas, and other notions
relevant in this work. We refer to the textbooks [KN97] and [Juk12] for more information
about communication complexity and Boolean formulas, respectively. To put our results
into context, here we only briefly review a few known upper bounds on the communication
complexity of certain classes G.
Parities (XOR) and Bipartite Formulas. Clearly, the deterministic two-party commu-
nication complexity of any parity function is at most 2, since to agree on the output it is
enough for the players to exchange the parity of their relevant input bits. Moreover, note
that the bipartite formula model discussed above precisely corresponds to formulas whose
leaves are computed by a two-party protocol of communication cost at most 1.
Halfspaces and Polynomial Threshold Functions (PTFs). Recall that a halfspace,
also known as a Linear Threshold Function (LTF), is a Boolean function of the form
sign(
∑n
i ai ·xi−b), where each ai, b ∈ R and x ∈ {0, 1}n, and that a degree-d PTF is its nat-
ural generalization where degree-d monomials are allowed. It is known that if g(x1, . . . , xn)
is a halfspace, then its randomized two-party communication complexity, namely R(2)δ (g),
satisfies R(2)δ (g) = O(log(n) + log(1/δ)) [Nis94]. On the other hand, if g(x1, . . . , xn) is a
degree-d PTF, then R(d+1)δ (g) = O
(
(d log d)(d logn+ log(1/δ))
)
[Nis94, Vio15].
Degree-d Polynomials over GF(2). It is well known that a degree-d GF(2)-polynomial
admits a (d+1)-party deterministic protocol of communication cost d+1 under any variable
partition, since in the number-on-forehead model each monomial is entirely seen by some
player. In particular, the Inner Product function IPn(x, y) =
∑





Prior to this work, the only known lower bound against FORMULA ◦ XOR or bipartite
formulas was the recent result of [Tal17a] showing that IPn is hard (even on average) against
111
nearly sub-quadratic formulas. In contrast, we obtain a significantly stronger result and
establish lower bounds for different Boolean functions. We define such functions next.
GIPkn. The Generalized Inner Product function GIPkn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is defined as
GIPkn
(










where x(i) ∈ {0, 1}n/k for each i ∈ [k].
MKtP. In the Minimum Kt Problem, where Kt refers to Levin’s time-bounded Kolmogorov
complexity2, we are given a string x ∈ {0, 1}n and a string 1`. We accept (x, 1`) if and only
if Kt(x) ≤ `.
MCSP. In the Minimum Circuit Size Problem, we are given as input the description of a
Boolean function f : {0, 1}logn → {0, 1} (represented as an n-bit string), and a string 1`.
We accept (f, 1`) if and only the circuit complexity of f is at most `.
Theorem 5.1 (Lower bounds). The following unconditional lower bounds hold:











2. If MKtP ∈ FORMULA[s] ◦ G, then
s = Ω̃
 n2
k2 · 16k ·R(k)1/3(G)
 .
3. If MCSP ∈ FORMULA[s] ◦ XOR, then s = Ω̃(n2), where Ω̃ hides inverse polylog(n)
factors.
Observe that, while [Tal17a] showed that the Inner Product function IPn is hard against
sub-quadratic bipartite formulas, Theorem 5.1 Item 1 yields lower bounds against formulas
whose leaves can compute bounded-degree PTFs and GF(2)-polynomials, including IPn.
Previously, only sub-linear lower bounds were known [Nis94, Vio15] for circuits with PTF
gates of similar degree.
2For a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗, Kt(x) denotes the minimum value |M |+ log t taken over M and t, where M is
a machine that prints x when it computes for t steps, and |M | is the description length of M according to
a fixed universal machine U .
112
Let us now comment on the relevance of Items 2 and 3. Both MCSP and MKtP are
believed to be computationally much harder than GIPkn. However, it is more difficult to
analyze these problems compared to GIPkn because the latter is mathematically “structured”,
while the former problems do not seem to be susceptible to typical algebraic, combinatorial,
and analytic techniques.
More interestingly, MCSP and MKtP play an important role in the theory of hardness
magnification (see [OPS19, CJW19]). In particular, if one could show that MCSP restricted
to an input parameter ` ≤ no(1) is not in FORMULA[n1+ε] ◦ XOR for some ε > 0, then it
would follow that NP cannot be computed by Boolean formulas of size nc, where c ∈ N
is arbitrary. Theorem 5.1 makes partial progress on this direction by establishing the first
lower bounds for these problems in the FORMULA ◦ G model. (We note that the proof of
Theorem 5.1 Item 3 requires instances where the parameter ` is nΩ(1).)
Pseudorandom generators
We also get pseudorandom generators (PRGs) against FORMULA ◦ G for various classes of
functions G. Recall that a PRG against a class of functions C is a function G mapping short
Boolean strings (seeds) to longer Boolean strings, so that every function in C accepts G’s
output on a uniformly random seed with about the same probability as that for an actual
uniformly random string. More formally, G : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}n is a PRG that ε-fools C if for
every Boolean function h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} in C, we have∣∣∣∣∣ Prz∼{0,1}`[h(G(z)) = 1]− Prx∼{0,1}n[h(x) = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
Furthermore, we requireG to run in deterministic time poly(n) on an input string z ∈ {0, 1}`.
The parameter ` = `(n) is called the seed length of the PRG and is the main quantity to
be minimized when constructing PRGs.
There exists a PRG that fools formulas of size s and that has a seed of length s1/3+o(1) [IMZ19].
In particular, there are non-trivial PRGs for n-variate formulas of size nearly n3. Unfortu-
nately, such PRGs cannot be used to fool even linear size formulas over parity functions,
since the naive simulation of these enhanced formulas by standard Boolean formulas requires
size n3. Moreover, it is not hard to see that this simulation is optimal: Andreev’s function,
which is hard against formulas of nearly cubic size (cf. [Hås98]), can be easily computed
in FORMULA[O(n)] ◦ XOR. Given that a crucial idea in the construction of the PRG in
[IMZ19] (shrinkage under restrictions) comes from this lower bound proof, new techniques
are needed in order to approach the problem in the FORMULA ◦ XOR model.
More generally, extending a computational model for which strong PRGs are known to
allow parities at the bottom layer can cause significant difficulties. A well-known example
is AC0 circuits and their extension to AC0-XOR. While the former class admits PRGs of
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poly-logarithmic seed length (see e.g. [ST19]), the most efficient PRG construction for the
latter has seed length (1− o(1)) ·n [FSUV13]. Consequently, designing PRGs of seed length
≤ (1− Ω(1)) · n can already be a challenge. We are not aware of previous results on PRGs
for FORMULA ◦ G for any non-trivial class G.
By combining ideas from circuit complexity and communication complexity, we con-
struct PRGs of various seed lengths for FORMULA ◦ G, where G ranges from the class
of parity functions to the much larger class of functions of bounded randomized k-party
communication complexity.
Theorem 5.2 (Pseudorandom generators). Let G be a class of n-bits functions. Then,




s · log(s) · log(1/ε) + log(n)
)
.
2. In the context of two-party randomized communication complexity, there is a PRG
that ε-fools FORMULA[s] ◦ G of seed length











More generally, for every k(n) ≥ 2, let G be the class of functions that have k-party
number-in-hand (NIH) (ε/6s)-error randomized communication protocols of cost at
most R(k-NIH)ε/(6s) . There exists a PRG that ε-fools FORMULA[s] ◦ G with seed length








· log(1/ε) + log(k)
)
· log(k).
3. In the setting of k-party NOF randomized communication complexity, there is a PRG
that ε-fools FORMULA[s] ◦ G of seed length
` = n− n
O
(√








A few comments are in order. Under a standard connection between PRGs and lower
bounds (see e.g. [Kab02]), improving the dependence on s in the seed length for FORMULA[s]◦
XOR (Theorem 5.2 Item 1) would require the proof of super-quadratic lower bounds against
FORMULA ◦ XOR. We discuss this problem in more detail in Section 5.1.3. Note that the
additive term n/2 is necessary in Theorem 5.2 Item 2, since the model computes in particu-
lar every Boolean function on the first n/2 input variables (i.e. a protocol of communication
cost 1). Similarly, ` ≥ (1 − 1/k) · n in Theorem 5.2 Item 3. Removing the exponential de-
pendence on k would also require advances in state-of-the-art lower bounds for multiparty
communication complexity.
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Theorem 5.2 Item 2 has an interesting implication for fooling a well-studied class of
functions: intersections of halfspaces.3 Note that an intersection of halfspaces is precisely
a polytope, or equivalently, the set of solutions of a 0-1 integer linear program. Such ob-
jects have found applications in many fields, including optimization and high-dimensional
geometry. After a long sequence of works on the construction of PRGs for bounded-weight
halfspaces, (unrestricted) halfspaces, and generalizations of these classes,4 the following
results are known for the intersection of m halfspaces over n input variables. Gopalan,




m · log(m/ε) + logn) · log(m/ε)
)
.
Note that the seed length of their PRG becomes trivial if the number of halfspaces is linear
in n. More recently, O’Donnell, Servedio and Tan [OST19] constructed a PRG with seed
length
poly(log(m), 1/ε) · log(n).
Their PRG has a much better dependence on m, but it cannot be used in the small error
regime. For example, the seed length becomes trivial if ε = 1/n. In particular, before
this work it was open to construct a non-trivial PRG for the following natural setting of
parameters (cf. [OST19, Section 1.2]): intersection of n halfspaces with error ε = 1/n.
We obtain the following consequence of Theorem 5.2 Item 2, which follows from a result
of Viola [Vio15] on the k-party number-in-hand randomized communication complexity of
a halfspace.
Corollary 5.3 (Fooling intersections of halfspaces in the low-error regime). For every
n,m ∈ N and ε > 0, there is a pseudorandom generator with seed length
O
(
n1/2 ·m1/4 · log(n) · log(n/ε)
)
.
that ε-fools the class of intersections of m halfspaces over {0, 1}n.
We note that the PRG from Theorem 5.2 Item 3 can fool, even in the exponentially small
error regime, not only intersections of halfspaces, but also small formulas over bounded-
degree PTFs.
Finally, Theorem 5.2 Item 2 yields the first non-trivial PRG for formulas over symmetric
functions. Let SYM denote the class of symmetric Boolean functions on any number of input
variables.
3Clearly, the intersection of s functions can be computed by an enhanced formula of size s+ 1.
4We refer to the recent reference [OST19] for an extensive review of the literature in this area.
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Corollary 5.4 (Fooling sub-quadratic formulas over symmetric gates). For every n, s ∈ N
and ε > 0, there is a pseudorandom generator with seed length
O
(
n1/2 · s1/4 · log(n) · log(1/ε)
)
.
that ε-fools n-variate Boolean functions in FORMULA[s] ◦ SYM.
Prior to this work, Chen and Wang [CW19] proved that the number of satisfying assign-
ments of an n-variate formula of size s over symmetric gates can be approximately counted to
an additive error term ≤ ε · 2n in deterministic time exp(n1/2 · s1/4+o(1)
√
(log(n) + log(s))),
where ε > 0 is an arbitrary constant. While their upper bound is achieved by a white-box
algorithm, Corollary 5.4 provides a (black-box) PRG for the same task.
Satisfiability algorithms
In the #SAT problem for a computational model C, we are given as input the description
of a computational device D(x1, . . . , xn) from C, and the goal is to count the number of
satisfying assignments for D. This generalizes the SAT problem for C, where it is sufficient
to decide whether D is satisfiable by some assignment.
In this section, we show that #SAT algorithms can be designed for a broad class of
functions. We consider the FORMULA ◦ G model for classes G that admit two-party com-
munication protocols of bounded cost. We establish a general result in this context which
can be used to obtain algorithms for previously studied classes of Boolean circuits.
To put our #SAT algorithms for FORMULA ◦ G into context, we first mention relevant
related work on the satisfiability of Boolean formulas. Recall that in the very restricted
setting of CNF formulas, known algorithms run (in the worst-case) in time 2n−o(n) when
the input formulas can have a super-linear number of clauses (cf. [DH09]). On the other
hand, for the class of general formulas, there is a better-than-brute-force algorithm for
formulas of size almost n3. In more detail, for any ε > 0, there is a deterministic #SAT
algorithm for FORMULA[n3−ε] that runs in time 2n−nΩ(ε) [Tal15]. No results are known
for formulas of cubic size and beyond, and for the reasons explained in Section 5.1.1, the
algorithm from [Tal15] cannot even be applied to FORMULA ◦ XOR.
Before stating our results, we discuss the input encoding in the #SAT problem for
FORMULA ◦ G. The top formula F is represented in some canonical way, while for each leaf
` of F , the input string contains the description of a protocol Π` computing a function in
G. Our results are robust to the encoding employed for Π`. Recall that a protocol for a
two-party function is specified by a protocol tree and a sequence of functions, where each
function is associated with some internal node of the tree and depends on n/2 input bits.
Since a protocol of communication cost o(n) has a protocol tree containing at most 2o(n)
nodes, it can be specified by a string of length 2n/2+o(n). Our algorithms will run in time
closer to 2n, and using a fully explicit input representation for the protocols is not an issue.
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Another possibility for the input representation is to use “computational efficient” protocols.
Informally, the next bit messages of such protocols can be computed in polynomial time from
the current transcript of the protocol and a player input. An advantage of this representation
is that an input to our #SAT problem can be succinctly represented. We observe that these
input representations can be generalized to randomized two-party protocols in natural ways.
We refer to Section 5.2 for a formal presentation.
We obtain non-trivial satisfiability algorithms assuming upper bounds on the two-party
deterministic and randomized communication complexities of functions in G.
Theorem 5.5 (Satisfiability algorithms). The following results hold.
1. There is a deterministic #SAT algorithm for FORMULA[s] ◦ G that runs in time




s · log2(s) ·D(G)
)
.
2. There is a randomized #SAT algorithm for FORMULA[s] ◦ G that runs in time




s · log2(s) ·R1/3(G)
)1/2
.
Theorem 5.5 readily provides algorithms for many circuit classes. For instance, since one
can effectively describe a randomized communication protocol for linear threshold functions
[Nis94, Vio15], the algorithm from Theorem 5.5 Item 2 can be used to count the number of
satisfying assignments of Boolean devices from FORMULA[n1.99] ◦ LTF.
Corollary 5.6 (#SAT algorithm for formulas of linear threshold functions). There is a
randomized #SAT algorithm for FORMULA[s] ◦ LTF that runs in time




s · log2(s) · log(n)
)1/2
.
In connection with Corollary 5.6, prior to this work essentially two lines of research have
been pursued. #SAT and/or SAT algorithms were known for bounded-depth circuits of
almost-linear size whose gates can compute LTFs or sparse PTFs (see [KL18] and references
therein), and for sub-exponential size bounded-depth ACC0 circuits with two layers of LTFs
at the bottom, assuming a sub-quadratic number of them in the layer next to the input
variables (see [ACW16] for this result and further related work). Corollary 5.6 seems to
provide the first non-trivial SAT algorithm that operates with unbounded-depth Boolean
devices containing a layer with a sub-quadratic number of LTFs.
Theorem 5.5 can be seen as a generalization of several approaches to designing SAT
algorithms appearing in the literature, which often employ ad-hoc constructions to convert
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bottlenecks in the computation of devices from a class C into non-trivial SAT algorithms
for C. We observe that, before this work, [PW10] had made a connection between faster
SAT algorithms for CNFs and the 3-party communication complexity of a specific func-
tion. Their setting is different though: it seems to work only for CNFs, and they rely on
conjectured upper bounds on the communication complexity of a particular problem. More
recently, [CW19] employed quantum communication protocols to design approximate count-
ing algorithms for several problems.5 In comparison to previous works, to our knowledge
Theorem 5.5 is the first unconditional result that yields faster #SAT algorithms via com-
munication complexity in a generic way. 6
Learning algorithms
We describe a learning algorithm for the FORMULA ◦ XOR class in Leslie Valiant’s chal-
lenging PAC-learning model [Val84]. Recall that a (PAC) learning algorithm for a class of
functions C has access to labelled examples (x, f(x)) from an unknown function f ∈ C, where
x is sampled according to some (also unknown) distribution D. The goal of the learner is to
output, with high probability over its internal randomness and over the choice of random
examples (measured by a confidence parameter δ), a hypothesis h that is close to f under
D (measured by an error parameter ε). We refer to [KV94] for more information about this
learning model, and to Section 5.2 for its standard formalization.
It is known that formulas of size s can be PAC-learned in time 2Õ(
√
s) [Rei11b]. Therefore,
formulas of almost quadratic size can be non-trivially learned from random samples of an
arbitrary distribution. A bit more formally, we say that a learning algorithm is non-trivial
if it runs in time 2n/nω(1), i.e., noticeably faster than the trivial brute-force algorithm that
takes time 2n · poly(n). Obtaining non-trivial learning algorithms for various circuit classes
is closely connected to the problem of proving explicit lower bounds against the class [OS17]
(see also [ST17] for a systematic investigation of such algorithms). We are not aware of the
existence of non-trivial learning algorithms for super-quadratic size formulas. However, it
seems likely that such algorithms exist at least for formulas of near cubic size. As explained
in Section 5.1.1, this would still be insufficient for the learnability of classes such as (linear
size) FORMULA ◦ XOR.
We explore structural properties of FORMULA ◦ XOR employed in previous results and
boosting techniques from learning theory to show that sub-quadratic size devices from this
class can be PAC-learned in time 2O(n/ logn).
5Recall that approximately counting satisfying assignments is substantially easier than solving #SAT,
for which the fastest known algorithms run in time 2(1−o(1))n.
6It has been brought to our attention that Avishay Tal has independently discovered a SAT algorithm
for bipartite formulas of sub-quadratic size (see the discussion in [AB18, Page 7]), which corresponds to a
particular case of Theorem 5.5.
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Theorem 5.7 (PAC-learning FORMULA ◦ XOR in sub-exponential time). For every con-
stant γ > 0, there is an algorithm that PAC learns the class of n-variate Boolean functions
FORMULA[n2−γ ]◦XOR to accuracy ε and with confidence δ in time poly
(
2n/ logn, 1/ε, log(1/δ)
)
.
We make a few comments on potential extensions of this result to larger classes of
formulas and on the running time of this learning algorithm.
Note that a sub-exponential running time cannot be achieved for FORMULA ◦ G when
we consider the communication complexity of G. Again, the class is too large, for the same
reason discussed in Section 5.1.1. It might still be possible to design a non-trivial learning
algorithm in this case, but this would possibly require the introduction of new lower bound
techniques for FORMULA ◦ XOR.
In contrast to the algorithm mentioned above that learns (standard) formulas of size
s ≤ n2−o(1) in time 2Õ(
√
s), the algorithm from Theorem 5.7 does not learn smaller formulas
over parities in time faster than 2O(n/ logn). We discuss this in more detail in Section 5.1.2
and Section 5.1.3.
Finally, we mention a connection to cryptography that provides a conditional upper
bound on the size of FORMULA ◦ XOR circuits that can be learned in time 2o(n). It is well
known that if a circuit class C can compute pseudorandom functions (or some variants of this
notion), then it cannot be learned in various learning models (see e.g. [KV94]). It has been
recently conjectured that depth-two MOD3 ◦ XOR circuits of linear size can compute weak
pseudorandom functions of exponential security [BIP+18, Conjecture 3.7]. If this conjecture
holds, then such circuits cannot be learned in time 2o(n). Since MOD3 gates over a linear
number of input wires can be simulated by formulas of size at most O(n2.8) [Ser17], under
this cryptographic assumption it is not possible to learn FORMULA[n2.8]◦XOR in time 2o(n),
even if the learner only needs to succeed under the uniform distribution.
5.1.2 Techniques
In order to explain our techniques, we focus for the most part on the design of PRGs for
FORMULA ◦ G when G is of bounded two-party randomized communication complexity (a
particular case of Theorem 5.2 Item 2). This proof makes use of various ingredients employed
in other results. After sketching this argument, we say a few words about our strongest lower
bound (Theorem 5.1 Item 1) and the satisfiability and learning algorithms (Theorem 5.5
and Theorem 5.7, respectively).
We build on a powerful result showing that any small De Morgan formula can be ap-
proximated pointwise by a low-degree polynomial:
(A) For every formula F (y1, . . . , ym) of size s, there is a polynomial p(y1, . . . , ym) ∈
R[y1, . . . , ym] of degree O(
√
s) such that |F (a)− p(a)| ≤ 1/10 on every a ∈ {0, 1}m.
The only known proof of this result [Rei11b] relies on a sequence of works [BBC+01, LLS06,
HLS07, FGG08, Rei09, ACR+10, RS12] on quantum query complexity, generalizing Grover’s
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search algorithm for the OR predicate [Gro96] to arbitrary formulas. The starting point of
many of our results is a consequence of (A) which is implicit in the work of Tal [Tal17a].




[F (x) = f(x)] ≥ 1/2 + ε then Pr
x∼D
[h(x) = f(x)] ≥ 1/2 + exp(−t)
for some function h which is the XOR of at most t functions in G, where t = Θ̃(
√
s·log(1/ε)).
Intuitively, if we could understand well enough the XOR of any small collection of functions
in G, then we can translate this into results for FORMULA[s] ◦ G, as long as s  n2.
We adapt the techniques behind (B) to provide a general approach to constructing PRGs
against FORMULA ◦ G:
Main PRG Lemma. In order for a distribution D to ε-fool the class FORMULA[s] ◦ G, it
is enough for it to exp(−t)-fool the class XORt · G, where t = Θ̃(
√
s · log(1/ε)).
Recall that, in Theorem 5.2 Item 2, we consider a class G of functions that admit two-party
randomized protocols of cost R = R(2)ε/6s(G). It is easy to see that the XOR of any t functions
from G is a function that can be computed by a protocol of cost at most t·R. Thus the lemma
above shows that it is sufficient to fool, to exponentially small error, a class of functions of
bounded two-party randomized communication complexity. Moreover, since a randomized
protocol can be written as a convex combination of deterministic protocols, it is possible to
prove that fooling functions of bounded deterministic communication complexity is enough.
Pseudorandom generators in the two-party communication model have been known since
[INW94]. Their construction exploits that the Boolean matrix associated with a function of
small communication cost can be partitioned into a not too large number of monochromatic
rectangles. We provide in Appendix A.2 a slightly modified and self-contained construction
based on explicit extractors. It achieves the following parameters: There is an explicit PRG
that δ-fools any n-bit function of two-party communication cost D and that has seed length
n/2 + O(D + log(1/δ)). This PRG has non-trivial seed length even when the error is ex-
ponentially small, as required by our techniques. One issue here is that the INW PRG was
only shown to fool functions with low deterministic communication complexity. To obtain
our PRGs for FORMULA ◦ G when G admits low-cost randomized protocols, we first extend
the analysis of the INW PRG to show that it also fools functions with low randomized com-
munication complexity. Combining this construction with the aforementioned discussion
completes the proof of Theorem 5.2 Item 2.
The argument just sketched reduces the construction of PRGs for FORMULA ◦ G when
functions in G admit low-cost randomized protocols to the analysis of PRGs for functions
that admit relatively low-cost deterministic protocols. Our lower bound proof for GIPkn in
Theorem 5.1 Item 1 proceeds in a similar fashion. We combine statement (B) described
above with other ideas to show:
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Transfer Lemma (Informal). If a function correlates with some small formula whose leaf
gates have low-cost randomized k-party protocols, then it also non-trivially correlates with
some function that has relatively low-cost deterministic k-party protocols.
Given this result, we are able to rely on a strong average-case lower bound for IPkn against k-
party deterministic protocols from [BNS92] to conclude that GIPkn is hard for FORMULA◦G.
Our #SAT algorithms combine the polynomial representation of the top formula pro-
vided by (A), for which we show that such a polynomial can be obtained explicitly, with
a decomposition of the Boolean matrix at each leaf that is induced by a corresponding
low-cost randomized or deterministic two-party protocol. A careful combination of these
two representations allows us to adapt a standard technique employed in the design of non-
trivial SAT algorithms (fast rectangular matrix multiplication) to obtain non-trivial savings
in the running time.
Finally, our learning algorithm for FORMULA ◦XOR is a consequence of statement (B)
above coupled with standard tools from learning theory. In a bit more detail, since a parity
of parities is just another parity function, (B) implies that, under any distribution, every
function in FORMULA[n1.99]◦XOR is weakly correlated with some parity function. Using the
agnostic learning algorithm for parity functions of [KMV08], it is possible to weakly learn
FORMULA[n1.99] ◦XOR in time 2O(n/ logn). This weak learner can then be transformed into
a (strong) PAC learner using standard boosting techniques [Fre90], with only a polynomial
blow-up over its running time.
5.1.3 Concluding remarks
The main message of our results is that the computational power of a subquadratic-size
top formula is not significantly enhanced by leaf gates of low communication complexity.
We believe that the idea of decomposing a Boolean device into a computational part and a
layer of communication protocols will find further applications in lower bound proofs and
algorithm design.
One of our main open problems is to discover a method that can analyze FORMULA[s]◦G
when s  n2. For instance, is it possible to adapt existing techniques to show an explicit
lower bound against FORMULA[n2.01] ◦ G, or achieving this is just as hard as breaking the
cubic barrier for formula lower bounds? Results in this direction would be interesting even
for G = XOR.
Finally, we would like to mention a few questions connected to our results and their
applications. Is it possible to combine the techniques behind Corollary 5.3 and [OST19] to
design a PRG of seed length no(1) and error ε = 1/n for the intersection of n halfspaces? Can
we design a satisfiability algorithm for formulas over k-party number-on-forehead commu-




algorithm for formulas from [Rei11b] relies on techniques from [KKMS08], and it is unclear
how to extend them to the case of FORMULA ◦ XOR.)
Organization of this chapter. Theorem 5.1 Item 1 is proved in Section 5.3, while
Items 2 and 3 rely on our PRG constructions and are deferred to Section 5.4. The latter
describes a general approach to constructing PRGs for FORMULA◦G. It includes the proof of
Theorem 5.2 and other applications. Our satisfiability algorithms (Theorem 5.5) appear in
Section 5.5. Finally, Section 5.6 discusses learning results for FORMULA◦XOR and contains
a proof of Theorem 5.7.
5.2 Preliminaries
Notation
In this chapter, we will mainly use {−1, 1} as the Boolean basis. In some parts of this
chapter, we will use the {0, 1} basis for the simplicity of the presentation. This will be
specified in corresponding sections.
De Morgan formulas and extensions
In this work, we denote by FORMULA[s] the class of Boolean functions computable by size-
s De Morgan formulas. Let G denote some class of Boolean functions; then, we denote by
FORMULA[s]◦G the class of functions computable by some size-s De Morgan formula where
its leaves are labelled by functions in G.
Approximating polynomials
Definition 5.8 (Point-wise approximation). For a Boolean function f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1},
we say that the function f̃ : {−1, 1}n → R ε-approximates f if for every z ∈ {−1, 1}n,∣∣∣f(z)− f̃(z)∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
We will need the following powerful result for the approximating degree of De Morgan
formulas.
Theorem 5.9 ([Rei11b], see also [BNRdW07]). Let s > 0 be an integer and 0 < ε < 1. Any
De Morgan formula F : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} of size s has a ε-approximating polynomial of
degree d = O(
√
s · log(1/ε)). That is, there exists a degree-d polynomial p : {−1, 1}n → R
over the reals such that for every z ∈ {−1, 1}n,
|p(z)− F (z)| ≤ ε.
Note that Theorem 5.9 still holds if we use {0, 1} as the Boolean basis.
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Communication complexity
We use standard definitions from communication complexity. We consider the standard two
party model of Yao and its generalizations to multiparty setting. We denote deterministic
communication complexity of a Boolean function by D(f) in the two party setting. We refer
to [KN97] for standard definitions from communication complexity.
Definition 5.10. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a Boolean function. The communication ma-
trix of f , namely Mf , is a 2n/2 × 2n/2 matrix defined by (Mf )x,y := f(x, y).
Definition 5.11. A rectangle is a set of the form A×B, for A,B ⊆ {0, 1}n. A monochro-
matic rectangle is a rectangle S such that for all pairs (x, y) ∈ S the value f(x, y) is the
same.
Lemma 5.12. Let Π be a protocol that computes f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} with at most D
bits of communication. Then, Π induces a partition of Mf into at most 2D monochromatic
rectangles.
Given a protocol, its transcript is the sequence of bits communicated.
Lemma 5.13. For every transcript z of some communication protocol, the set of inputs
(x, y) that generate z is a rectangle.
Below, we recount the definitions of two multiparty communication models used in this
work, namely the number-on-forehead and the number-in-hand models.
Definition 5.14 (“Number-on-forehead” communication model; informal). In the k-party
“number-on-forehead” communication model, there are k players and k strings x1, . . . , xk ∈
{0, 1}n/k and player i gets all the strings except for xi. The players are interested in comput-
ing a value f(x1, . . . , xk), where f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is some fixed function. We denote by
D(k)(f) the number of bits that must be exchanged by the best possible number on forehead
protocol solving f .
We also use the following weaker communication model.
Definition 5.15 (“Number-in-hand” communication model; informal). In the k-party “number-
in-hand” communication model, there are k players and k strings x1, . . . , xk ∈ {0, 1}n/k and
player i gets only xi. The players are interested in computing a value f(x1, . . . , xk), where
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is some fixed function. We denote by D(k-NIH)(f) the number of bits
that must be exchanged by the best possible communication protocol.
Note that D(k-NIH)(f) ≤ (1− 1/k) · n + 1, for any n-variate Boolean function f , as if
k − 1 players write on the blackboard their string, then the player that did not reveal her
input may compute f(x1, . . . , xk) on her own and then publish it.
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For the communication models mentioned above, there are also bounded-error random-
ized versions, denoted by Rδ, R
(k)
δ , and R
(k-NIH)
δ , respectively, where 0 < δ < 1 is an upper
bound on the error probability of the protocol. In this setting, the players have access to
some shared random string, say r, and the aforementioned error probability of the protocol
is considered over the possible choices of r. Moreover, we require the error to be at most δ
on each fixed choice of inputs.
We can extend the definitions of the communication complexity measures, defined above,
to classes of Boolean functions, in a natural way. That is, for any communication complexity
measure M ∈
{






and for any class of Boolean functions




We note that throughout this chapter, we denote by n the number of input bits for the
function regardless the communication models. In the k-party communication setting (either
NOF or NIH), we assume without loss of generality that n is divisible by k.
Learning
For a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and a distribution D supported over {0, 1}n, we denote
by EX(f,D) a randomized oracle that outputs independent identically distributed labelled
examples of the form (x, f(x)), where x ∼ D.
Definition 5.16 (PAC learning model [Val84]). Let C be a class of Boolean functions. We
say that a randomized algorithm A learns C if, when A is given oracle access to EX(f,D)
and inputs 1n, ε, and δ, the following holds. For every n-variate function f ∈ C, distribution
D supported over {0, 1}n, and real-valued parameters ε > 0 and δ > 0, AEX(f,D)(1n, ε, δ)
outputs with probability at least 1 − δ over its internal randomness and the randomness of
the example oracle EX(f,D) a description of a hypothesis h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} such that
Pr
x∼D
[f(x) = h(x)] ≥ 1− ε.
The sample complexity of a learning algorithm is the maximum number of random examples
from EX(f,D) requested during its execution.
5.3 Lower bounds
In this section, we prove an average-case lower bound for the generalized inner product
function, against FORMULA ◦G, where G is the set of functions that have low-cost random-
ized communication protocols in the number-on-forehead setting. This corresponds to Item
1 of Theorem 5.1. Items 2 and 3 rely on our PRG constructions, and the proofs are deferred
to Section 5.4.
124
Theorem 5.17. For any integer k ≥ 2, s > 0 and any class of functions G, let C : {−1, 1}n →


















We need a couple useful lemmas from [Tal16], whose proofs are presented in Section A.1
(Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2) for completeness.
Lemma 5.18 ([Tal16]). Let D be a distribution over {−1, 1}n, and let f, C : {−1, 1}n →
{−1, 1} be such that
Pr
x∼D
[C(x) = f(x)] ≥ 1/2 + ε.
Let C̃ : {−1, 1}n → R be a ε-approximating function of C, i.e., for every x ∈ {−1, 1}n,
|C(x)− C̃(x)| ≤ ε. Then,
E
x∼D
[C̃(x) · f(x)] ≥ ε.
Lemma 5.19 ([Tal16]). Let D be a distribution over {−1, 1}n and let G be a class of func-




[D(x) = f(x)] ≥ 1/2 + ε0.
Then there exists some h : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} ∈ XORO(√s·log(1/ε0)) ◦ G such that
E
x∼D




We also need the following communication-complexity lower bound for GIP.
Theorem 5.20 ([BNS92, Theorem 2]). For any k ≥ 2, any function that computes GIPkn on
more than 1/2 + δ fraction of the inputs (over uniformly random inputs) must have k-party
deterministic communication complexity at least Ω
(
n/(k · 4k)− log(1/δ)
)
.
We first show that if a function correlates with some small formula, whose leaves are func-
tions with low randomized communication complexity, then it also correlates non-trivially
with some function of relatively low deterministic communication complexity.
Lemma 5.21. For any distribution D over {−1, 1}n, and any class of functions G, let
f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} and C : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} ∈ FORMULA[s] ◦ G be such that
Pr
x∼D
[C(x) = f(x)] ≥ 1/2 + ε.
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[h(x) = f(x)] ≥ 1/2 + 1/sO(
√
s·log(1/ε)).
Proof. Let C = F (g1, g2 . . . , gs) be the function in FORMULA[s]◦G, where F is a formula and
g1, g2, . . . , gs are leaf functions from the class G. For each gi, consider a k-party randomized






D(x) := F (Π1(x),Π2(x), . . . ,Πs(x)).
Note that for any fixed choice of (Π1,Π2, . . . ,Πs), D is a formula whose leaves are functions
with deterministic communication complexity at most R. Next, we show the following.
Claim 5.22. The function C̃ ε-approximates C.
Proof of Claim 5.22. First note that since each Πi is a (ε/(2s))-error randomized protocol,




[Π1(x) = g1(x) ∧Π2(x) = g2(x) ∧ · · · ∧Πs(x) = gs(x)] ≥ 1− ε/2.
Denote by E the event Π1(x) = g1(x) ∧ Π2(x) = g2(x) ∧ · · · ∧ Πs(x) = gs(x). We have for




= E [D(x) | E ] ·Pr[E ] + E [D(x) | ¬E ] ·Pr[¬E ]
= C(x) ·Pr[E ] + E [D(x) | ¬E ] ·Pr[¬E ].
On the one hand, we have
C̃(x) = C(x) ·Pr[E ] + E [D(x) | ¬E ] ·Pr[¬E ] ≤ C(x) + ε/2.
On the other hand, we get
C̃(x) = C(x) ·Pr[E ] + E [D(x) | ¬E ] ·Pr[¬E ] ≥ C(x) · (1− ε/2) + (−1) · (ε/2) ≥ C(x)− ε.
This completes the proof of the claim.
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Now by Claim 5.22 and Lemma 5.18, we have
E
x∼D
[C̃(x) · f(x)] ≥ ε. (5.1)
By the definition of C̃, Equation (5.1) implies that there exists some D, which is a formula








[D(x) = f(x)] ≥ 1/2 + ε/2.
Then by Lemma 5.19, there exists a function h, which can be expressed as the XOR of at
most O(
√
s · log(1/ε)) leaf functions in D, such that
E
x∼D
















where R = R(k)ε/(2s)(G).
We are now ready to show Theorem 5.17.
Proof of Theorem 5.17. Consider Lemma 5.21 with f being GIPkn and D being the uniform




























Some of our PRGs are obtained from a general framework that allows us to reduce the task
of fooling FORMULA ◦ G to the task of fooling the class of functions which are the parity
or conjunction of few functions from G.
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5.4.1 The general framework
We show that in order to get a PRG for the class of subquadratic-size formulas with leaf
gates in G, it suffices to get a PRG for very simple sublinear-size formulas: either XOR ◦ G
or AND ◦ G.
Theorem 5.23 (PRG for FORMULA◦G from PRG for XOR◦G or AND◦G). Let G be a class
of gates on n bits. For any integer s > 0 and any 0 < ε < 1, there exists a constant c > 0







the XOR (parity) or the AND (conjunction) of c ·
√
s · log(1/ε) arbitrary functions from G,
then D also ε-fools FORMULA[s] ◦ G.
Proof. We first show the case where D fools the parity of a few functions from G. The proof
can be easily adapted to the case of conjunction.
Let C = F (g1, g2 . . . , gs) be a function in FORMULA[s] ◦ G, where F is a formula, and
g1, g2, . . . , gs are functions from the class G. Let U be the uniform distribution over {−1, 1}n.
We need to show
E[C(D)] ε≈ E[C(U)]. (5.2)
Let p be a (ε/3)-approximating polynomial for F given by Theorem 5.9. Note that the




Let us replace F , the formula part of C, with p and let
C̃ := p(g1, g2 . . . , gs).





































Now note that for each S ⊆ [s],
∏
i∈S gi(x) computes the XOR of at most d functions from G.






-fools the XOR of any d functions






























































p̂(S) · δS .





























|p̂(S)| ≤ δ · sO(
√
s·log(1/ε)) ≤ ε/3,
where the last inequality holds for some sufficiently large constant c.
To show the case of conjunction, we can write the approximating polynomial as the sum
of all degree-d monomials, each of which is the AND of at most d variables. One way to do
this is to use the domain {0, 1} instead of {−1, 1} in the above argument. We need to show
that the coefficients in this case still have small magnitude.
































































For a pair (S, `) where S ⊆ [n], |S| ≤ d and ` ∈ {0, 1}|S|, let us define the polynomial q(S,`)
as





Note that there are at most nd · 2d many pairs of such (S, `)’s and for each (S, `), we have
|q(S,`)|1 =
















as desired.  (Claim 5.24)
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.23.  (Theorem 5.23)
5.4.2 Formulas of low-communication functions in the number-in-hand
setting
In this subsection, we will use {0, 1} as the Boolean basis.
Theorem 5.25. For any integers k ≥ 2, s > 0 and any 0 < ε < 1, let G be the class of func-
tions that have k-party number-in-hand (ε/6s)-error randomized communication protocols
of cost at most R. There exists a PRG that ε-fools FORMULA[s] ◦ G with seed length
n/k +O
(√
s · (R+ log(s)) · log(1/ε) + log(k)
)
· log(k).
We need the following PRG that fools single functions with low communication com-
plexity in the number-in-hand model. The proof is presented in Section A.2 (Theorem A.3)
for completeness.
Theorem 5.26 ([ASWZ96, INW94]). For any k ≥ 2, there exists a PRG that δ-fools any
n-bits functions with k-party number-in-hand deterministic communication complexity of at
most D′, with seed length
n/k +O
(
D′ + log(1/δ) + log(k)
)
· log(k).
Next, we show a PRG for FORMULA ◦ G, where G is the class of functions with low-
cost communication protocols in the number-in-hand setting. We first show for the case of
deterministic protocols.
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Theorem 5.27. For any integers k ≥ 2 and s > 0, let G be the class of functions whose
k-party number-in-hand deterministic communication complexity are at most D. There is a
PRG that ε-fools FORMULA[s] ◦ G of size s with seed length
n/k +O
(√
s · log(1/ε) · (D + log(s)) + log(k)
)
· log(k).







every function that is the XOR of t = c ·
√
s · log(1/ε) arbitrary functions from G. Note
that such a function has deterministic communication complexity at most D′ = t ·D. Then
Theorem 5.27 follows from Theorem 5.26.
We now establish the randomized case.
Proof of Theorem 5.25. Let C be a function in FORMULA[s] ◦ G. For each of the leaf func-
tions in C, consider a k-party number-in-hand randomized protocol of cost at most R that
has an error at most ε/(6s). By taking a union bound over the s leaf functions and by
viewing a randomized protocol as a distribution of deterministic protocols (as shown in the






where each pi ∈ [0, 1] is some probability density value (so
∑
i pi = 1), and each Di is a
formula whose leaves are functions with deterministic communication complexity at most
R. Then to ε-fool C, it suffices to (ε/3)-fool its (ε/3)-approximating function C̃. Also, since
C̃ is a convex combination of the Di’s, it suffices to (ε/3)-fools all the Di’s. We will do this
using the PRG form Theorem 5.27. We get that there exists a PRG that (ε/3)-fools each
Di with seed length
n/k +O
(√




5.4.3 Applications: Fooling formulas of SYMs, LTFs, XORs, and AC0
circuits
FORMULA ◦ SYM and FORMULA ◦ LTF
Here, we show how the PRG in Theorem 5.25 implies PRGs for FORMULA ◦ LTF and
FORMULA ◦ SYM.
Theorem 5.28. For any size s > 0 and 0 < ε < 1, there exists a PRG that ε-fools
FORMULA[s] ◦ LTF with seed length
O
(




For FORMULA[s] ◦ SYM, the seed length is
O
(
n1/2 · s1/4 · log(n) · log(1/ε)
)
.
We need the fact that the class of LTF has low communication complexity in the number-
in-hand model. Consider the following k-party SUM-GREATERm problem where the i-th
party holds a m-bit number zi in hand and they want to determine whether
∑k
i=1 zi > θ,
where θ is a fixed number known to all the parties. Nisan [Nis94] gave an efficient randomized
protocol (with public randomness) for this problem.
Theorem 5.29 ([Nis94]7). Let m > 0 be an integer. For any integer 2 ≤ k ≤ mO(1), and
any 0 < δ < 1, there exists a δ-error randomized protocol of cost O(k · log(m) · log(m/δ))
for the k-party SUM-GREATERm problem.
By Theorem 5.29 and the fact that every linear threshold function on n bits has a
representation such that the weights are O(n log(n)) integers [MTT61], we get the following.
Corollary 5.30. For every k ≥ 2 and 0 < δ < 1, the k-party number-in-hand δ-error
randomized communication complexity of LTF is O(k · log(n) · log(n/δ)).
Proof of Theorem 5.28. By Corollary 5.30 and Theorem 5.25, for every k ≥ 2 we get a PRG
for FORMULA ◦ LTF of seed length
n/k +O
(√






s1/4 · log(n) · log(n/ε)
,
the claimed seed length follows from a simple calculation.
For FORMULA ◦ SYM, note that every n-bit symmetric function has a deterministic
k-party number-in-hand communication protocol of cost at most k · log(n). Then the rest






For the case of FORMULA ◦ XOR, we get a PRG with better seed length.
Theorem 5.31. For any size s > 0 and 0 < ε < 1, there exists a PRG that ε-fools
FORMULA[s] ◦ XOR with seed length
O
(√
s · log(s) · log(1/ε) + log(n)
)
.
7Viola [Vio15] gave a δ-error randomized protocol for the k-party SUM-GREATERm problem of cost
O(k · log(k) · log(m/δ)), which is better than Nisan’s protocol when k = mo(1).
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fool the XOR of a few functions from G, where G in this case is the set of all XOR func-
tions. Note that the XOR of any set of XOR functions simply computes some XOR func-
tion. Therefore, we can use small-bias distribution, which fools every XOR function, to fool
FORMULA[s]◦XOR. Finally, note that there are known constructions for δ-bias distributions
that use O(log(n/δ)) random bits (see e.g. [AGHP92]).
Using the “locality” of this PRG for FORMULA ◦XOR, we get a lower bound for MCSP
against subquadratic-size formulas of XORs.
Theorem 5.32. For every integer s > 0, if MCSP on N -bit can be computed by some
function in FORMULA[s] ◦ XOR, then s = Ω̃(N2).
Proof sketch. There is a standard construction of δ-bias distribution that is local (see
e.g. [AGHP92, Construction 3] and [CKLM20, Fact 18]) in the following sense: there exists
a circuit of size at most Õ(log(n/δ) · log(n)) such that given a seed of length O(log(n/δ))
and a index j ∈ [n], outputs the j-th bit of the distribution. Local PRGs imply MCSP lower
bounds (see [CKLM20, Section 3]).
FORMULA ◦ AC0
Another application of Theorem 5.23 is to take G to be the set all functions that can be
computed by small constant-depth circuits (AC0). Note the state-of-the-art PRG against
size-M depth-d AC0 has a seed length of logd+O(1)(Mn) · log(1/ε) [ST19]. Below, let AC0d,M
denote the class of depth-d circuits of size at most M .
Theorem 5.33. For any size s,m > 0 and 0 < ε < 1, there exists a PRG that ε-fools
FORMULA ◦ AC0d,M of size s with seed length
logd+O(1)(Mn) ·
√
s · log(s) · log(1/ε).
Moreover, by inspecting the construction of PRG in [ST19], it is not difficult to see that
the PRG is also local; there exists a circuit of size at most λ = logd+O(1)(Mn) · log(1/ε)
such that given a seed of length O logd+O(1)(Mn) · log(1/ε) and a index j ∈ [n], outputs the
j-th bit of the PRG. As a result, we get MCSP lower bounds from the this PRG.
Theorem 5.34. For every s, d,M ∈ N, if MCSP on N -bit can be computed by some
function in FORMULA[s] ◦ AC0d,M , then
s ≥ N2/ log2d+O(1)(Mn).
5.4.4 Formulas of low number-on-forehead communication leaf gates
In this section, we show a PRG with mild seed length for formulas of functions with low
multi-party number-on-forehead communication complexity.
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Theorem 5.35. Let G be a class of n-bits functions. For any size s > 0, there exists a












The PRG is constructed using the hardness vs. randomness paradigm.
Hardness based PRGs
We show how to construct the PRG using the average-case hardness result for formulas of
functions with low multi-party communication complexity (Theorem 5.17). We start with
some notations. For x ∈ {−1, 1}m and an integer k such that k divides m, we consider a
partition of x into k equal-sized consecutive blocks and write x = x(1), x(2), . . . , x(k), where
x(i) ∈ {−1, 1}m/k for each i ∈ [k].
Lemma 5.36. For any integers m, t, k > 0 such that k divides m, t, let G be a class of
functions on mt+ t bits, and let G : {−1, 1}m×t → {−1, 1}mt+t be























where x1, x2, . . . , xt ∈ {−1, 1}m. Then G is a PRG that (t · ε)-fools FORMULA ◦ G of size
s = Ω
 m2








Proof. The high level idea is as follows. We argue that if there is a FORMULA ◦ G of the
claimed size that breaks the PRG, then there is a FORMULA ◦ G′ of the same size that
computes GIP on m bits, where G′ has a k-party communication complexity that is at
most that of G with respect to the m-bit input, and hence contradicts the FORMULA ◦ G′
complexity of the generalized inner product function. The resulting formula is obtained by
fixing some input bits of the original FORMULA ◦ G which breaks the PRG.
We use a hybrid argument. First consider the distribution given by G, where we replace
each GIP(xj) (j ∈ [t]) with a uniformly random bit; let us denote those random bits as Uj for
j ∈ [t] (note that this is just the uniform distribution). Then for each j ∈ [t], define Hj to be
the distribution that we substitute back GIP(x1),GIP(x2), . . . ,GIP(xj) for the corresponding
uniform bits in the previous distribution.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose there exists a FORMULA◦G C of size s such that
|Pr[C(Ht) = 1]−Pr[F (H0) = 1]| > t · ε.
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By the triangle inequality, there exists a 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that
|Pr[C(Hj) = 1]−Pr[C(Hj−1) = 1]| > ε.
Then by averaging, there exist some fixings of x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xt and Uj+1, . . . , Ut to
C such that the above inequality still holds. Let us denote by C ′ the circuit obtained by C
after such fixings and assume without loss of generality (k − 1)t/k ≤ j ≤ t. Then we have∣∣∣Pr [C ′ (x(1)j , x(2)j , . . . , x(k)j ,GIP(xj)) = 1]−Pr [C ′ (x(1)j , x(2)j , . . . , x(k)j , Uj) = 1]∣∣∣ > ε.
(5.4)
By a standard “unpredictability implies pseudorandomness” argument [Yao82], we can show
that there is some circuit C ′′, obtained from C ′ by fixing some value for the last bit, that
computes the generalized inner product function on m bits with probability greater than
1/2 + ε over uniformly random inputs. Note that the size of C ′′ is the same as C ′ (hence
also C) , and also C ′′ can be computed by some FORMULA ◦ G′, where R(k)δ (G′) ≤ R
(k)
δ (G)
for every δ. This contradicts hardness of GIP for such circuits (Theorem 5.17).
We are now ready to prove Theorem 5.35.






Then Lemma 5.36 gives a PRG that ε-fools FORMULA ◦ G of size
s = Ω
 m2



































Note that the seed length in this case is n− t.
MKtP lower bounds
The PRG in Theorem 5.35 is sufficient to give an MKtP lower bound for formulas of
functions with low multi-party communication complexity.
Theorem 5.37. For any integer s > 0 and any class of N -bit function G, if MKtP on
N -bit can be computed by some function FORMULA[s] ◦ G, then
s = N
2
k2 · 16k ·R(k)1/3(G) · polylog(N)
.
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Proof. Let C be a function in FORMULA ◦ G of size less than
N2
k2 · 16k ·R(k)1/3(G) · log
c(N)
where c > 0 is some sufficiently large constant. By Theorem 5.35, we have that there is a
PRG that (1/3)-fools C and its seed length is
N − polylog(N).
Also, since the PRG is polynomial-time computable, we get that for every seed, the out-
put of the PRG has Kt complexity at most θ = N − polylog(N). However, consider the
MKtP function with a threshold parameter θ; this function is not fooled by such a PRG,
since it accepts every output of the PRG and rejects a uniformly random string with high
probability.
5.5 Satisfiability algorithms
In this section, we will use {0, 1} as the Boolean basis.
5.5.1 Computational efficient communication protocols
Definition 5.38 (Computational efficient communication protocols). Let t : N × N → N.
We say that a two-party communication protocol is t-efficient if for each of the parties, given
an input x and some previously sent messages π ∈ {0, 1}∗, the next message to send can
be computed in time t(|x|, |π|) (⊥ is being output if there is no next message). We say that
such a protocol is explicit if t(|x|, |π|) = 2o(|x|+|π|).
Lemma 5.39. Let f : {0, 1}n → 1 and let Π be a t-efficient communication protocol for
f with communication cost at most D. Then the protocol tree of Π can be output in time
O
(
D · t(n/2, D) · 2n/2 · 2D
)
. That is, there exists an algorithm that outputs a list of all
(partial and full) transcripts of length at most D and the rectangles associated with each of
the transcripts.
Proof. It suffices to show that, given an input x ∈ {0, 1}n/2 and a transcript ` ∈ {0, 1}≤D, we
can decide whether x belongs to the rectangle indexed by ` in time D · t(n/2, D). Suppose x
is the input for Alice (resp. Bob), and we want to decide whether x belongs to the rectangle
indexed by π. We can carry out the communication task by simulating the behavior of Alice
(resp. Bob) using the protocol Π and simulating Bob’s (resp. Alice’s) behavior using the
transcript π, and check whether the messages sent by Alice (resp. Bob) is consistent with
the transcript π. This takes time at most D · t(n/2, D). To construct the tree, we do the
above for every (partial and full) transcript π ∈ {0, 1}≤D and every input x ∈ {0, 1}n/2 for
Alice (resp. Bob). The total running time is O
(




For a protocol Π, we denote by Leaves(Π) the set of full transcripts of Π.
Remark. We note that, in the white-box context of the satisfiability problem, there is no
need to assume a canonical partition of the input variables among the players. For instance,
a helpful partition can either be given as part of the input, or computed by the algorithm.
As a consequence, in instantiations of Theorem 5.5 for a particular circuit class C, it is
sufficient to be able to convert the input circuit from C into some device from FORMULA◦G
for which protocols of bounded communication cost can be described.
5.5.2 Explicit approximating polynomials for formulas
From Theorem 5.9, we know that every size-s formula has a degree-O(
√
s) polynomial that
point-wisely approximates it. In our SAT algorithms, we will need to explicitly construct
such an approximating polynomial given a formula. One way to do this is to use an efficient
quantum query algorithm for formulas. It is known that a quantum query algorithm for a
function f using at most T queries implies an approximating polynomial for f of degree
at most 2T [BBC+01], and by classically simulating such an quantum algorithm, one can
show that the approximating polynomial can be obtained in time that is polynomial in the
number of its monomials, in addition to the time for the classical simulation. For our task,
we can use the result of Reichardt [Rei11a] which showed an efficient quantum algorithm
for evaluating size-s formulas with O (
√
s · log s) queries8. Here, we present an alternate
way to construct approximating polynomials for De Morgan formulas which rely only on
the existence of such polynomials, without requiring an efficient quantum query algorithm.
This “black-box” approach was suggested to us by an anonymous reviewer.
We first need the following structural lemma for formulas.
Lemma 5.40 ([IMZ12a, Tal14]). For every integer s > 0, there exists an algorithm such
that given a size-s De Morgan formula F , runs in poly(s) time and outputs a top formula
F ′ with O(
√
s) leaves and each leaf of F ′ is a sub-formula with O(
√
s) input leaves.
Lemma 5.41. For any integer s > 0 and any 0 < ε < 1, there exists an algorithm of
running time sO(
√
s·log(s)·log(1/ε)) such that given a De Morgan formula F of size s, outputs
an ε-approximating polynomial of degree O(
√
s·log(s)·log(1/ε)) for F . That is, the algorithm
outputs a multi-linear polynomial (as sum of monomials) over the reals such that for every
x ∈ {0, 1}n,
|p(x)− F (x)| ≤ ε.









(see Theorem 5.9). However, because this algorithm is not known to be efficient, it is unclear whether
such an approximating polynomial can be constructed efficiently with respect to the number of monomials.
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Proof. We first note that it suffices to construct a (1/3)-approximating polynomial for F
with degree D = O(
√
s · log(s)). This is because given a (1/3)-approximating polynomial
one can obtain explicitly an ε-approximating polynomial of degree D · O(log(1/ε)), by
feeding O(1/ε) copies of the (1/3)-approximating polynomial to the polynomial computing
MAJORITY on O(1/ε) bits [BNRdW07] (see also [Tal14, Appendix B]).
We first invoke Lemma 5.40 on F to obtain a top formula F ′ with t = O(
√
s) leaves,
each of which is a sub-formula of size O(
√
s). We construct a (1/20)-approximating (multi-
linear) polynomial P for the top formula F ′, which has degree d1 = O(s1/4) by Theorem 5.9.
Note that P can be constructed in time 2O(
√
s) because F ′ has at most O(
√
s) leaves.
Next, for each of the t sub-formulas, denoted as F1, F2, . . . , Ft, we construct a (1/(20t))-
approximating polynomial. Note that these polynomials have degree d1 = O(s1/4 · log(s))
and can be constructed in time 2O(
√
s). Let’s denote these t polynomials as Q1, Q2, . . . , Qt.
Now for each Qi (i ∈ [t]), we define
qi(x) =
Qi(x) + 1/(20t)
1 + 1/(10t) .
The final approximating polynomial for F is given as
p(x) = P (q1(x), q2(x), . . . , qt(x)) .
Note that p has degree d1 ·d2 = O(
√
s·log(s)) and can be constructed (as sum of monomials)
in time sO(
√
s·log(s)). It remains to show that p (1/3)-approximates F .
For 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, let Nq be the distribution over {0, 1} such that Pry∼Nq [y = 1] = q. Then
for an fixed input x ∈ {0, 1}s, we have
p(x) = E
yi∼Nqi(x)
[P (y1, y2, . . . , yt)]. (5.5)
Let E be the event that yi = Fi(x) for all i ∈ [t]. Note that
δ := Pr
yi∼Nqi(x)
[¬E ] ≤ 1/10. (5.6)




[yi 6= Fi(x)] ≤ 1/(10t).
Similar for the case when Fi(x) = 1 (which implies 1 − 1/(10t) < qi(x) ≤ 1). Then Equa-
tion (5.6) follows from a union bound. Now we can re-write Equation (5.5) as
p(x) = E[P (y1, y2, . . . , yt) | E ] ·Pr[E ] + E[P (y1, y2, . . . , yt) | ¬E ] ·Pr[¬E ]
=
(
F ′(F1(x), F2(x), ·Ft(x))± 1/20
)
· (1− δ) + E[P (y1, y2, . . . , yt) | ¬E ] · δ.
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Note that P (y) ∈ [−1/(20t), 1 + 1/(20t)] for every y ∈ {0, 1}t, and that δ ≤ 1/10. A simple
calculation shows that




5.5.3 The #SAT algorithm
In this subsection, we present our #SAT algorithm.
Theorem 5.42. For any integer s > 0, there exists a deterministic #SAT algorithm for
FORMULA[s] ◦ G, where G is the class of functions with explicit two-party deterministic








In the case G is the class of functions with explicit randomized protocols of communication








The algorithm is based on the framework for designing satisfiability algorithms developed
by Williams [Wil14b]. The idea is to transform a given circuit into a “sparse polynomial”
and solve satisfiability by evaluating the polynomial on all points in a faster-than-brute-force
manner.
We first need the following fast matrix multiplication algorithm for “narrow” matrices.
Theorem 5.43 ([Cop82]). Multiplication of an N×N .172 matrix with an N .172×N matrix
can be done in O(N2 log2N) arithmetic operations over any field.
For an even number n > 0, and x ∈ {0, 1}n, we denote by xL (resp. xR) the first half of
x and xR ∈ {0, 1}n/2 the second half. We now prove Theorem 5.42.
Proof of Theorem 5.42. We first prove the deterministic case.
Let C = F (g1, g2 . . . , gs) be a device in FORMULA ◦ G where F is a formula and
g1, g2, . . . , gs are functions that have a explicit communication protocol of cost at most
D. The first step is to output the protocol tree for each gi (i ∈ [s]). Since each gi has
explicit protocol of cost at most D, by Lemma 5.39, these protocol trees can be output in
time s · 2n/2+D+o(n) ≤ 2n/1.9 (here we assume D = o(n) and s ≤ n2 otherwise the theorem
holds trivially).
Let n′ be an integer whose value is determined later. Let T be a set of n′ variables such
that T contains n′/2 variables from the first half of the n variables and the rest are from the
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second half. For a partial assignment z ∈ {0, 1}n
′
to T , denote by Cz the restricted function
of C where the variables in T are fixed according to z. To count the number of satisfying











We will try to obtain the value of Q(x) for every x ∈ {0, 1}n−n
′
, in time about 2n−n′ , which
will allow us to compute the quantity in Equation (5.7) in time Õ(2n−n′) by summing
Q(x) over all the x’s. We do this by first transforming Q into an approximating polynomial
with not-too-many monomials, and each monomial is a product of functions that only rely
on either the first or the second half of x. With such a polynomial, we can perform fast
multipoint evaluation using the fast matrix multiplication algorithm in Theorem 5.43.
For each z ∈ {0, 1}n
′
, we view the formula Cz as F (g1z , g2z , . . . , gsz), where F is the De
Morgan formula part of Cz and g1z , g2z , . . . , gsz are the leaf gates. Let us now replace F by




, using Lemma 5.41. Note that the
degree of p is at most
d ≤ O(
√
s · log(s) · log(1/ε)) ≤ O(
√
s · log(s) · n′).




p(g1z(x), g2z(x), . . . , gsz(x)).
First, note that by the value that we’ve chosen for the approximating error ε, we have that,
for every x, ∣∣Q′(x)−Q(x)∣∣ ≤ 2n′ · ε = 1/3.
In other words, given Q′(x), we can recover the value of Q(x), which is supposed to be an
integer.










































to the rectangle indexed by πi and the function value of that rectangle is 1. Note that for
each i ∈ [s], given the pre-computed protocol tree of the Πi, αi and βi can be computed
in polynomial time (for example, using binary search). After plugging Equation (5.9) into

























Note that Q′ can be expressed as the sum of at most m terms, where











Next, we construct a 2(n−n′)/2 ×m matrix A and a m× 2(n−n′)/2 matrix B as follows:

















It is easy to see that for each x ∈ {0, 1}n−n
′
,
Q′(x) = (A ·B)xL,xR .
We now want to compute A · B. Therefore, we want m ≤ 2.172(n−n′)/2 so that computing




s · log2(s) ·D
,
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where c > 0 is some sufficiently large constant. Together with the running time in Equa-








For the randomized case, for each gi (i ∈ [s]), we consider a randomized protocol Πi
that has error ε′ ≤ 1/(3 · s · 2n′), and replace gi with a randomly picked protocol from
Πi, so we can say that for every x ∈ n− n′, the algorithm computes Q(x) (or Q′(x)) with
probability at least 2/3 (via a union bound over all the gi’s and a union bound over all
the z’s in {0, 1}n
′
). Then we can repeat the above algorithm poly(n) times and obtain
Q(x) for all x ∈ {0, 1}n−n
′
correctly with high probability. Note that the error of any
randomized protocol with communication complexity R can be reduced to ε′ by blowing
up the communication complexity by a factor of O(log(1/ε′)). In this case the, (as we are









s · log2(s) ·R
)1/2
,
which gives the claimed running time for the randomized case.
In fact, using the ideas above we can also get a randomized #SAT algorithm for the more
expressive class FORMULA ◦AC0d,M ◦ G, where AC0d,M is the class of depth-d size-M circuits
and G is the class of functions that have low-communication complexity9, by combining
with the fact that AC0 circuits have low-degree probabilistic polynomials over the reals (a
probabilistic polynomial of a function f is a distribution on polynomials such that for every
input x, a randomly picked polynomial from the distribution agrees with f on the input x).
More specifically, we have the following.
Theorem 5.44. For any integers s, d,M > 0, there exists a randomized #SAT algorithm
for FORMULA[s] ◦ AC0d,M ◦ G, where G is the class of functions with explicit two-party
deterministic protocols of communication cost at most D, the algorithm outputs the number









9Here we define the size of a AC0d,M circuit to be the number of wires. Note that a circuit in FORMULA ◦
AC0d,M ◦ G can have M functions from G at the bottom.
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In the case G is the class of functions with explicit randomized protocols of communication









Proof sketch. We show the case where G has low randomized communication complexity.
Let





• ε2 = 1/
(
6 · s · 2n′
)
and
• ε3 = 1/
(
6 ·M · 2n′
)
.
As in the proof of Theorem 5.42, we can replace the formula part of FORMULA[s]◦AC0d,M ◦G
with a ε1-approximating polynomial of degree
O(
√
s · log(s) · log(1/ε1)) = O(
√
s · log(s) · n′).
Then we replace the AC0d,M circuit with a randomly picked polynomial from a ε2-error
probabilistic polynomial. By [HS19], such a probabilistic polynomial is constructive and
has degree at most
(logM)O(d) · log(1/ε2) = (logM)O(d) · (n′ + log(s)).
Finally, we replace each of the bottom functions, which is from G, with a randomly picked
protocol from a randomized protocol with error ε3, and hence has cost at most
R ·O(log(1/ε3)) = O(R · (n′ + log(M))).




monomials, whose variables are functions that depend on either the first half or the second
half of x. Note that with our choices of ε2 and ε3, for every x ∈ {0, 1}n−n
′
, the algorithm
computes Q(x) correctly that with probability at least 2/3 (by union bounds). By the same












It is worth noting that unlike Theorem 5.42, the algorithm in Theorem 5.44 is randomized
even if G is the class of functions with low deterministic communication complexity, because
of the use of probabilistic polynomials for the AC0 circuits.
5.6 Learning algorithms
In this section, we prove the following learning result for the FORMULA ◦ XOR model.
Theorem 5.45. For every constant γ > 0, there is an algorithm that PAC learns the class
of n-variate Boolean functions FORMULA[n2−γ ] ◦XOR to accuracy ε and with confidence δ
in time poly
(
2n/ logn, 1/ε, log(1/δ)
)
.
We first review some useful results that pertain to agnostically learning parities as well
as boosting of learning algorithms.
5.6.1 Agnostically learning parities and boosting
For a parameter n ≥ 1, let ∆ be a distribution on labelled examples (x, y) supported over
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}, and assume that for each x there is at most one y such that (x, y) ∈






[h(x) 6= y] .









We will need a result established by Kalai, Mansour, and Verbin [KMV08], which gives a
non-trivial time agnostic learning algorithm for the class of parities.
Lemma 5.46 ([KMV08]). Let XOR be the class of parity functions on n variables. Then,
for any constant ζ > 0, there is a randomized learning algorithm W such that, for every
parameter n ≥ 1 and distribution ∆ over labelled examples, when W is given access to
independent samples from ∆ it outputs with high probability a circuit computing a hypothesis





(XOR) + 2−n1−ζ .
The sample complexity and running time of W is 2O(n/ logn).
Recall that a boosting procedure for learning algorithms transforms a weak learner that
outputs a hypothesis that is just weakly correlated with the unknown function into a (strong)
PAC learning algorithm for the same class (i.e., a learner in the sense of Definition 5.16).
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We refer for instance to [KV94] for more information about boosting in learning theory. We
shall make use of the following boosting result by Freund [Fre90].
Lemma 5.47 ([Fre90]). Let W be a (weak) learner for a class C that runs in time t(n) and
outputs (under any distribution) a hypothesis of error up to 1/2− β, for some constructive
function β(n) > 0. Then, there exists a PAC learning algorithm for C that runs in time
poly(n, t, 1/ε, 1/β, log(1/δ)).
5.6.2 PAC-learning small formulas of parities
We are ready to show that sub-quadratic size formulas over parity functions can be learned
in time 2O(n/ logn). First, we argue that Lemma 5.46 provides a weak learner that works
under any distribution D supported over {0, 1}n. This will follow from Lemma 5.19, which
shows that any function in FORMULA[s]◦XOR is correlated with some parity function with
respect to D. We then obtain a standard PAC learner via the boosting procedure from
Lemma 5.47.
Proof of Theorem 5.45. Let C = FORMULA ◦ XOR, where s = n2−γ for some constant
γ > 0. For any function f ∈ FORMULA[s] ◦XOR and distribution D supported over {0, 1}n,
Lemma 5.19 shows that there exists a parity function χ = χ(f,D) such that
Pr
x∼D




for some λ = λ(γ) > 0 independent of n, under the assumption that n is sufficiently large.
Let ∆ = ∆(D, f) be the distribution over labelled examples induced by D and f . Note that
opt∆(XOR) ≤ 1/2 − exp(n1−λ). Consequently, by invoking Lemma 5.46 with parameter
ζ = λ, it follows that FORMULA[n2−γ ]◦XOR can be learned under an arbitrary distribution
to error β(n) ≤ 1/2− exp(n1−Ω(1)) in time t(n) = 2O(n/ logn). Consequently, we can obtain
a PAC learner algorithm for FORMULA[n2−γ ] ◦ XOR via Lemma 5.47 that runs in time
poly(n, t(n), 1/ε, 1/β, log(1/δ)) = poly(2n/ logn, 1/ε, log(1/δ)).
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Chapter 6
Circuit Lower Bounds for MCSP
6.1 Background and results
Given the truth table of some Boolean function f and a size parameter θ, the minimum
circuit size problem (MCSP) asks whether f can be computed by a circuit of size at most
θ. Understanding the exact complexity of MCSP is an important open problem in compu-
tational complexity theory, dating back to the 1950s [Tra84].
It is easy to see that MCSP is in NP. A popular conjecture is that MCSP is also
NP-hard. However, despite serious efforts over the years, such a proof is still unknown.
Given that it is difficult to show that MCSP is hard, perhaps the problem is easy? It turns
out that this cannot be the case under some plausible cryptographic assumptions. More
specifically, it is known that if one-way functions exist, then MCSP is not in P [KC00]. As
proving an unconditional lower bound for MCSP seems far beyond the reach of currently
known techniques, can we at least prove unconditional lower bounds for MCSP against some
restricted computational models?1
Two of the most studied restricted computational models in complexity theory are
constant-depth circuits (AC0) and De Morgan formulas. For AC0 circuits, the best-known
lower bound is about PARITY: PARITY on N variables requires depth-d AC0 circuits of size
2Ω(N1/(d−1)) [Hås89]. For De Morgan formulas, the state-of-the-art lower bound is almost cu-
bic, namely N3−o(1), for some polynomial-time computable function [Hås98, Tal14, Tal17a,
DM18].
Notably, there are also lower bounds against these models for MCSP. Allender et
al. [ABK+06] showed that MCSP, on functions represented as a truth table of length N ,
cannot be computed by polynomial-size constant-depth AC0 circuits. In fact, by a more
careful analysis of their argument, one can get a lower bound of 2N1/(c·d+O(1)) , for a constant
c ≥ 2. However, such a lower bound still has a worse dependence on the depth compared
1A recent line of research on hardness magnification [OS18, OPS19] provides another motivation for
proving relatively weak lower bounds for restricted circuit models against certain “gap variants” of MCSP.
Such lower bounds are shown to imply much stronger (superpolynomial) lower bounds.
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to the PARITY lower bound. For De Morgan formulas, Hirahara and Santhanam [HS17]
showed that computing MCSP requires De Morgan formulas of size N2−o(1).
Given these two MCSP lower bounds and the best-known lower bounds against these
two models, it is natural to ask whether we can get MCSP lower bounds against small-depth
circuits and De Morgan formulas that match the state-of-the-art lower bounds against these
models. More specifically, can we show that computing MCSP requires depth-d AC0 circuits
of size 2N1/(d+O(1)) and De Morgan formulas of size N3−o(1)? Furthermore, can we show lower
bounds for MCSP against some other restricted models that match their state-of-the-art
lower bounds? In this work, we answer these questions in the affirmative.
6.1.1 Results
Our first result is an almost-cubic De Morgan formula lower bound for MCSP.
Theorem 6.1. Any De Morgan formula computing MCSP on truth tables of length N must
have size at least N3/2O(log
2/3 N).
We also get almost-quadratic lower bounds against formulas over an arbitrary basis
as well as general branching programs; these almost match the best-known lower bounds
against these models [Nec66].
Theorem 6.2. Let C be either a formula over any basis or a branching program that
computes MCSP on truth tables of length N . Then C must have size at least N2/2O(
√
logN).
For small-depth circuits, we have the following improved lower bound for MCSP, which
its dependence on the depth matches the one in the PARITY lower bound, up to a small
additive constant.
Theorem 6.3. For every d > 2 and every constant γ > 0, any depth-d AC0 circuit com-
puting MCSP on truth tables of length N must have size 2Ω(N1/(d+2+γ)).
For the special case of depth-2 circuits, we can have an almost optimal lower bound.
Theorem 6.4. Any CNF or DNF computing MCSP on truth tables of length N must have
size 2Ω(N).
Also, in this work, we give a fine-grained analysis of the approach of obtaining MCSP
lower bounds from average-case hardness via the Nisan-Wigderson framework (see Sec-
tion 6.7).
6.1.2 Techniques
For a class C of N -variate Boolean functions, a pseudorandom generator (PRG) against C
is a deterministic efficiently-computable function G mapping short binary strings (seeds) to
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longer binary strings so that every function in C accepts G’s output on a uniformly random
seed with about the same probability as that for an actual uniformly random string.
A key notion in this work is that of a local PRG. We say that a PRG is local if its N -
bit output (viewed as the truth table of some function) has small circuit complexity. More
precisely, for any fixed seed to the PRG, there exists a small circuit such that, given j ∈ [N ]
as an input, the circuit computes the j-th bit of the PRG output, where the complexity of
the circuit is measured relative to its input length, namely logN . Note that our notion of
local PRGs does not require that the PRG in question is explicit; that is, we do not require
that a local PRG can be computed by some uniform algorithm.
Local PRGs in the context of MCSP (and related problems) have been studied in pre-
vious works (see, e.g., [ABK+06, OS17, HS17, Hir18]). In this work, we refine the previous
approaches, and obtain stronger circuit lower bounds by establishing strong locality prop-
erties of certain PRG constructions.2
MCSP lower bounds from local PRGs
Suppose we have a local PRG against some class of circuits C of size s, and we want to show
that MCSP cannot be computed by any size-s circuit in C. Suppose some size-s circuit C
in C computes MCSP. Using the fact that a random function has almost maximum circuit
complexity, we have that C will output false on most of its inputs (by setting the size
parameter θ to be a non-trivial quantity that is asymptotically smaller than 2n/n, where
n is the input length of the function). If we replace the uniformly random inputs with the
outputs of the local PRG, then, by the definition of PRG, C will still output false with
large probability. However, since the PRG is local, all of its outputs have circuit complexity
smaller than the size parameter θ, and hence must be accepted by C. A contradiction.
To get a strong lower bound, we would like to make the above argument to work for large
s. Note that the local complexity of the PRG, λ(s), is a function on the size of the circuit
C, and we need this local complexity to be “non-trivial” in order to reach a contradiction.
Therefore, we want to choose s so that this local complexity remains asymptotically smaller
than 2n/n. As a result, the final lower bound (i.e., the largest s that we can choose) is
determined by the local complexity λ. So the main question we study in our work is: What
is the smallest local complexity of a PRG against a given circuit class?
2Note that, as one of our ICALP’19 reviewers pointed out, the notion of a local PRG can be also found in
the context of cryptography [CM01], where a PRG G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is called k-local, for some constant
k > 0, if every output PRG bit G(x)j , for any x ∈ {0, 1}n and j ∈ [m], depends only on k input bits
xi1 , . . . , xik , for i1, . . . , ik ∈ [n]. In our work, however, locality refers to the circuit complexity of the PRG
at hand and the output bits of our PRGs may depend on a super-constant number of input bits.
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MCSP lower bound against De Morgan formulas
Our formula lower bound for MCSP is obtained by applying the framework described above
to a local PRG against formulas. The state-of-the-art PRG against formulas is given by
Impagliazzo, Meka, and Zuckerman [IMZ19], which we refer to as the IMZ PRG. Their
PRG has a seed length of s1/3+o(1) for size s formulas (note that such a PRG is useful
against sub-cubic formulas only). If we want to utilize the IMZ PRG to get an MCSP lower
bound against formulas, we will need to argue that the IMZ PRG is local.
In fact, in order to get an almost-cubic lower bound, we will need such a PRG to be
strongly local in the sense that any single output bit of the PRG (on any given fixed seed)
can be computed by a circuit of size comparable to its seed length, which is s1/3+o(1).
However, by inspecting the construction, the IMZ PRG does not seem to have such a
property, and a straightforward implementation seems to require a circuit of size at least
s2/3 (see Section B.2 for more details), which yields a weaker lower bound for MCSP.
To overcome this issue, we present an alternative PRG useful against sub-cubic formulas
which is strongly local. The construction of this PRG can be viewed as a modification of the
IMZ PRG. At a high level, it is based on the Ajtai-Wigderson construction [AW89], which
is a framework for constructing PRGs against computations that can be simplified under
(pseudo)random restrictions. This framework is then combined with the ideas for reducing
(recycling) random bits using an extractor, by exploiting communication bottlenecks in
computations [NZ96]. Our modification, particularly the utilization of the Ajtai-Wigderson
construction, allows us to compute any output bit of the PRG efficiently by reducing the
number of calls to the extractor. Using some crucial observations on the circuit complexity
of certain pseudorandom objects, we get a PRG that is locally computable by a s1/3+o(1)-size
circuit.3
MCSP lower bounds against formulas over an arbitrary basis or branching pro-
grams
The MCSP lower bounds against formulas over an arbitrary basis or branching programs
are obtained similarly to those for De Morgan formulas. The idea is to construct strongly
local PRGs against these models by modifying the PRGs in [IMZ19]. Then, by applying
our “MCSP circuit lower bounds from local PRGs” framework, we get the desired lower
bounds.
3It is also possible to use the original IMZ PRG to obtain an almost-cubic formula lower bound for MCSP.
We can show that the IMZ PRG, although not fully strongly local, is “almost strongly local” in the sense
that most of its outputs have very small circuit complexity; see Section B.2.
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MCSP lower bounds against AC0
We use a local PRG against AC0 to get MCSP lower bounds. To get a lower bound matching
the one in Theorem 6.3, we can use the state-of-the-art PRG against AC0 by Trevisan and
Xue [TX13], which has a seed length of (log s)d+O(1) for size-s depth-d AC0 circuits. By a
careful analysis of the construction of this PRG, we can show that the Trevisan-Xue PRG is
strongly local and can be used to get an MCSP lower bound that is close to the one stated
in Theorem 6.3. However, in this work, we will present a more direct proof of such a lower
bound by using the pseudorandom switching lemma for constant-depth circuits, which is
due to Trevisan and Xue [TX13] as well, and is a key ingredient in their PRG.
The idea is to show that for any small-depth circuit of size less than the claimed lower
bound, there is some locally computable restriction that turns the circuit into a constant
function, but leaves many variables unrestricted. However, MCSP cannot be constant under
such a restriction, because depending on the partial assignment to the unrestricted variables,
the resulting input function (which is composed of the restriction and the partial assignment)
can be either easy or hard. Such an approach based on pseudorandom restrictions can also
be applied to the special case of depth-2 circuits to get almost optimal CNF (and DNF)
lower bounds for MCSP.
Organization of this chapter. We give the necessary background in Section 6.2. In Sec-
tion 6.3, we describe our framework of using local PRGs to obtain lower bounds for MCSP.
We prove the almost-cubic De Morgan formula lower bound for MCSP (Theorem 6.1) in
Section 6.4, and the almost-quadratic lower bounds against formulas over an arbitrary basis
and branching programs (Theorem 6.2) in Section 6.5. The improved AC0 lower bounds for
MCSP (Theorem 6.3 and Theorem 6.4) are proved in Section 6.6. In Section 6.7, we discuss
the framework of proving MCSP lower bounds from average-case hardness. Finally, we give
some open problems in Section 6.8.
6.2 Preliminaries
Notation
Throughout this chapter, we will use {0, 1} as the Boolean domain.
For any computational model, we use the term size to refer to its complexity measure.
For example, if the model is circuits of some fixed depth, then the size is the number of
gates in the circuit.
For a positive integer n that is a power of two,4 we use the following notation:
4We may sometimes implicitly assume that some quantity, such as the number of variables, or circuit
size, is a “nice” number (e.g., a power of two). This can always be made true by adding dummy variables or
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• [n] denotes the set { 1, . . . , n }. We will sometimes identify [n] with {0, 1}logn, in a
natural way.
• Fn denotes the field with n elements. Again, we will sometimes identify Fn with
{0, 1}logn where the elements in Fn are represented by (logn)-bit strings.
• Un denotes the uniform distribution over {0, 1}n.
• For a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, tt(f) ∈ {0, 1}N=2
n
denotes the truth table of
f , and CC(f) denotes its circuit complexity, that is, the size of the smallest Boolean
circuit that computes f .
Useful facts about Boolean circuits and pseudorandomness
We refer to a textbook as [Juk12] for a general introduction to Boolean circuits.
Proposition 6.5. A Boolean circuit of size s can be specified using O(s log s) bits. Hence
there are at most 2O(s log s) = sO(s) distinct circuits of size at most s.
Theorem 6.6 ([Sha49]). The fraction of functions on n variables that have a circuit of size
less than 2n/(3n) is o(1).
Lemma 6.7. For any integer t > 0, there exists a circuit C of size Õ(t) such that, given
any string x ∈ {0, 1}t, the circuit does the following:
• If x = 0t, then C outputs (0, 0log t).
• If x 6= 0t, then C outputs (1, q), where q ∈ {0, 1}log t is the index of the first bit in x
that is not 0.




and z(i), for any i = 1, . . . , t, recursively as follows:
z(i) =

z(i−1), if (z(i−1))1 = 1,
z(i−1), if (z(i−1))1 = 0 and xi = 0, and
(1, i), if (z(i−1))1 = 0 and xi = 1.
Note that each z(i) can be computed in polylog(t) size given z(i−1). Using a circuit of size
Õ(t) we can compute z(t), which is our output.
The following circuit upper bound for the addressing (storage access) function is well-
known (see, e.g., [Weg87]); we include a proof for completeness.
dummy gates, which may change the respective quantity by a small amount, and all of our results will still
hold asymptotically.
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Lemma 6.8. For any integers t,m > 0, there exists a circuit of size O(t ·m) such that,
given any string y = (y1, . . . , yt), where yi ∈ {0, 1}m, for each i, and an index i ∈ {0, 1}log t,
the circuit outputs yi.
Proof. We first look at the first bit (i.e., the least significant bit in binary) of i and output
either the first half of y (i.e., y1, . . . , yt/2), if the first bit is 0, or the second half (i.e.,
y(t/2)+1, . . . , yt), if the first bit is 1; denote this output as y(1). This can be done by a circuit
of size c · t ·m, for some constant c > 0. Then, we look at the second bit of i and output
either the first half or the second half of y(1), denoted as y(2). This can be done by a circuit
of size c · t ·m/2. We repeat the above process log t times, in total, until we get y(log t), which
is yi. The circuit complexity of this procedure is
log t∑
k=1
(c · t ·m)/2k−1 = O(t ·m).
We will need the following concentration bound for k-wise independent distributions,
which is an application of Cantelli’s inequality.
Proposition 6.9. For any 0 < p < 1, let X1, . . . , Xn be pair-wise independent variables
over {0, 1} such that Pr[Xi = 1] = p for each i ∈ [n]. Then, it is the case that
Pr[X ≤ pn/2] ≤ 4
pn
.
The following simple fact will be convenient for us.
Lemma 6.10. Let X and Y be two random variables that take values in {0, 1} and E be
some event. If
• |E[X | E ]−E[Y | E ]| ≤ ε1 and
• Pr[¬E ] ≤ ε2,
then |E[X]−E[Y ]| ≤ ε1 + ε2.
Proof. We have
E[X] = E[X | E ] ·Pr[E ] + E[X | ¬E ] ·Pr[¬E ],
and
E[Y ] = E[Y | E ] ·Pr[E ] + E[Y | ¬E ] ·Pr[¬E ].
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Then,
E[X]−E[Y ] = (E[X | E ]−E[Y | E ]) ·Pr[E ] + (E[X | ¬E ]−E[Y | ¬E ]) ·Pr[¬E ]
≤ |E[X | E ]−E[Y | E ]|+ Pr[¬E ]
≤ ε1 + ε2.
The fact E[Y ]−E[X] ≤ ε1 + ε2 can be similarly shown.
6.3 The “MCSP circuit lower bounds from local PRGs” frame-
work
We first describe how to use local PRGs to obtain circuit lower bounds for MCSP.
Definition 6.11 (Local PRGs). Let λ : N × N → N be a size function. For any Boolean
computational model and size s > 0, we say that a function G : {0, 1}r=r(N,s) → {0, 1}N is
a (N, s, λ(N, s))-local PRG against the model if
• G 1/3-fools every device f on N variables of size s in the model; that is,∣∣∣∣∣ Ez∼{0,1}r[f(G(z))]− Ex∼{0,1}N [f(x)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/3,
and
• for any seed z ∈ {0, 1}r, the function gz : {0, 1}logN → {0, 1} defined as gz(j) = G(z)j
can be computed by a general circuit of size at most λ(N, s).
Remark 6.12. Definition 6.11 is a notable departure from earlier work on PRGs, in that
there is no requirement that a local PRG is easy to compute. Instead, the utility of the PRG
is derived from the requirement that each of the functions gz is easy to compute.
Theorem 6.13. There exists a constant c > 0 such that the following holds. For any
computational model, let s be such that MCSP on truth tables of length N can be computed
by a device of size s in the model. If there exists some (N, s, λ(N, s))-local PRG, of any
seed-length, against the model, then λ(N, s) ≥ Nc logN .
Proof. Let C be a device in the computational model such that C computes MCSP on truth
tables of length N . Suppose C has size s, and let G be a (N, s, λ(N, s))-local PRG against
C with some seed length r.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose that
λ(N, s) < N
c logN .
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On the one hand, since most functions require circuits of size greater than Nc logN (Theo-
rem 6.6) and C computes MCSP, we have
µ = Pr
tt(f)∼{0,1}N
[C(tt(f) , λ(N, s)) = 0] ≥ 1/2.
Also, since G fools C, we have
Pr
z∼{0,1}r
[C(G(z), λ(N, s)) = 0] ≥ µ− 1/3 ≥ 1/6.
On the other hand, because G is (N, s, λ(N, s))-local, we must have C(G(z), λ(N, s)) = 1,
for every z. A contradiction.
It is easy to see that a local hitting set generator (HSG) is sufficient for the above
argument to work. HSGs are a weak version of PRGs with the following property: For every
function f in the class, if f accepts many of its inputs, then a HSG outputs such an input
for at least one of its seeds.
6.4 Almost-cubic De Morgan formula lower bounds for MCSP
In this section, we present our almost-cubic De Morgan formula lower bound for MCSP. By
saying “formula” within this section, we refer to formulas over the De Morgan basis (AND,
OR, and NOT). By the size of a formula, we mean its usual leaf complexity, i.e., the number
of leaves in the tree representation of the formula.
Theorem 6.14 (Theorem 6.1, restated). Any De Morgan formula computing MCSP on
truth tables of length N must have size at least N3/2O(log
2/3 N).
We will construct a strongly local PRG useful against sub-cubic formulas. That is, given
as input an index j, the j-th bit of the PRG can be computed by a circuit of size that is
comparable to its seed length, which in our case is around s1/3 for size s formulas.
Lemma 6.15. For any s ≥ N , there exists a
(
N, s, s1/3 · 2O(log
2/3 s))-local PRG against De
Morgan formulas.
Given the local PRG in Lemma 6.15, we can combine it with our Theorem 6.13 to obtain
a formula lower bound for MCSP.
Proof of Theorem 6.14. Let s ≤ N3 be such that MCSP on truth tables of length N can
be computed by some formula of size s. By Theorem 6.13 and Lemma 6.15, we have
s1/3 · 2O(log
2/3 s) ≥ N/(c logN);







The rest of this section is devoted to proving Lemma 6.15.
6.4.1 Almost-linear-size k-independent generators
The PRG in Lemma 6.15 will use k-wise independent distributions. Recall that a multidi-
mensional distribution is called k-wise independent if any k coordinates of the distribution
are uniformly distributed (see Definition 2.6).
A k-independent generator is a function from binary strings to binary strings that takes
as input a random seed and stretches that seed to a string that follows a k-wise independent
distribution. We will need efficient and local constructions for k-independent generators as
well as some other pseudorandom objects. These objects can be constructed using finite
fields; we need the following result, which says that finite field arithmetic can be performed
by almost-linear-size circuits.
Fact 6.16 (See, e.g., [vzGG13, GS13]). For any integer ` > 0, let the elements in F2` be
represented by `-bit strings. Then, addition over F2` can be performed by a circuit of size
O(`) and multiplication over F2` can be performed by a circuit of size Õ(`).
We now describe an efficient construction for k-independent generator, using the fact
that finite field arithmetic can be done using almost linear-size circuits.
Lemma 6.17. For any integer k > 0, there exists a k-independent generator G : {0, 1}r →
[m]n, with r = k ·max{logn, logm}, such that the following holds. There exists a circuit of
size
k ·max{Õ(logn), Õ(logm)}
such that, given j ∈ {0, 1}logn and a seed z ∈ {0, 1}r, the circuit computes the j-th coordinate
of G(z).
Proof. Let n′ = max{n,m} and suppose n′ = 2`. We view the elements in Fn′ as `-bit
strings. Consider the following function g : Fn′ × Fkn′ → Fn′ :
g(i, z0, . . . , zk−1) = z0 + z1 · i+ · · ·+ zk−1 · ik−1.
It is known (see [Vad12, Proposition 3.33]) that the function G : Fkn′ → Fn
′
n′ given as
G(z0, . . . , zk−1) =
(
g(1, z0, . . . , zk−1), . . . , g(n′, z0, . . . , zk−1)
)
,
is a k-independent generator.
Using Fact 6.16 it is easy to implement a circuit of size k · Õ(`) that computes g(j, z).
Note that to get an output in [m] we can simply output the first logm bits of G(z)j , since
the field has characteristic 2.
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6.4.2 Almost-linear-size extractors
Our PRG will make use of randomness extractors. Here, we describe an extractor that is
computable by a circuit of size that is almost linear in the length of its input. We start by
reviewing some basic definitions regarding extractors.
Definition 6.18 (ε-closeness and statistical distance). Let 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1. We say two distri-




|Pr[T (X) = 1]−Pr[T (Y ) = 1]| ,
is at most ε.
Definition 6.19 (Min-entropy). Let X be a random variable. The min-entropy of X, de-
noted by H∞(X), is the largest real number k such that Pr[X = x] ≤ 2−k for every x in
the range of X. If X is a distribution over {0, 1}ℵ with H∞(X) ≥ k, then X is called a
(ℵ, k)-source.
Definition 6.20 (Extractors). A function E : {0, 1}ℵ × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is an (k, ε)-
extractor if, for any (ℵ, k)-source X, the distribution E(X,Ud) is ε-close to Um.
We now state the extractor, which for a high min-entropy source extracts a constant
fraction of the min-entropy, using seeds of polylogarithmic length. The construction and
circuit complexity of this extractor are presented in Section B.1.
Lemma 6.21 (Almost-linear-size extractors, following [NZ96]). There exists some random-
ness extractor E : {0, 1}ℵ × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m that is an (ℵ/2, ε)-extractor with m = Ω(ℵ)
and d = polylog(ℵ/ε). Moreover, E can be computed by a circuit of size ℵ · polylog(ℵ/ε).
6.4.3 Strongly local PRG useful against sub-cubic De Morgan formulas
For a formula F , let L(F ) denote the size (which is measured by the number of leaves) of
F . We need the following pseudorandom shrinkage lemma for De Morgan formulas, which
says that there exists a p-regular restriction, where the unrestricted variables are selected
pseudorandomly and the restricted variables are fixed truly-randomly, such that with high
probability the size of the restricted formula will “shrink” by a factor of p2.
Lemma 6.22 (Pseudorandom shrinkage lemma, [IMZ19, Lemma 4.8]5 ). There exists a
constant c0 > 0 such that the following holds. For any constant c > c0, any s ≥ N ,
5The pseudorandom shrinkage lemma in [IMZ19] is not stated in this form, but rather selects the unre-
stricted variables and fixes the restricted variables both pseudorandomly (based on limited independence).
This immediately implies the above lemma, where the restricted variables are set independently (and hence
also k-wise independently, for any k). Further, the last statement follows from the fact that the restricted
variables are chosen by a k-wise independent distribution, which can be computed locally; see Lemma 6.17.
157
p ≥ s−1/2, and any De Morgan formula F on N variables of size s, there exists a p-regular










2/3 s · p2 · s
]
≤ s−c.
Moreover, there exists a circuit of size 2O(log2/3 s) such that, given j ∈ {0, 1}logN and a seed
z ∈ {0, 1}r, the circuit computes the j-th coordinate of D(z).
We are now ready to show our PRG in Lemma 6.15.
Proof of Lemma 6.15. The construction is as follows: We first sample a p-regular pseudo-
random selection from Lemma 6.22. Then, we fill the star coordinates, specified by the
pseudorandom selection, in the output string with the output of some extractor which
takes a min-entropy source sample and a short seed. (More precisely, the star coordinates
are filled with the output of some limited-independence generator that takes the output of
an extractor as a seed.) We then sample another pseudorandom selection, and fill the star
coordinates specified by this pseudorandom selection but this time only for those that have
not been filled in previous steps, again with the output of the same extractor using the
same min-entropy source sample but a different short seed. We continue this way until all
the coordinates are filled.
More formally, our PRG uses the following parameters:6
• p = 1/s1/3, the expected fraction of unrestricted variables in each of the pseudorandom
selections;
• ε = 1/poly(N) and ε0 = ε/(10t), which specify the error of the PRG;
• t = ln(4N/ε)/p = s1/3 ·O (logN), the number of steps needed so that all the coordi-
nates will be filled with probability 1− ε/4;
• s0 = p2 · s · 2O(log
2/3 s) = s1/3 · 2O(log
2/3 s), the size of the formula after being simplified
by a pseudorandom restriction;
• k ≥ s0 = s1/3 · 2O(log
2/3 s), the amount of independence needed to fool the simplified
formula, and rk = k · logN the seed length for the k-independent generator;
• ℵ, the length of the min-entropy source for the extractor, which is such that ℵ ≥
2 · log(1/ε0) + c · s0 · log s0, where c > 0 is some constant, and that Ω(ℵ) ≥ rk. We can
take ℵ = s1/3 · 2O(log
2/3 s);
• d = polylog(ℵ/ε0) = polylog(N), the seed length of the extractor;
6In fact, there are mainly two types of parameters here. Those that are close to s1/3, which are
1/p, t, s0, k,N , and those that are close to No(1), which are d and `.
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• ` = 2O(log2/3 s), the number of random bits for sampling a pseudorandom selection.
Construction. The PRG takes a seed (X,Y1, . . . , Yt, γ1, . . . , γt) ∈ {0, 1}r, where
• X ∈ {0, 1}ℵ is the min-entropy source sample of an extractor,
• Yi ∈ {0, 1}polylog(N), for each i ∈ [t], is the seed of an extractor, and
• γi ∈ {0, 1}`, for each i ∈ [t], is the seed for sampling a pseudorandom selection.
The construction of the PRG proceeds in the following two stages.
Stage 1. Compute a sequence of t p-regular pseudorandom selections
σ1, . . . , σt,
using Lemma 6.22, with the seeds γ1, . . . , γt. Below, we denote the star coordinates in σi by
σ−1i (∗). Let S1, . . . , St ⊆ [N ] be t disjoint sets defined by
Si = σ−1i (∗) \ (S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Si−1).
Stage 2. Define Z1, . . . , Zt ∈ {0, 1}N by
Zi = Gk(E(X,Yi)),
where E : {0, 1}ℵ×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}Ω(ℵ) is an (ℵ/2, ε0)-extractor and Gk : {0, 1}rk → {0, 1}N
is a k-independent generator. The final output of our PRG is the binary string that has the
values Zi|Si in the positions indexed by Si, for all i ∈ [t], where Zi|Si denotes the bit values
of Zi projected to the set Si. (We fix those positions that are not in any of the Si’s to be
0.) Stage 2 of the PRG construction is depicted in Figure 6.1.
Correctness. Next, we show that the above PRG ε-fools N -variate formulas of size s.
First, note that, by our choice of t, with probability 1− ε/4, S = S1 ∪ · · · ∪ St covers all N
coordinates. To proceed, we will use a hybrid argument. Let G denote the distribution given
by the PRG described above. Let U be the uniform distribution. Note that if in the above
construction we replace Zi, for all i ∈ [t], with U , then we would get a uniform distribution.
Now we can start from there and we will gradually replace U with the Zi’s step-by-step for
a total of t steps. We will argue that after each replacement step, the expected value of the
function does not change by much. Let Bi be the distribution where we have replaced U
with Zi in the first i steps and S = [N ]. That is,
Bi =
(





















Figure 6.1: Construction of the PRG in Stage 2 of Lemma 6.15, Stage 2. For each i ∈ [t],
1Si ∈ {0, 1}
N denotes the characteristic Boolean vector of the set Si, where Si ⊆ [N ]
is the set of star coordinates, in the i-th pseudorandom selection, that did not appear
in the preceding sets S1, . . . , Si−1. Also, ∧ denotes a coordinate-wise AND operation (i.e.,
coordinate-wise multiplication of Boolean vectors) and
∨
is a coordinate-wise OR operation.
and we want to show that |E[f(U)]−E[f(G)]| = |E[f(B0)]−E[f(Bt)]| ≤ ε. Let
Ai =
(




Z1|S1 , . . . , Zi|Si , U | Si+1∪···∪St∪([N ]\S)
)
be the version of the distribution Bi in the case where S ( [N ]. Let C denote the event
S = [N ]; by Lemma 6.10, for all i, we get that
|E[f(Ai)]−E[f(Bi)]| ≤ |E[f(Ai) | C]−E[f(Bi) | C]|+ Pr[¬C] ≤ 0 + ε/4 = ε/4.
Therefore, it would suffice to establish |E[f(A0)]−E[f(At)]| ≤ ε/2 since this inequality
would imply the desired |E[f(B0)]−E[f(Bt)]| ≤ ε.
Note that using the distributions would Bi require that S = [N ] and this could result
in dependencies among the sets Si. This is the reason for introducing the distributions Ai;
we shall later make use of the fact that the selections σi, that come up in the definitions of
the sets Si, are independent.
160
Now, for the sake of contradiction, suppose there exists a size-s formula f on N variables
such that
|E[f(A0)]−E[f(At)]| > ε/2.
By the triangle inequality, there exists an 0 ≤ i < t such that
|E[f(Ai)]−E[f(Ai+1)]| > ε/(2t). (6.1)
Let us say that both the expectations in Equation (6.1) are over
σ1, . . . , σi+1, Y1, . . . , Yi+1, X, U,













Denote Wi = (σ1, . . . , σi, Y1, . . . , Yi, X), and let f ′ be the random function (where the ran-
domness is over Wi) defined as
f ′ = f(Z1|S1 , . . . , Zi|Si , · ).













f ′(Zi+1|Si+1 , U |Si+2∪···∪St∪([N ]\S))
] ]
. (6.3)
Note that, at this point, we can view ρi+1 = (σi+1, U) as a pseudorandom restriction (in
the sense of Lemma 6.22) applied to f ′. Next, let f ′′ be the random function defined as
the restricted function of f ′ under ρi+1 (note that the randomness is over Wi, and also the















Note that in the above, we abuse the notation and use U and Zi+1 to denote U |Si+1 and
Zi+1|Si+1 , respectively.
Next we want to show that the difference between the two expectations in Equation (6.4)
is at most 3ε0 = 3ε/ (10t) ≤ ε/ (2t), which would give a contradiction, by Equation (6.2).
The intuition is the following. On the one hand, f ′′ is obtained by a pseudorandom restriction
ρi+1, and so, with high probability, it has size at most s0. On the other hand, Zi+1 is obtained
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using an extractor that is supposed to extract enough random bits for an s0-independent
generator.
The issue, however, is that f ′′ depends on X, the source sample of the extractor. There-
fore, f ′′ may contain information aboutX, so thatX is not truly random anymore. Nonethe-
less, being a formula of size at most s0, f ′′ cannot contain too much information, and so
cannot take too much entropy away from X. We make this argument more formal next.
Let us define the set of good functions for f ′′, namely
F =
{
g | L(g) ≤ s0 and Pr
Wi,ρi+1
[f ′′ = g] ≥ ε0/scs00
}
,
where c is some constant. Let E denote the event f ′′ ∈ F . We first show the following.
Claim 6.23. It is the case that Pr[¬E ] ≤ 2ε0.
Proof of Claim 6.23. We have
Pr[¬E ] = Pr[(f ′′ /∈ F) ∧ (L(f ′′) > s0)] + Pr[(f ′′ /∈ F) ∧ (L(f ′′) ≤ s0)]
≤ Pr[(L(f ′′) > s0)] + Pr[(f ′′ /∈ F) ∧ (L(f ′′) ≤ s0)].
Note that, by the pseudorandom shrinkage lemma (Lemma 6.22), we have
Pr[L(f ′′) > s0] ≤ ε0;
in fact, our choices of s0 and ε0 were informed by our intention to make the above inequality
hold. Also note that under the condition that L(f ′′) ≤ s0, there can be at most sO(s0)0 choices




(f ′′ /∈ F) ∧ (L(f ′′) ≤ s0)
]
≤ sO(s0)0 · ε0/s
cs0
0 ≤ ε0.
Let us now analyze Equation (6.4) while conditioning on the event E . We show the
following.
Claim 6.24. It is the case that E [f ′′(U) | E ]−E [f ′′(Zi+1) | E ] ≤ ε0.
Proof of Claim 6.24. First note that conditioning on E , X still has a large min-entropy.
More precisely, for every g ∈ F it is the case that
H∞
(
X | f ′′ = g
)
≥ ℵ/2.
This is because, for every x, we have





= 2−(ℵ−log(1/ε0)−c·s0·log s0) ≤ 2−ℵ/2.
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Then, by the definition of the extractor, we have
E
[














f ′′(U) | E
]
,
since s0-wise independent distributions fool size-s0 formulas.
Combining Claim 6.23, Claim 6.24, and Lemma 6.10, we get that the quantity in Equa-
tion (6.4) is at most 3ε0, which leads to a contradiction. This completes the proof of the
correctness.
Locality. To see that the j-th bit of the PRG can be computed using a circuit of size
s1/3 · 2O(log
2/3 s), we observe the following equivalent construction:
1. Compute the j-th bits of the t pseudorandom selections (σ1)j , . . . , (σt)j .
2. Retrieve Yq, where q is the smallest integer such that (σq)j is a star.
3. Compute (Zq)j = Gk(E(X,Yq))j as the j-th bit of the PRG.
Note that Step 1 can be done using a circuit of size t · 2O(log
2/3 s) = s1/3 · 2O(log
2/3 s),
by the pseudorandom shrinkage lemma (Lemma 6.22). Also, Step 2 can be done by first
computing q from the sequence ((σi)j)i∈[t] using a circuit of size Õ(t) (Lemma 6.7), and
then outputting Yq from (Yi)i∈[t] using a circuit of size t · polylog(N) (Lemma 6.8). Finally,
Step 3 can be done by a circuit of size Õ(ℵ) using the efficient extractor (Lemma 6.21) and
the limited-independence generator (Lemma 6.17).
6.5 Almost-quadratic lower bounds against arbitrary basis
formulas and branching programs
Here, we prove MCSP lower bounds against formulas, over an arbitrary basis, and branching
programs. These lower bounds are obtained similarly to those for De Morgan formulas in
the previous section. The idea is to construct strongly local PRGs against these models by
modifying the PRGs in [IMZ19].
The following pseudorandom shrinkage lemma for formulas over an arbitrary basis as
well as branching programs is an analogue of Lemma 6.22.
Lemma 6.25 ([IMZ19, Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 5.3]). There exists a constant c0 > 0 such
that the following holds. For any constant c > c0 and any s ≥ N , let p = s−1/2 and F be a
formula over any basis (or a branching program) on N variables of size s; then, there exists a
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p-regular pseudorandom selection D over N variables that is samplable using r = polylog(N)










c·log s · p · s
]
≤ 2 · s−c.
Moreover, there exists a circuit of size 2O(log2/3 s) such that, given j ∈ {0, 1}logN and a seed
z ∈ {0, 1}r, the circuit computes the j-th bit of D(z).
Using the above pseudorandom shrinkage lemma and an argument as in the proof of the
strongly local PRG against De Morgan formulas (Lemma 6.15), we get the following local
PRGs.
Lemma 6.26. For any s ≥ n, there exists a
(
N, s, s1/2 · 2O(
√
log s))-local PRG against
size-s formulas over an arbitrary basis (or branching programs).
The MCSP lower bound in Theorem 6.2 follows from Lemma 6.26 and Theorem 6.13.
6.6 Improved AC0 lower bounds for MCSP
In this section, we show improved lower bounds for MCSP against constant-depth circuits.
6.6.1 The case of depth d > 2
We first show an improved lower bound against depth-d circuits that almost matches the
lower bound for PARITY.
Theorem 6.27 (Theorem 6.3, restated). For every d > 2 and every constant γ > 0,
any depth-d AC0 circuit computing MCSP on truth tables of length N must have size
2Ω(N1/(d+2+γ)).
The above result is proved using the following structural property of small-depth circuits,
which says that, for any such circuit, there exists some locally computable restriction that
simplifies the circuits to a constant while leaving many variables unrestricted.
Lemma 6.28. For any size-s depth-d circuit C, there exists a restriction ρ ∈ {0, 1, ∗}N
such that
• Cρ is a constant function,
•
∣∣ρ−1(∗)∣∣ ≥ N
O(log s)d−2 − log s, and




such that, given j ∈ {0, 1}logN , the
circuit computes the j-th coordinate of ρ.
We now prove Theorem 6.27 using Lemma 6.28.
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Proof of Theorem 6.27. Let C be a depth-d AC0 circuit on {0, 1}N × {0, 1}logN such that
C computes MCSP on truth tables of length N , and let s be the size of C.




, let C ′ = C(·, λ). Let ρ be a restriction












= C (tt(f) , λ) ,
where C computes MCSP and f : {0, 1}logN → {0, 1} is the following:
f(j) =
0, if ρj = 0 or ρj = ∗,1, if ρj = 1.
By Item 3 of Lemma 6.28, such a function f can be computed by a λ-size circuit. On the
other hand, there can be 2|ρ−1(∗)| different functions corresponding to the different partial
assignments to the unrestricted variables. Since there are at most 2O(λ log λ) different circuits
of size at most λ, in order for C ′ρ to be constant and equal to 1, we must have





which, by a simple calculation, implies s = 2Ω(N1/(d+2+γ)), for any constant γ > 0.
The proof of Lemma 6.28 uses the pseudorandom switching lemma due to Trevisan and
Xue [TX13], which we revisit below. The (pseudorandom) switching lemma says that a
depth-2 circuit is likely to be simplified after being hit by a (pseudo)random restriction.
Below, when we refer to the size of a DNF or CNF we mean the number of its terms or
clauses, respectively.
Lemma 6.29 (Pseudorandom switching lemma, [TX13, Lemma 7]). For any integers d, t >
0, s ≥ N , and any (480/N)1/(d−2) < p < 1 and 0 < ε0 < 1, there exists a distribution D
over {0, 1}N ·log(1/p) × {0, 1}N that ε0-fools
(





[Fρ does not have a depth-t decision tree] ≤ 2t+w+1 · (5pw)w + ε0 · 2(t+1)(2w+log s).
Lemma 6.30 (Following [TX13, Theorem 11]). For any integers d, t > 0, s ≥ N , and any
1/n < p < 1 and 0 < ε0 < 1, there exists a distribution D over {0, 1}N ·log(1/p) × {0, 1}N for
sampling a pseudorandom restriction such that
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22t+1 · (10p log s)t + ε0 · 2(t+1)(2t+log s)
)
,
• with probability at least 2/3 the number of unrestricted variables is p
d−2
80 ·N , and
• there exists a circuit of size d · k · Õ(logN) such that, given j ∈ {0, 1}logN and a seed
z ∈ {0, 1}d·k·O(logN), the circuit computes the j-th coordinate of ρ (as an element in
{0, 1, ∗}), where
k = O
(
(log(s) + t · log(1/p))2 + (log(s) + t · log(1/p)) · log(1/ε0)
)
.
Proof (sketch). The proof is similar to that of Theorem 11 in [TX13]. The idea is to apply
the pseudorandom switching lemma (Lemma 6.29) repeatedly. Each time, we sample a pseu-
dorandom restriction using some distribution that ε0-fools CNFs of size s0 = s·2w·(log(1/p)+1),
for w = t. By Lemma 6.29, each time, with high probability, the two bottom layers can be
computed by depth-t decision trees, so we can switch them to t-DNFs or t-CNFs, and hence
reduce the depth of the circuit by one as we merge them with the layer above.
One difference here from the argument in [TX13] is that we only apply the pseudorandom
switching lemma d−1 times, instead of d times, since we only need the final restricted circuit
to be a t-DNF or t-CNF (rather than a depth-t decision tree as in the original statement
of [TX13], which requires an additional application of the pseudorandom switching lemma).
Note that we use parameter p = 1/40 for the first iteration. Another difference is that,
to sample a pseudorandom restriction, we use a k-wise independent distribution (say over
[1/p]2N ), instead of using the PRG against depth-2 circuits in [DETT10], where
k = O (log(s0/ε0) · log s0) = O
(
(log(s) + t · log(1/p))2 + (log(s) + t · log(1/p)) · log(1/ε0)
)
,
and we use the fact that such a k-wise independent distribution ε0-fools s0-clause CNFs [Tal17b,
Theorem 22].7
Note that the expected number of unrestricted variables is p
d−2
40 ·N . Then Item 2 follows
from the fact that the random restriction is pair-wise independent and Proposition 6.9.
Finally, it is easy to get Item 3 using Lemma 6.17.
We are now ready to show Lemma 6.28.
7The PRG in [DETT10] is based on a small-biased distribution. While it has smaller seed length, compared
to a k-wise independent distribution, it does not seem to offer any advantage in terms of the local circuit
complexity of computing the PRG.
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Proof of Lemma 6.28. By Lemma 6.30, using the parameters t = O(log s), p = 1/O(log s),
and ε0 = 1/2O(log
2 s), we get a restriction ρ0 such that the circuit restricted by ρ0 is a
width-O(log s) DNF or CNF, with probability at least 1− 1/poly(N). Note that, by Item 2
of Lemma 6.30, ρ0 leaves at least NO(log s)d−2 variables unrestricted, with constant probability.
Therefore, by a union bound, with some constant probability, we get a restriction ρ0 that
both simplifies the circuit to be a width-(log s) DNF or CNF and that leaves N
O(log s)d−2
variables unrestricted. Note that once we have such a restriction, we can make the restricted
circuit constant by further fixing at most log s variables; denote this restriction by ρ1. The
final restriction is ρ = ρ0 ◦ ρ1.
We now show the last item. Note that our final restriction consists of two parts, ρ0 and
ρ1, where ρ0 is a restriction from Lemma 6.30 and ρ1 is a restriction that fixes log s variables.
To compute the final restriction, given an index j ∈ {0, 1}logN , we can first check if the
j-th variable is fixed by ρ1 and output the fixing value if it is the case. This can be done by
hard-wiring the log s variables that are fixed by ρ1 and their corresponding fixing values.
It is easy to see that the above can be done using a circuit of size at most O(log s · logN).
Otherwise, we can output the j-th coordinate of ρ0, which can be done with a circuit of size




, by Item 3 of Lemma 6.30.
6.6.2 The case of depth 2
Here, we show that computing MCSP requires depth-2 circuits of almost maximum size.8
Theorem 6.31 (Theorem 6.4, restated). Any CNF or DNF computing MCSP on truth
tables of length N must have size 2Ω(N).
To prove Theorem 6.31, we will utilize the following lemma and corollary.
Lemma 6.32. Let 0 < δ < 1. Any N -variate CNF or DNF of width s ≤ 2δN can be fixed to





Proof. We will show the lemma for the case of DNFs. The proof can be easily adapted to
the case of CNFs. Fix a constant A := 1/
√
δ. We choose the restriction in question in two




variables to get the width of
the DNF down to A log s =
√
δN . In Phase 2, we can easily set any term of the remaining
DNF to fix the function. Since Phase 2 is trivial, let us henceforth focus on Phase 1.
To this end, imagine that we choose a uniformly random input variable xi (for some i)
and set it to a random value. If T is any term in the DNF of size greater than A log s, then
T is set to 0 with probability at least
A log s
2N .
8The results of this subsection exactly follow the guidelines of one of our ToCT reviewers.
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Repeating this process t := 2
√
δN times, we see that the probability that T survives is at
most (









≤ exp(− log s) < 1
s
.





variables such that ρ sets all the terms of width greater than A log s
to 0. This completes Phase 1.
Corollary 6.33. For any size-s depth-2 circuit C, there exists a restriction ρ ∈ {0, 1, ∗}N
such that
• Cρ is a constant function,
•
∣∣ρ−1(∗)∣∣ ≥ Ω(N), and
• there exists a circuit of size log s/Ω(log log s) such that, given j ∈ {0, 1}logN , the
circuit computes the j-th coordinate of ρ.
Proof. By Lemma 6.32. We shall verify that all of three properties of Corollary 6.33 hold
for the restriction ρ that is proved to exist by Lemma 6.32. Items 1 and 2 trivially hold, as
Cρ is a constant by the construction of ρ and
∣∣ρ−1({0, 1})∣∣ = O(√δN), respectively. Item
3 follows by a result of Lupanov [GII+19, Theorem 2.2] for the (biased) Boolean function
that sets all the unrestricted variables to 0.
We are now able to prove the main result of this subsection (Theorem 6.31) by using
Corollary 6.33.
Proof of Theorem 6.31 (sketch). One may prove Theorem 6.31 by using Corollary 6.33 ex-
actly as we did in the proof of Theorem 6.27 with Lemma 6.28.
6.7 MCSP circuit lower bounds from average-case hard func-
tions
6.7.1 The Nisan-Wigderson generator
It is well known in the field of derandomization that, if we have a function that is average-
case hard against some circuit class C, we can get a PRG for C by plugging the hard
function into the Nisan-Wigderson framework [NW94] (provided that the hard function
is not too hard to compute and that C satisfies some mild conditions). The construction
involves computing some combinatorial design with some suitably chosen parameters; a
design is a list of subsets (over some universe) that have some combinatorial properties (see
Definition 6.34). Also, to compute a single bit of such a PRG, we need to compute the
corresponding subset of the design. There are known design constructions such that any
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single subset of the design can be computed efficiently and locally (without computing the
whole design). Therefore, using such a local design, we can get a locally computable PRG
which can be used to obtain an MCSP lower bound against C.
The idea of using Nisan-Wigderson PRGs to study MCSP and related problems has been
explored before (e.g. [ABK+06, OS17, Hir18]). However, the previous works were content
with the fact that the output of a PRG has circuit complexity at most polynomial in the
seed length. Here, we provide a more fine-grained analysis of the local complexity of the
Nisan-Wigderson PRG, which depends on the parameters that we choose for the design, and
in turn will depend on the “usefulness” of the average-case hard function. This allows us to
turn average-case hardness against some circuit class C into a lower bound for MCSP against
the same class, where such a lower bound is more quantitatively linked to the average-case
hardness.
We first review the Nisan-Wigderson framework.
Definition 6.34 (Designs [NW94]). Let N, r, `, α be positive integers. A family of sets
S1, . . . , SN is a (N, r, `, α)-design if
• ∀j ∈ [N ] : Sj ⊆ [r],
• ∀j ∈ [N ] : |Sj | = `, and
• ∀j, k ∈ [s], such that j 6= k, it is the case that |Sj ∩ Sk| ≤ α.
Lemma 6.35 (Local designs). For any positive integers N and α, there exists a (N, r, `, α)-
design such that r = N2/(α+1) and ` = N1/(α+1). Moreover, given any z ∈ {0, 1}r, and any
j ∈ {0, 1}logN , z|Sj ∈ {0, 1}






Proof. Consider the field F` with ` elements. We identify the universe [r] with F` × F` of
size `2. Let {e1, . . . , e`} be the ` elements of the field (in lexicographic order). For each
j ∈ {0, 1}logN , we view j as an element in [`]α+1 and identify it with a degree-α polynomial
pj ∈ F`[x]. Let
Sj = {(e1, pj(e1)) , . . . , (e`, pj(e`))} .
Note that, for all j, the set Sj is a subset of F` × F`, the set Sj has size `, and for two
different sets Sj and Sk we have that |Sj ∩ Sk| ≤ α, as the difference pj−pk is a polynomial
of degree at most α, and thus has at most α roots.








into some circuit, for all k ∈ [`], by using
size ` ·α · log ` = Õ(`). Then computing pj(ek), for any k, can be done with a circuit of size
α · Õ(log `) (using Fact 6.16). As a result, Sj can be computed in size
` · α · Õ(log `) = N1/(α+1) · Õ(logN).
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Once we have the set Sj , we can divide the input z into ` equal-size blocks. For each element
(a, b) in Sj , we output the b-th bit of the a-th block, using Lemma 6.8, in O(`) size. Then,





Definition 6.36 (Average-case hardness). Let C be a class of circuits on N variables. We
say that a function f is (s, ε)-hard against C if, for every C ∈ C of size s, it is the case that
Pr
x∼{0,1}N
[f(x) = C(x)] ≤ 12 + ε.
Let DNFα denote the class of DNF circuits on α variables. Note that every α-variate
Boolean function can be computed by a DNF of size at most 2α.
Theorem 6.37 (Nisan-Wigderson generator [NW94]). Let C be a class of circuits on N
variables of size s. Let S1, . . . , SN be a (N, r, `, α)-design, and let f : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} be
a function that is (s+N · 2α, ε/N)-hard against C ◦ DNFα. Then, the Nisan-Wigderson












is a PRG that ε-fools C.
Combining Theorem 6.37 with the design construction in Lemma 6.35, we immediately
get the following.
Theorem 6.38 (Local Nisan-Wigderson generator). Let C be a class of circuits on N
variables of size s. For any α = α(N, s), if there exists a function f : {0, 1}` → {0, 1},
where ` = N1/(α+1), that is (s+N · 2α, 1/(3N))-hard against C ◦DNFα, then there exists a
(N, s, λ(N, s))-local PRG against C, with




+N1/(α+1) · Õ(logN) + CC(f) .
We remark that the above local Nisan-Wigderson generator has local complexity that
is comparable to its seed length (for this particular local design and modulo the circuit
complexity of the hard function).
6.7.2 Applications
Next we demonstrate the use of such local PRGs in obtaining lower bounds for MCSP from
average-case hardness results.
One of the restricted circuit classes that have been well studied in circuit complexity is
the class of constant-depth circuits augmented with few SYM (symmetric) or THR (linear
threshold) gates (see, e.g., [LVW93, Vio07, LS11, ST18]). A SYM gate computes a symmetric
function, which is a Boolean function whose output depends only on the sum of its input
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variables. A THR gate computes a linear threshold function, which is a Boolean function
defined as the sign of some linear form, over Boolean variables, with real coefficients. We
will combine the above local Nisan-Wigderson framework with the following average-case
lower bounds against the class of constant-depth circuits augmented with a few (sublinearly
many) symmetric and linear threshold gates.
Theorem 6.39 ([ST18, Theorem 4]). There exists a constant τ > 0 such that the following
hold. For any `, there exists a function f : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} that is
(





hard against AC0 circuits of size `τ log ` with at most `0.249 SYM or THR gates. Moreover f
can be computed by a circuit of size O(`).
As a result, we get a local PRG against such circuits.
Corollary 6.40. There exists some constant τ > 0 such that, for any s ≥ N , there exists
a (N, s, λ(N, s))-local PRG against AC0 circuits of size s = `τ log `, for some ` > 0, with at
most `0.249 SYM or THR gates and λ(N, s) = 2O(
√
log s).
Proof. Let C be the class of AC0 circuits of size `τ log `, for some constant τ > 0, with at
most `0.249 SYM or THR gates. Choose
α = τ ′ · logN√
log s
,
where τ ′ > 0 is some sufficiently small constant. Then, for ` = N1/(α+1), if we can
show the existence of some efficiently computable function f : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} that is
(s+N · 2α, 1/(3N))-hard against C ◦ DNFα, then the result follows from Theorem 6.38.
The existence of such a function is given by Theorem 6.39, by noting that for our choice of
α we have







We remark that the above example does not take advantage of the fact that the local
complexity of the Nisan-Wigderson PRG is almost the same as its seed length. This is
because, in this case, the seed length has some arbitrary constant in the exponent.
Combining Corollary 6.40 with Theorem 6.13, we get the following.
Theorem 6.41. There exists a constant γ > 0 such that the following hold. Let C be
the class of constant-depth AC0 circuits augmented with at most 2γ
√
logN SYM or THR
gates. Then, any circuit in C computing MCSP on truth tables of length N must have size
NΩ(logN).
As another application of our framework, combined with the Nisan-Wigderson genera-
tor, we show that separating P/poly (non-uniform circuits of polynomial size) from some
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restricted circuit class, such as TC0 (non-uniform constant-depth polynomial-size circuits
with threshold gates) or NC1 (non-uniform polynomial-size logarithmic-depth circuits), im-
plies MCSP lower bounds against the same class of circuits. More precisely, we show that
if there exists some function in P/poly that is mildly hard against TC0 (resp. NC1), then
MCSP cannot be computed by TC0 (resp. NC1) circuits.
Theorem 6.42. If there exists a function in P/poly that requires size-s TC0 (resp. NC1)
circuits to compute within error 1/poly(n), for some superpolynomial size function s, then
MCSP requires superpolynomial size TC0 (resp. NC1) circuits.
Proof (sketch). Let s(n) = nω(1) and let f = {fn}n, with fn : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}, be a function
that requires size-s(n) TC0 circuits to compute with error at most 1/poly(n). Using standard
hardness amplification tools, such as the direct product theorem and the XOR lemma (see,
e.g., [CIKK16, Section 4]), we can amplify f to a strongly hard on average function within
P/poly. By plugging f into the Nisan-Wigderson construction (Theorem 6.37) we get a local
PRG against TC0; this implies that MCSP /∈ TC0 by Theorem 6.13.
6.8 Open problems
Our De Morgan formula lower bound for MCSP is still slightly weaker than the state-of-the-




logN · (log logN)2
))
.
Can the MCSP lower bound be improved? Are there better constructions of local PRGs
against formulas? Or, are there alternative proofs that do not rely on local PRGs?
What are other restricted models of computation against which we can show MCSP lower
bounds using local PRGs? The recent “random walk PRG” by Chattopadhyay, Hatami,
Hosseini, and Lovett [CHHL18] is also local and can be used to get MCSP lower bounds.
However, as a general PRG that can be used to fool a variety of restricted models, it has
sub-optimal usefulness (which is determined by its seed length) compared to the best-known
lower bounds for most of those models.
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Appendix A
Omitted proofs for Chapter 5
A.1 Useful lemmas for formulas
The proofs in this section are essentially the same as that of [Tal16].
Lemma A.1 ([Tal16], Lemma 5.18 restated). Let D be a distribution over {−1, 1}n, and
let f, C : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} be such that
Pr
x∼D
[C(x) = f(x)] ≥ 1/2 + ε.
Let C̃ : {−1, 1}n → R be a ε-approximating function of C, i.e., for every x ∈ {−1, 1}n,
|C(x)− C̃(x)| ≤ ε. Then,
E
x∼D
[C̃(x) · f(x)] ≥ ε.
Proof. Note that since C̃ ε-approximate C, we have for every x ∈ {−1, 1}n
C̃ · C(x) ≥ 1− ε,
and




[C̃(x) · f(x)] = E
x∼D





[C̃(x) · f(x) | C(x) 6= f(x)] · Pr
x∼D
[C(x) 6= f(x)]
≥ (1− ε) · Pr
x∼D






= 2 · Pr
x∼D
[C(x) = f(x)]− 1− ε
≥ 2 · (1/2 + ε)− 1− ε ≥ ε,
as desired.
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Lemma A.2 ([Tal16], Lemma 5.19 restated). Let D be a distribution over {−1, 1}n and
let G be a class of functions. For f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}, suppose that D : {−1, 1}n →
{−1, 1} ∈ FORMULA[s] ◦ G is such that
Pr
x∼D
[D(x) = f(x)] ≥ 1/2 + ε0.
Then there exists some h : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} ∈ XORO(√s·log(1/ε0)) ◦ G such that
E
x∼D





D = F (g1, g2 . . . , gs)
be a device in FORMULA ◦ G where F is a formula and g1, g2, . . . , gs are function from G.
Let p : {−1, 1}s → R be a ε0-approximating polynomial for F of degree d = O(
√
s ·














∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1 + ε0.
Now let
D̃ := p(g1, g2 . . . , gs).





































The above equation is the sum of at most sO(d) summands. Therefore, there exists some




]∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε0(1 + ε0) · sO(d) ≥ 1sO(√s·log(1/ε0)) ,
which implies that there exists some h, such that either h =
∏









Finally, note that such h can be expressed as the XOR of at most d functions from G.
A.2 PRG for low-communication functions in the number-
in-hand setting
In this subsection, we show how to fool functions with low communication complexity in
the number-in-hand model.
Theorem A.3 ([ASWZ96, INW94], Theorem 5.26 restated). For any k ≥ 2, there exists a
PRG that δ-fools any n-bits functions with k-party number-in-hand deterministic commu-
nication complexity at most D′, with seed length
n/k +O
(
D′ + log(1/δ) + log(k)
)
· log(k).
The PRG in Theorem A.3 is based on the PRG by Impagliazzo, Nisan and Wigder-
son [INW94] that is used to derandomize “network algorithms” and space-bounded compu-
tation. We will need to use randomness extractors, which we review below.
Definition A.4 (Min-entropy). Let X be a random variable. The min-entropy of X, de-
noted by H∞(X), is the largest real number k such that Pr[X = x] ≤ 2−k for every x in
the range of X. If X is a distribution over {−1, 1}ℵ with H∞(X) ≥ k, then X is called a
(ℵ, k)-source.
Definition A.5 (Extractors). A function Ext: {−1, 1}ℵ × {−1, 1}d → {−1, 1}m is an
(k, ε)-extractor if, for any (ℵ, k)-source X, and any test T : {−1, 1}m → {−1, 1}, it is the
case that
|Pr[T (Ext(X,Ud)X) = 1]−Pr[T (Um) = 1]| ≤ ε.
Theorem A.6 ([Vad12, Theorem 6.22]). For any integer m,κ > 0 and 0 < δ′ < 0, there
exists an explicit (κ, δ′) extractor Ext: {0, 1}m × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with d = O(m − k +
log(1/δ′)).
We are now ready to show Theorem A.3.
Proof of Theorem A.3. We first describe the construction of the PRG. In fact, we will con-
struct a sequence of PRGs G0, G1, . . . , Glog(k). We begin by specifying the parameters of
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these PRGs. Let t = log(k), and let
d = O
(
D′ + log(1/δ) + t
)
.
For i = 0, 1, . . . , t, let
• r0 = n/k,
• ri = ri−1 + d.
Note that we have ri = n/k + i · d. Also, let
Exti : {0, 1}ri × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}ri
be a (κi, δ′)-extractor from Theorem A.6, where







Note that the seed length of the extractors is d = O (D′ + log(1/δ) + t). Finally, define
Gi : {0, 1}ri → {0, 1}n/2
t−i
recursively as follows
• G0(a) = a, where a ∈ {0, 1}n/k.
• Gi(a, z) = Gi−1(a) ◦Gi−1(Exti−1(a, z)), where a ∈ {0, 1}ri−1 and z ∈ {0, 1}d.
We will show that Gt : {0, 1}rt=n/k+t·d → {0, 1}n fools any functions f with k-party number-
in-hand deterministic communication complexity at most D′. First, note that such f can
be written as





1 (x1) · h
(i)
2 (x2) · . . . · h
(i)
k (xk),
for some h(i)j : {0, 1}




, j ∈ [k]). Therefore, to show that the PRG Gt




-fools every function g of the form
g(x1, x2, . . . , xk) = h1(x1) · h2(x2) · . . . · hk(xk).
More specifically we show the following.





every function gi : {0, 1}n/2
t−i
→ {0, 1} of the form
gi(x1, x2, . . . , xk/2t−i) = h1(x1) · h2(x2) · . . . · hk/2t−i(xk/2t−i),
where x1, x2, . . . , xk/2t−i ∈ {0, 1}n/k.
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Proof of Claim A.7. The proof is by induction on i. The base case is i = 0, which is trivial
given the definition of G0. Now suppose the claim holds for i − 1, we show the case for i.
This is done using a hybrid argument. Consider the following four distributions
• D1 = Un/2t−i ,
• D2 = Un/2t−i+1 ◦Gi−1(Uri−1),
• D3 = Gi−1(Uri−1)◦Gi−1(U ′ri−1) (U and U
′ are two independent uniform distributions),
• D4 = Gi(Uri).
We want show show that
|E[gi(D1)]−E[gi(D4)]| ≤ 3i · δ′.
By the triangle inequality, it suffices to show that
|E[gi(D1)]−E[gi(D2)]|+ |E[gi(D2)]−E[gi(D3)]|+ |E[gi(D3)]−E[gi(D4)]| ≤ 3i · δ′. (A.1)
We show Equation (A.1) by upper bounding each of the three summands.
First summand. We show that
|E[gi(D1)]−E[gi(D2)]| ≤ 3i−1 · δ′. (A.2)
Let us re-write gi as
































± 3i−1 · δ′
)









± 3i−1 · δ′
= E[gi(D1)]± 3i−1 · δ′,
as desired.
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Second summand. By a similar argument, it can be shown that
|E[gi(D2)]−E[gi(D3)]| ≤ 3i−1 · δ′. (A.3)
We omit the details here.
Third summand. We show that







(where X ∼ {0, 1}ri−1 and Z ∼ {0, 1}d)
= E[A(X) ·B(Exti−1(X,Z))]
(where A(·) = hL(Gi−1(·)) and B(·) = hR(Gi−1(·)))
= E[B(Exti−1(X,Z)) | A(X) = 1] ·Pr[A(X) = 1].
Similarly, we get
E[gi(D3)] = E[B(Uri−1) | A(X) = 1] ·Pr[A(X) = 1].
As a result, we have
|E[gi(D4)]−E[gi(D3)]|
=
∣∣(E[B(Exti−1(X,Z)) | A(X) = 1]−E[B(Uri−1) | A(X) = 1]) ·Pr[A(X) = 1]∣∣ . (A.5)
On the one hand, if Pr[A(X) = 1] ≤ δ′, then Equation (A.5) is at most δ′. On the other
hand, if Pr[A(X) = 1] > δ′, then
H∞(X | A(X) = 1) > ri−1 − log(1/δ′) > ri−1 −D′ − 2t− log(1/δ) = κi−1.
Then by the fact that Exti−1 is a (κi−1, δ′)-extractor, we have∣∣E[B(Exti−1(X,Z)) | A(X) = 1]−E[B(Uri−1) | A(X) = 1]∣∣ ≤ δ′.
Therefore, Equation (A.5) is at most δ′ and this complete the proof of Equation (A.4).
Finally, note that Equation (A.1) follows from Equation (A.2), Equation (A.3) and Equa-
tion (A.4). This completes the proof of Claim A.7.  (Claim A.7)
Given Claim A.7, Theorem 5.26 now follows by letting i = t.  (Theorem A.3)
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Appendix B
Omitted proofs for Chapter 6
B.1 Circuit complexity of the Nisan-Zuckerman extractor:
Proof of Lemma 6.21
In this section, we will describe the construction of the Nisan-Zuckerman extractor [NZ96],
and show that it can be computed by a circuit of almost-linear size.
Lemma B.1 (Lemma 6.21, restated). There exists an extractor E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d →
{0, 1}m that is an (n/2, ε)-extractor with m = Ω(n) and d = polylog(n/ε). Moreover, E can
be computed by a circuit of size n · polylog(n/ε).
In proving Lemma 6.21, we start with some definitions. The extractor works for sources of
high min-entropy.
Definition B.2 (Dense source). We say that a distribution over {0, 1}n is a δ-source if it
has min-entropy at least δ · n.
Definition B.3 (Block-wise source). A distribution X = (X1, . . . , Xs) over {0, 1}`1 ×· · ·×
{0, 1}`s is called a block-wise δ-source if, for every x1, . . . , xi−1, Xi|X1=x1,...,Xi−1=xi−1 is a
δ-source (i.e., has min-entropy at least δ · `i).
The extractor will make use of universal hashing, which we define below.
Definition B.4 (k-wise independent hashing). A family of hash functions H = {h : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m} is called k-wise independent if, for any x1, . . . , xk ∈ {0, 1}n, where x1, . . . , xk are
distinct, and y1, . . . , yk ∈ {0, 1}m, we have
Pr
h∼H
[h(x1) = y1 ∧ · · · ∧ h(xk) = yk] = (1/2m)k .
H is also called a universal hash family if it is 2-wise independent.
It is easy to see that any k-wise independent hashing family can be defined using some k-wise
independent distribution. As a result, by Lemma 6.17, we have the following construction
of k-wise independent hash families.
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Lemma B.5. There exists a k-wise independent hash family H = {h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m}
such that, given any h ∈ H, as a kn-bit string, the function h can be computed by a circuit
of size k · Õ(max{n,m}).
The Nisan-Zuckerman extractor consists of two parts. The first part, block-wise source
conversion, takes the source of high min-entropy and converts it into an almost block-wise
source by building a list of “blocks”. The second part, block-wise source extraction, takes
the resulting block-wise source of the previous part and extracts the randomness “block-by-
block”, using some hash-based extractor. Next, we describe some basic component functions
as well as how they are combined to perform the respective task of each part. The main focus
here is around the circuit complexity of these procedures and we will not get into details
about their correctness. Interested readers are referred to [NZ96, Section 5] for details on
the correctness.
In the following, we only work with δ-sources and block-wise δ′-sources where δ and δ′ are
constants.
Block-wise source converter D. This function has the following parameters:
• n, the size of the original input;
• δ, the quality of the input source;
• `1 ≤ · · · ≤ `s ≤ n, the size of each block; and
• k, the amount of independence used.
We first describe how to build one block using a function that we call B. To build the
i-th block, on input x ∈ {0, 1}n and yi ∈ {0, 1}k logn, the function B first divides x into `i
contiguous disjoint sets A1, . . . , A`i , each of size mi = n/`i. It then uses the (k logn)-bit
string yi to pick, k-wise independently, j1, . . . , j`i , where jq ∈ [mi], for each q ∈ [`i], and
outputs the `i-bit vector (
(A1)j1 , . . . , (A`i)j`i
)
.
The block-wise source converter D works as follows.
1. Input: x ∈ {0, 1}n and y1, . . . , ys ∈ {0, 1}k logn.
2. Output: (B(x, y1), . . . , B(x, ys)) ∈ {0, 1}`1 × · · · × {0, 1}`s .
Nisan and Zuckerman [NZ96] showed that if the input x is from a δ-source and k =
O (log(1/ε)), then, for all but at most a ε/4 fraction of the seeds y1, . . . , ys, the output
of the function D is (ε/4)-close to a block-wise δ′-source, where δ′ = Ω(δ/ log(1/δ)).
Claim B.6. The function D can be computed using a circuit of size s · k · Õ(n).
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Proof. It is sufficient to show that outputting the i-th block takes a circuit of size k · Õ(n).
On input yi ∈ {0, 1}k·logn, we can compute, using Lemma 6.17, (j1, . . . , j`i) ∈ [mi]`i with a
circuit of size
`i · k · Õ(log(mi · `i)) = k · Õ(n).
Then, for each index jq, with q ∈ [`i], we can compute (Aq)jq using a circuit of size O(mi)
(by Lemma 6.8).
Block-wise source extractor C. This function has s+ 1 parameters:
• δ′, the quality of the block source, and
• `1, . . . , `s, the block sizes. Here, `i−1`i = 1 +
δ′
4 , for all 1 < i ≤ s.
The way the block-wise source extractor C works is described below.
1. Input: x1 ∈ {0, 1}`1 , . . . , xs ∈ {0, 1}`s and y0 ∈ {0, 1}2`s .
2. For each i, we consider a universal family of hash functions,
Hi =
{





given by Lemma B.5, and each function in Hi is by 2`i bits.
3. hs ← y0.
4. For i← s down to 1: hi−1 ← hi ◦ hi(xi), where “◦” denotes string concatenation.
5. Output: h0, excluding the bits in hs. Note that this output is a string in {0, 1}m.
It was shown in [NZ96] that if x1, . . . , xs are chosen from a block-wise δ′-source and y0 is





Claim B.7. The function C can be computed using a circuit of size s · Õ(`1).
Proof. Note that, given hi ∈ {0, 1}2`i and xi ∈ {0, 1}`i , we can compute hi(xi) using a
circuit of size Õ(`i) (by Lemma B.5). Then, to compute h0, we need to compute hi for




The above is at most s · Õ(`1), since `1 is the largest among `1, . . . , `s.
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The final extractor E. The parameters are:
• n, the size of the input source;
• δ, where 1/n ≤ δ ≤ 1/2, the quality of the input source;
• ε, where 2−δn ≤ ε ≤ 1/n, the quality of the output distribution;
• δ′ = Θ(δ/ log(1/δ));
• `0 = Θ(δ2n/ log(1/δ)); `i = `i−1/(1+δ′/4) for each 0 < i < s, with s = O(log(n) log(1/δ)/δ);
therefore, `s = log(1/ε) log(1/δ)/δ;
• k = O(log(1/ε)).
The following is a description of the extractor E:
1. Input: x1 ∈ {0, 1}n, y1, . . . , ys ∈ {0, 1}k logn, y0 ∈ {0, 1}2`s .
2. Output: C(D(x, y1, . . . , ys), y0). (Here, D and C are used with the parameters spec-
ified above.)
It was shown in [NZ96] that if x is from a δ-source and the y’s are uniform, then the output
of the function E is ε-close to a uniform m-bit string, where m = Ω(δ2n/ log(1/δ)).
Claim B.8. The function E can be computed using a circuit of size n · polylog(n/ε).
Proof. This follows easily from Claim B.6 and Claim B.7.
B.2 The IMZ PRG is “almost strongly local”
Here, we show that the IMZ PRG [IMZ19] is “almost strongly local”, in the sense that, for
most of its seeds, the output of the PRG can be computed by some circuit of size comparable
to its seed length.
Lemma B.9. For any s ≥ N , there exists a PRG G : {0, 1}r → {0, 1}N that 1/poly(N)-
fools De Morgan formulas in N variables of size s, where r = s1/3 · 2O(log
2/3 s). Moreover,
for at least a fraction of 1− 1/poly(N) of the seeds z ∈ {0, 1}r, the function defined as
gz(j) = G(z)j
can be computed by a circuit of size s1/3 · 2O(log
2/3 s).
It is easy to see that such a PRG is sufficient to obtain MCSP lower bounds using our
framework (see Theorem 6.13).
We first need a version of the pseudorandom shrinkage lemma, in which we select and fix
the variables both in a pseudorandom manner (note that in Lemma 6.22 we select the
variables pseudorandomly and then fix the variables in a truly-random manner). Such a
pseudorandom shrinkage lemma is provided in [IMZ19].
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Lemma B.10 (Pseudorandom shrinkage lemma, [IMZ12b, Lemma 4.8]). There exists a
constant c0 > 0 such that the following hold. For any constant c > c0, any s ≥ N , p ≥
s−1/2, and any De Morgan formula F on N variables of size s, there exists a p-regular





2/3 s · p2 · s] ≤ s−c.
Moreover, there exists a circuit of size 2O(log2/3 s) such that, given j ∈ {0, 1}logN and a seed
z ∈ {0, 1}r, the circuit computes the j-th coordinate of D(z).
We are now ready to show Lemma B.9.
Proof of Lemma B.9. The construction is essentially that of [IMZ19]. We use the same
parameters as those in the proof of Lemma 6.15.
The PRG first samples t independent pseudorandom restrictions using Lemma B.10. For
each of the restrictions, the PRG replaces the ∗ coordinates with the output of some extrac-
tor (in fact, it is the output of some limited-independence generator that takes the output
of the extractor as a seed). After the ∗ coordinates are replaced in each restriction, the PRG
XORs, coordinate-wisely, the t binary strings.
More formally, the PRG takes as input a seed
(X,Y1, . . . , Yt, γ1, . . . , γt) ∈ {0, 1}r ,
where
• X ∈ {0, 1}ℵ is the min-entropy source sample of an extractor,
• Yi ∈ {0, 1}polylog(N), for each i ∈ [t], is the seed of an extractor, and
• γi ∈ {0, 1}`, for each i ∈ [t], is the seed for sampling a pseudorandom restriction.
Then, the j-th bit of the PRG is the XOR of a sequence of bits (U1)j , . . . , (Ut)j , where
for each i ∈ [t] the value of (Ui)j depends on the value of (ρi)j , where ρi is a p-regular
pseudorandom restriction sampled from Lemma B.10 with seed γi. Specifically,
(Ui)j =
{
(ρi)j , if (ρi)j 6= ∗, and
(Zi)j = Gk(E(X,Yi))j , if (ρi)j = ∗,
where E : {0, 1}ℵ×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}Ω(ℵ) is an (ℵ/2, ε)-extractor and Gk : {0, 1}rk → {0, 1}N
is a k-independent generator. It was shown in [IMZ19] that the PRG constructed as above
ε-fools De Morgan formulas of size s.
Note that, for each i ∈ [t] and j ∈ [N ], (ρi)j can be computed by a circuit of size M1 =
2O(log2/3 s) (Lemma B.10). Also, using Lemma 6.21 and Lemma 6.17, (Zi)j can be computed
by a circuit of size M2 = Õ(ℵ) = s1/3+o(1).
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To compute the j-th bit of the PRG, we need to have the values (U1)j , . . . , (Ut)j . It seems
that we need to compute both (ρi)j (which is cheap to compute) and (Zi)j (which is ex-
pensive to compute) for all i ∈ [t], which seems to require size at least t · M2 ≥ s2/3.
However, we want to compute this with a circuit of size s1/3. The key observation here is
that we do not need to compute (Zi)j for all the i values; we only need to compute (Zi)j
for those i’s such that the j-th coordinate of the i-th pseudorandom restriction is a star
(i.e., (ρi)j = ∗). Since the j-th coordinate is a star with probability p, we can expect to see
only p · t ≤ O(logN) stars in the sequence ((ρi)j)i∈[t]. In fact, since the t pseudorandom
restrictions are independently sampled, by a standard concentration bound, with very high
probability, we only see polylog(N) stars in the sequence. Then, a union bound over the N
coordinates yields that, with high probability over the ρ’s, we only have polylog(N) stars in
((ρi)j)i∈[t], for all j ∈ [N ]. Therefore, for each of these “good” seeds, to compute the j-th
bit of the PRG, we can first compute the sequence ((ρi)j)i∈[t] (which can be done with a
circuit of size t ·M1). Then, for each i such that the j-th coordinate of the i-th restriction
is a star (there are only polylog(N) such i values), we compute (Zi)j . This can be done by
a circuit of size polylog(N) ·M2.
We provide a sketch of how to implement a circuit performing the above task. First, we need
to compute the sequence ((ρi)j)i∈[t], which can be done by a circuit of size t·2
O(log2/3 s). Then,
we need to find the i’s for which we need to compute (Zi)j and select the corresponding Yi’s.
This can be done by using divide and conquer and t “bins” with fixed polylog(N) “slots”,
each of size log t, to store those indices i. Here, each slot is a set of gates that hold the bits
of an index i and each bin is a set of slots.
More specifically, we will look through (ρi)j for i ∈ [t] and “copy” to the bin those i’s for
which (ρi)j = ∗. For the first step, we store the index “1” to the leftmost slot of the bin if
and only if (ρ1)j = ∗. At the next step, we look at the current bin and the next index, say
i′. We then create a new bin which holds all the indices in the previous bin and also i′ if and
only if (ρ1)j = ∗; here, the indices are stored in the leftmost slots and the rest of the slots
are marked as “empty”. Since each bin is of size polylog(N) and merging the current bin
with a new index can be done in polynomial time (which implies that it can be done by a
polylog(N)-size circuit), each step can be done by a circuit of size at most polylog(N). After
t steps, we will have a bin that stores all of the star indices (some of the slots in the bin can
be empty). Therefore, the whole procedure can be done by a circuit of size O(t) ·polylog(N).
Once we have the indices, we retrieve the corresponding Yi’s (using Lemma 6.8). We then
compute the extractor on each of these Yi’s (with the same min-entropy source sample X)
and apply the limited-independence generator on the output of the extractor to get the j-th
bit for each of those i’s. We also need to make sure that we produce only 0 for those i’s
that come from the “empty” slots, in the bin where the indices are stored. Once we have
those bits, we XOR them and then we XOR the resulting bit with the non-star values in
((ρi)j)i∈[t]. The XOR of the non-star values can be obtained by taking the XOR of the
values in ((ρi)j)i∈[t] and by treating the stars as 0’s.
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